
Qass_ 



/ 



Book 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



S HISTORICAL RAID, 



THE MEMOIRS 



IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECORD. 



A REVIEW BASED UPON COMPILATIONS FROM 
THE FILES OF THE WAR OFFICE. 



t* — n flfc^ 

H! V? BOYNTCW, 



WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT OP THE CINCINNATI GAZETTE. 



CINCINNATI: \ } 

WILSTACH, BALDWIN & CO., 

1875. 






SS 6SS+ 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, by 
WILSTACH, BALDWIN & CO., 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congi-ess, at Washington. 



PREFACE. 



General Sherman in the introduction to his Memoirs, 

says: 

"What is now offered is not designed as a history of the war, or even as a 
complete account of all the incidents in which the writer bore a part ; but merely 
as bis recollection of events, corrected by a reference to his own memoranda, 
which may assist the future historian when he comes to describe the whole, 
and account for the motives and reasons which influenced some of the actors 
in the grand drama of the war." 

The object of the present compilation, chiefly from the offi- 
cial records, is to show wherein the Memoirs of General Sher- 
man fall far short of presenting the correct history of many 
great events of which they treat; how much they lack of 
giving a complete account of incidents which they relate; how 
far the author's recollection, even when corrected by his own 
memoranda, is at fault; and to furnish the future historian 
with facts which will guard him against perpetuating the error 
and the injustice which pervade both volumes of the work. 

This book is a criticism upon Sherman as a general, only so 
far as the official records presented furnish such criticism. 
There is no attempt to contradict his statements, except as the 
records contradict them. Wherever these show that he has 
done grave injustice both to the living and to the dead, they 
are produced with as little comment as is needed to set them 
in connected order, and point out the refutations which they 
contain. While by this method of review, his mistakes only 

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4 PEEFACE. 

are presented, there has been no intention to underrate the 
great and brilliant services which he performed. 

If these pages serve in any degree to correct error and do 
justice, where error uncorrected, and injustice done, affect the 
reputations of men or officers, who, either in humble position 
or exalted station, freely periled their lives, or laid them down 
for the country, the object for which they have been written 
will be accomplished. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAP. PAGE 

I. — Introductory 7 

IX — Forts Henry and Donelson — The Credit which Sher- 
man Denies Grant 10 

III. — Shiloh — The Question of Surprise — Unfair Treatment 

OF BuELL AND HIS ARMY 25 

IV. — Iuka and Second Corinth — General Eosecrans Misrep- 
resented 44 

V. — Chickasaw Bayou — Plunging an Army Through Swamps 

and Against Impregnable Bluffs .... 54 

VI. — Chattanooga and Chickamauga — Injustice to Eosecrans, 

Thomas, and the Army of the Cumberland . . 65 

VII. — The Meridian Campaign — Unjust Arraignment of Gen- 
eral W. Sooy Smith 89 

VIII. — Eesaca — The Failure There Attributed to McPherson 96 

IX. — Kenesaw — Ungenerous Treatment of Thomas; Inaccu- 
rate Statements 107 

X. — The Battle of Atlanta and its Political Generals . 119 

XI. — The March to the Sea — Did Grant or Sherman Plan 

It? 128 

XII. — Hardee's Escape from Savannah 162 

XIII. — Affairs at Nashville Criticised from Savannah . 173 

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6 CONTENTS. 

CHAP. PAGE 

XIV. — Thomas' Troubles at Nashville — The History of his 

Contemplated Eemoval 183 

XV. — The Captured Cotton at Savannah — Character of the 
Attack on Secretary Stanton; The Jeff. Davis 
Gold 198 

XVI. — Battle of Bentonville — The Careless Advance of an 

Army 208 

XVII. — The Terms with Johnston — First Draft Made by a 
Confederate Cabinet Officer — Fac-Simile of the 
Original 219 

XVIII. — Opinions of Jeff. Davis' Cabinet Officers on Sher- 
man's Terms 244 

XIX. — Sneers at the Staff — The Controversy with the War 

Department Over the Control of the Staff Corps 259 

XX. — Conclusion — The Case Against the Memoirs Summed Up 272 



CHAPTER I, 



INTRODUCTORY. 



General Sherman is one of the most popular heroes of 
the late war. He has published his book after ten years of 
reflection upon events in which he bore most conspicuous and 
honorable part. During these years he has had uninterrupted 
access to the official records, including their most confidential 
papers; and in view of his high position, his opportunities 
for intimate knowledge and his popularity, what he has now 
written will, in spite of himself, be accepted as history by 
most readers who have not the means of testing his story by 
the records. It is believed that the extracts from these, pre- 
sented in this volume, will prove sufficient to thoroughly 
fortify General Sherman in the claim that his book is not 
history, and so in part prevent the injustice which will be 
done to many distinguished officers and brave armies, if what 
he has written be received as accurate. No criticisms of the 
strategy or the tactics of General Sherman will be found in 
these pages, except such as are plainly called forth by the 
records produced. 

High as is the position which he occupies, great as is the 
authority with which he speaks, there is nothing in either 
which should afford him the least protection in the eyes of his 
countrymen, if he be found detracting from the merit or the 
fame which belongs to his associates. 

It might be pardoned in one who accomplished so much if 
he had contented himself with moderately magnifying his own 
achievements, but when he goes beyond this, and claims the 

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8 INTRODUCTORY. 

merit which belongs to others, and steps still beyond and 
attempts to belittle the deeds of men in no respect his 
inferiors as generals or soldiers, and does cruel injustice to 
whole armies, the harmless vanity of the successful general 
becomes the gigantic wrong of the false historian. 

In a broad and high sense, the merit of every man who 
bore a musket faithfully, and slept finally in the grave of the 
"unknown/' is as great as his. His Memoirs arraign the 
dead as well as the living. The files of the War Department 
afford an answer for both. These orders, letters, telegrams, 
and reports, written either before, at the time, or immediately 
after the occurrence of the events ordered, in progress, or 
accomplished, photographed the truth, and in these the living 
and the dead find just defense. Here Thomas, McPherson, 
Stanton, and their companions, speak for themselves, and 
vindicate themselves from unjust aspersions. Here, in short, 
truth is made manifest, and exact justice done. 

The position which General Sherman occupies now, and 
that which he held during the war, will naturally, and of nec- 
essity, give the force of history to what he has written, in 
spite of any disclaimer he may make, and this historical 
character will attach to these Memoirs so long as they remain 
uncorrected by the official record. 

For the benefit of comrades living, who can not conveni- 
ently consult these records, and especially in vindication of 
such as are dead, it should be esteemed a duty by all who can 
reach the files, to search them carefully, with a view to over- 
throw error and establish truth. So far as General Sherman's 
book conforms to official papers, their production can only 
strengthen him; so far as it fails to agree with these, it not 
only deserves to be condemned, but its condemnation should 
be measured by the prominence of the author and his abund- 
ant facilities for obtaining accurate information. 

Judged by the official record, the verdict must be that the 
work is intensely egotistical, unreliable, and cruelly unjust to 
nearly all his distinguished associates. Our erratic General 



INTRODUCTORY. 9 

thrusts his pen recklessly through reputations which are as 
dear to the country as his own. He detracts from what right 
fully belongs to Grant; misrepresents and belittles Thomas ; 
withholds justice from Buell, repeatedly loads failures for 
which he was responsible, now upon Thomas, now upon 
Schofield, now upon McPherson, and again upon the three 
jointly; is unjust in the extreme to Rosecrans; sneers at 
Logan and Blair; insults Hooker, and slanders Stanton. 

The salient points of the long story are readily found by 
those who either followed, or made themselves familiar by 
study with his campaigns. The reader turns naturally for 
explanations of the surprise and attending disgrace at Shiloh ; 
the ill-judged and fatal assault at Chickasaw Bayou ; the 
protest against the move by which Vicksburg was captured ; 
his failure to carry the point assigned him at the battle of 
Chattanooga; the escape of Johnston from Dalton and Resaca; 
the terrible mistake of the assault on Kenesaw; the plunging 
of his army, marching by the flank, into Hood's line of battle 
under the supposition that Atlanta was evacuated; the escape 
of the rebel army from Savannah ; the careless and inexcus- 
able periling and narrow escape of his own army at Benton- 
ville ; and lastly, the political surrender to Johnston at 
Raleigh: these are points upon which every reader desires 
light. But instead of gaining it, he finds that for most, the 
chief aim of the author seems to be to make the darkness 
more impenetrable. 

The succeeding chapters will treat, in their order, of the 
prominent movements and battles which General Sherman 
passes in review in his Memoirs, and in each of these the ver- 
sion of his book will be compared with the facts as disclosed 
by the records now on file in the War Department. 



CHAPTER II. 

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON — THE CREDIT WHICH SHER- 
MAN DENIES TO GRANT. 

Of the many remarkable things in General Sherman's book 
few will excite more comment than the deliberate attempt to 
take from General Grant the credit which belongs to him 
for several very important movements, and either assign it to 
others, as in the case of the move against Forts Henry and 
Donelson, or appropriate it for himself, as is done in claiming 
that he planned the "March to the Sea." No one general 
officer of his rank was under greater obligations to another 
throughout the war than Sherman to Grant, and on this 
account any unjust treatment of the latter deserves severer 
condemnation. 

General Sherman wrote his book while in Washington. A 
staff officer at his headquarters copied the rough manuscript 
daily. All the records of the War Department, including re- 
ports, field telegrams, and all other species of official corres- 
pondence pertaining to every movement of which he wrote, 
and arranged for ready reference, were at his disposal. He 
had only to ask for them, or to send an orderly after them. And 
yet, incredible as it may seem, he scarcely availed himself of 
this collection of records, but wrote from memory and from some 
portions of these which happened to be in his own possession. 

In reviewing the campaign up the Cumberland and Tennes- 
see Rivers, Sherman thus gives the credit to Halleck — or to 
"Cullum or I"— on page 219 of Vol. I: 

"Though it was midwinter, General Hal leek was pushing his preparations 
most vigorously, and surely he brought order out of chaos in St. Louis with 

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FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 11 

commendable energy. I remember one night sitting in his room, on the sec- 
ond floor of the Planters' House, with him and General Cullum, his chief of 
staff, talking of things generally, and the subject then was of the much-talked- 
of 'advance,' as soon as the season would permit. Most people urged the 
movement down the Mississippi River ; but Generals Polk and Pillow had a 
large rebel force with heavy guns in a very strong position at Columbus, Ky., 
about eighteen miles below Cairo ; Commodore Foote had his gun-boat fleet at 
Cairo ; and General U. S. Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting 
a large force at Paducah, Cairo, and Bird's Point. General Halleck had a 
map on his table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, 'Where is the 
rebel line? ' Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Forts Donelson 
and Henry, and Columbus, Ky. ' That is their line,' said Halleck ; ' now where 
is the proper place to break it ?' And either Cullum or I said, ' Naturally the 
center.' Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other, near its middle, 
and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River, and 
he said, ' That's the true line of operations.' 

" This occurred more than a month before General Grant began the move- 
ment, and as he was subject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given 
General Halleck the full credit for that movement, which was skillful, suc- 
cessful, and extremely rich in military results; indeed it was the first real 
success on our side in the civil war. The movement up the Tennessee began 
about the 1st of February, and Fort Henry was captured by the joint action 
of the navy under Commodore Foote, and the land forces under General 
Grant, on the 6th of February, 1862. About the same time General S. R. 
Curtis had moved forward from Rolla, and on the 8th of March, defeated the 
rebels under McCulloch, Van Porn and Price at Pea Ridge. 

"As soon as Fort Henry fell, General Grant marched straight across to 
Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, invested the place, and, as soon as 
the gun-boats had come round from the Tennessee, and had bombarded the 
water front, he assaulted; whereupon Buckner surrendered the garrison of 
twelve thousand men, Pillow and ex-Secretary of War General Floyd having 
personally escaped across the river at night, occasioning a good deal of fun 
and criticism at their expense." 

If General Sherman had taken the trouble to send for Gen- 
eral Halleck's letter-book for the time he mentions above, he 
would have found a letter to General McClellan, then General- 
in-Chief of the army, showing that he (Halleck) had no settled 
plans for a movement up the Cumberland and the Tennessee, 
and only general ideas of it at most, and that he did not ex- 
pect such a movement could take place till long after the time 
General Grant actually captured both Forts Henry and Donel- 
son, and effectually opened these rivers. 



12 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

This letter, lying at General Sherman's very elbow, is dated 
at Headquarters Department of the Missouri, St. Louis, Jan- 
uarv 20, 1862. The following extracts are sufficient to settle 
the question at issue : 

I have received no information in respect to the general plan of campaign, 
and therefore feel much hesitation in recommending any line of operations for 
these and other troops which I may be able to withdraw from Missouri. Of 
course this line must be subordinate to some general plan. I take it for 
granted General, that what has heretofore been done has been the result of 
political policy rather than military strategy, and that the want of success on 
our part is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals. * 

I am aware General, that you are in no way responsible for this; these 
movements have been governed by political expediency, and in many cases 
directed by politicians in order to subserve party interest. * * But 

is it not possible, with the new Seoretary of War, to introduce a different pol- 
icy, and make our future movements in accordance with military principles. 
On this supposition I venture to make a few suggestions in regard to opera- 
tions in the West. 

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is in my opinion im- 
practicable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of operations, at 
least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and 
Tennessee, making Nashville the present objective point. This would threaten 
Columbus, and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. * * * * 

This line of the Cumberland and the Tennessee is the great central line of 
the Western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River 
as the base, and two great navigable rivers extending far into the theater of op- 
erations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force — not less 
than sixty thousand effective men. * * '* The main central line will also 
require the withdrawal of all available troops from this State, also those in 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which are armed, or still to be 
armed, and also the transfer to that route, or near it, of all the Kentucky 
troops not required to secure the line of Green River. 

The force at Cairo and on the Ohio River below the mouth of Green River 
is now about fifteen thousand. Seven regiments have just been ordered there 
from Missouri. 

By the middle or last of February I hope to send fifteen thousand more. 
If thirty thousand or forty thousand can be added from the sources indicated, 
these will be sufficient for holding Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and form 
the column proposed. * * * * 

These suggestions are hastily written out, but they are the result of much anx- 
ious inquiry and mature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly 
carried out, will produce important results. I also believe it to be feasible. 

I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement; that must 



FORTS HENRY AND DC-NELSON. 13 

be a matter for further study, if the general idea should be approved. Per- 
haps the main column should move from Smithland, between the rivers, by 
Dover, etc. Perhaps the line east of the Cumberland, or that west of the 
Tennessee, would be preferable. These questions, however, are matters easily 
determined. * * * 

H. W. .Halleck:, Major- General. 

As General Grant formally proposed, on January 28th, to 
General Halleek to take Fort Henry, captured it on the 6th 
of February, moved on Fort Donelson the next day, and took 
it on the 16th of February, it will be seen from the above 
letter, that General Halleck, at the time Grant had accom- 
plished this work and opened both rivers, did not expect 
to have men enough by thirty or forty thousand to begin the 
vague movement he had in his mind. 

But if General Sherman had searched the records with the 
least care he would have found that even these identical ideas 
of Halleck, about a move on a line perpendicular to one join- 
ing Bowling Green and Columbus were suggested by General 
Buell. 

For the records show that as early as November of the pre- 
ceding year, Buell had proposed to General McClellan to move 
around the right flank of the rebels at Bowling Green, and 
advance on Nashville, while supplies and troops from Halleck 
should move up the Cumberland, guarded by the fleet. General 
McClellan urged cooperation on Halleck, who delayed answer- 
ing dispatches for some time. Finally, on January 3d, at the 
request of President Lincoln, General Buell wrote General 
Halleck, setting forth most of the ideas that Halleck afterward 
submitted as his own to McClellan, and which are given above 
in the letter dated January 20th. 

The records give a connected history of the discussion at 
this time between the authorities at Washington, and Generals 
Buell and Halleck. 

Washington, D. C, December 31, 18fi1. 
General Buell, Louisville, Ky. 

General McClellan is sick. Are General Halleck and yourself in concert? 
When you move on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from 
Columbus? Answer. A. Lincoln. 



14 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

Louisville, Ky., January 1, 1862. 
To A. Lincoln, President. 

There is no arrangement between General Ilalleck and myself. I have 
been informed by General McClellan that he would make suitable disposition 
for concerted action. 

There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reenforced from Colum- 
bus, if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place. 

D. C. Buell, Brigadier-General 

Louisville, 11 P. M., January 1, 1862. 
To President Lincoln. 

I have already telegraphed General Halleck with a view to arranging a 
concert of action between us, and am momentarily expecting his answer. 

D. C Buell, Brigadier General. 

Washington, D. C, December 31, 1861. 
General Halleck, St. Louis. 

General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? 
When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from 
Columbus? A simultaneous move by you on Columbus might prevent it. 
Answer. A. LINCOLN. 

Headquarters Department or the Missouri,) 
St. Louis, January 1, 1S02. j 

A. Lincoln, President U. S. A., Washington. 

I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to co- 
operate with him ; hope to do so in a few weeks. Have written fully on this 
subject to General McClellan. Too much haste will ruin everything here. 

H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 

Louisville, Ky., January 1, 1S62. 
Major- General Halleck, St. Louis. 

I understand General McClellan is sick. Has any concerted action been 
arranged for us? If not, can any be arranged between us? If possible, it is 
desirable it should be done speedily. 

D. C. Buell, Brigadier- General commanding. 

Headquarters Department of the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, January 2, 1862. J 
Brigadier- General Buell, Louisville. 

I have had no instructions respecting cooperation. All my available troops 
are in the field, except those at Cairo and Paducah, which are barely sufficient 
to threaten Columbus, etc. A few weeks hence I hope to be able to render 
you very material assistance, but now a withdrawal of my troops from this 
State is almost impossible. Write me fully. 

H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 15 

Headquarters Department of the Ohio, } 
Louisville, January 3, 1862. J 

General W. H. Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri. 

Generax: I received your dispatch, and, with more delay than I meant, 
proceed to the subject of it, in compliance with your request, and I may add 
also, at the wish of the President. 

I do not underrate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it is not extrava- 
gant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arranged on 
a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center 
about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee and 
Cumberland Rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below, It 
is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their force on that line at 
eighty thousand men, including a column about Somerset, Ky. In rear of 
their right flank it is more. 

Of their force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowling Green, twenty 
thousand at Columbus — though you, doubtless, have more information on 
that point than I have — -and twenty thousand at the center. Considering the 
railroad facilities, which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on 
any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance of a com- 
bined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which 
may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole 
front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus 
and the center are concerned, more attention than I have. With reference to 
the former, at least, I can make no more than the general suggestion already 
expressed, that it should be fully occupied. 

The attack upon the center should be made by two gun-boat expeditions, 
with, I should say. twenty thousand men on the two rivers. They should, of 
course, be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers; and 
whether they should be of equal or unequal strength, would depend upon 
that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment 
of departure. The mode of attack must depend on the strength of the enemy 
at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first 
importance to break the railroad communication, and, if possible, that should 
be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and 
Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some 
thirty-one miles above the first principal battery that I know of at Dover. 
The other is eighteen miles above Fort Henry — the first I know of on the 
Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work 
alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, 
and remain at least until they ascertained that reinforcements from my col- 
umns, or some other source, would not reach them. By uniting, they could 
establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gun-boats. 

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any 
iefinite plan for your side. Whatever is done should be done speedily, within 



16 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me 
hear from you at once. Very truly yours, 

D. C Buell, Brigadier- General commanding. 

Four days later General Buell telegraphed as follows: 

Louisville, January 7, 1862. 
General Halleck, St. Louis. 

I am telegraphed by the President. Can you fix a day for concerted action *? 

D. C. Buell, Brigadier- General. 

To which Halleck replied: 

St. Louis, January 1, 1862. 
General Buell, Louisville. 

Designate a day for a demonstration. I can do nothing more. See my letter 
of yesterday. H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 

The letter thus referred to was as follows : 

Headquarters Department op the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, January 6, 1862. f 

Brigadier- General D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky. 

General : I have delayed writing to you for several days in hopes of get- 
ting some favorable news from the South-west. The news received to-day, 
however, is unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near 
Springfield, and that all our available forces will be required to dislodge and 
drive him out. 

My last advices from Columbus represent that the enemy has about twenty- 
two thousand men there. I have only about fifteen thousand at Cairo, Fort 
Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at these places I could not send 
into the field over ten or eleven thousand. Moreover, many of these are very 
imperfectly armed. 

Under these circumstances, it would be madness for me to attempt any 
serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus. ProDably, in the 
course of a few weeks, I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo and 
Paducah to cooperate with you, but at present it is impossible; and it seems 
to me that, if you deem such cooperation necessary to your success, your 
movement on Bowling Green should be delayed. I know nothing of the plan 
of campaign, never having received any information on the subject; but it 
strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah, or Cairo, against an 
enemy at Bowling Green, is a plain case of exterior lines, like that of 
McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of the exterior columns is 
superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 17 

On the 6th of January McClellan wrote to Buell as follows : 
"Halleck, from his own accounts, will not soon be in condi- 
tion to support properly a movement up the Cumberland." 
And again on the 13th: "Halleck is not yet in condition to 
afford you the support you need when you undertake the 
movement on Bowling Green." 

On the 10th of January Halleck telegraphed Buell: 

Headquarters Department op the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, January 10, 1862. J 
General Buell, Louisville. 

Troops at Cairo and Paducah are ready for a demonstration on Mayfield, 
Murray, and Dover. Six additional regiments will be there next week. Fix 
the day when you wish a demonstration ; but put it off as long as possible, in 
order that I may increase the strength of the force. 

H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 

On the same day Halleck telegraphed Grant : " Reinforce- 
ments are receiving arms. Delay your movements until I 
telegraph. Let me know when the channel is clear." 

And on the next day : " I can hear nothing from Buell, so 
fix your own time for the advance. Three regiments will 
come down Monday." 

Subsequently the following passed between Halleck and 
Buell: 

St. Louis, February 2, 1862. 
Brigadier- General Buell, Louisville, Ky. 

General : Yours of the 30th ultimo is received. At present it is only 
proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover, and, if possible, cut 
the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green. * * * But it will 
take some time to get troops ready to advance far south of Fort Henry. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

H. W. Halleck, Major General. 

St. Louis, February 1, 1862. 
To General Buell, Louisville. 

You say you regret that we could not have consulted on tbis matter earlier. 
So do I most sincerely. I had no idea of commencing the movement before 
the 15th or 20th inst., until I received General McClellan's telegram about 
the reinforcements sent to Tennessee and Kentucky by Beauregard. Although 

2 



18 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

not ready, I deemed it important to move instantly. I believe I was right. 
Fort Henry must be held at all hazards. 

H. W. Halleck, Major- General. 

From all of which it will appear that General Halleck had 
not originated, up to the time General Grant was ready to 
execute it, any such move as the latter was anxious and 
waiting to make, and General McClellan did not even con- 
sider Halleck as prepared to afford a support. 

As a matter of fact, General Grant began preparations for 
the move he had in contemplation the latter part of Decem- 
ber, and consequently before the date of the correspond- 
ence between President Lincoln and Generals Buell and 
Halleck. Nor is there any thing in the records to indicate 
that General McClellan, the President, or General Buell com- 
municated with General Grant upon the subject of a move up 
the Tennessee or Cumberland. In fact, as he was subordinate 
to General Halleck, they would not have written him directly. 

On the 6th of January, 1862, General Grant, then in com- 
mand at Cairo, telegraphed to General Halleck for permission 
to visit St. Louis, for the purpose of obtaining authority from 
General Halleck to move against Forts Henry and Donelson. 
At first, leave to visit headquarters was refused ; but on the 
22d of January it was granted, and on the 23d Grant started 
for St. Louis, called on Halleck, and suggested a move on 
Fort Henry. According to Badeau, who wrote by authority, 
when Grant " attempted to broach the subject, Halleck 
silenced him so quickly and sharply that Grant said no more 
on the matter, and went back to Cairo with the idea that his 
commander thought him guilty of proposing a great military 
blunder." 

Grant, however, had been quietly engaged for three weeks 
in preparing for this move, had studied it carefully, and quite 
set his heart upon it. He was the more convinced of its fea- 
sibility, from a report of a partial reconnoissance of Fort 
Henry, made by General C. F. Smith, and forwarded to Gen- 
eral Halleck on January 24th. 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 19 

Upon reaching Cairo he telegraphed Halleck : 

Cairo, January 28, 1862. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. 

With permission I will take Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish 
and hold a large camp there. U. 8. Grant, Brigadier-General. 

On the same day Commodore Foote, then in command of 
the gnn-boats in that section, and in full accord with General 
Grant, also telegraphed Halleck as follows : 

Cairo, January 28, 1862. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. 

Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, 
on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and 
troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that 
purpose when ready ? A. H. Foote, Flag Officer 

On the 29th General Grant wrote Halleck as follows: 

Hradquarters District of Cairo,) 
Cairo, January 29, L862. J 

Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis Mo. 

In view of the large force now concentrating in this district, and the present 
feasibility of the plan, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing 
Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. 
If this is not done soon, there is but little doubt but that the defenses on both 
the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers will be materially strengthened. 
From Fort Henry it will be easy to operate, either on the Cumberland, only 
twelve miles distant, Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides, have a moral 
effect upon our troops to advance them toward the rebel States. The advan- 
tages of this move are as perceptible to the General commanding as to 
myself, therefore, further statements are unnecessary. 

U. S. Grant, Brigadier-General. 

To these dispatches of Grant and Commodore Foote, Hal- 
leck replied: 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,) 

St. Louis, January 29, 1862. J 
Brigadier-General Grant, Cairo. 

Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. I will send you 
written instructions by mail. H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 



20 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON 

Department of 
St. Louis, January 29, 1862 



Headquarters Department of the Missouri, ) 



Commodore Foote, Cairo- 

I am waiting for General Smith's report on the road from Smithland to 
Fort Henry. As soon as that is received will give orders. In the meantime 
have every tiling ready. H. W. Halleck, Major- General 

On the 1st of February permission to make the movement 
arrived from Halleck, and on the 2d Grant began the cam- 
paign with seventeen thousand men, less than one-third the 
force Halleck had in mind for the operations he thought 
might be carried on along this general line. On the 6th. of 
February Fort Henry was taken, and on the 8th Grant tele- 
graphed Halleck that he should immediately take Fort Don- 
elson and return to Fort Henry. 

On the 16th he had accomplished the work, and the cam- 
paign for which Halleck wanted "not less than sixty thousand 
effective men," thirty thousand of which he hoped to have 
" by the middle or last of February," had been made a suc- 
cess by Grant with a force of seventeen thousand men and 
four gun-boats. 

General Sherman closes the chapter in which he treats of 
the movements on Forts Henry and Donelson as follows : 

" From the time I had left Kentucky General Buell had really made no 
substantial progress ; though strongly reenforced, beyond even what I had 
asked for, General Albert Sidney Johnston had remained at Bowling Green 
until his line was broken at Henry and Donelson, when he let go Bowling 
Green and fell back hastily to Nashville , and on Buell's approach he did 
not even tarry there, but continued his retreat southward." 

Three chapters previous to the one containing this unkind 
allusion to General Buell, General Sherman, writing of his 
selection as Superintendent of the Louisiana Military College, 
says : " For this honorable position I was indebted to Major 
D. C. Buell and General G. Mason Graham, to whom I have 
made full and due acknowledgment." 

While the General of the army should have felt himself, by 
virtue of his position and opportunities for obtaining exact 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 21 

information, under strong obligations to correctly present all 
matters of which he wrote, he was thus peculiarly bound to 
treat General Buell with common fairness. But in the above 
extract he wholly ignores the fact that after he left Ken- 
tucky, General Buell had organized and made efficient the 
Army of the Ohio, which, from that time forward, under 
Buell, Rosecrans, and Thomas, held high rank among the 
armies of the Union. A portion of it under General Buell's 
directions and the immediate command of General Thomas, 
had broken the Confederate right at Mill Springs, killed the 
commander of its army, captured its fortified camp, with all 
its artillery, several thousand stand of small arms, transporta- 
tion, and stores, and there achieved a victory which at the 
time was regarded by the nation as a most important one. 
It was the Western Bull Run for the Confederacy. General 
Thomas, in his report upon the battle, thus speaks of the 
captures : 

" On reaching the intrenchments we found that the enemy had abandoned 
every thing and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of artillery, with 
their caissons packed with ammunition, one battery wagon and two forges, a 
large amount of small arms, mostly the old flint-lock muskets, and ammuni- 
tion for the same, one hundred and fifty or sixty wagons, and upward of one 
thousand of horses and mules, a large amount of commissary stores, intrench- 
ing tools, and camp and garrison equipage, fell into our hands. A correct 
list of all the captured property will be forwarded as soon as it can be made 
up and the property secured. 

"The steam and ferry-boats having been burned by the enemy on their re- 
treat, it was found impossible to cross the river and pursue them ; besides, 
their command was completely demoralized, and retreated with great haste 
and in all directions, making their capture in any numbers quite doubtful if 
pursued." 

Besides this, General Buell had contributed a considerable 
force to aid General Grant in the movement on Fort Donel- 
son, and Bowling Green was evacuted in the face of an 
advance upon it by General Buell, and before Fort Donelson 
had fallen. 

But whether any "substantial progress" had been made by 



22 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

General Buell after General Sherman left Kentucky, will best 
appear from portions of three letters written by General Sher- 
man while in Kentucky, the first two bearing date about ten 
days before he relieved General Robert Anderson in com- 
mand, and the third about a week before he was in turn 
relieved by General Buell. Muldraugh's Hill is about forty 
miles south of Louisville, on the railroad to Nashville, and 
was one of the first points of consequence occupied on that 
line by the Union forces. General Sherman gives the follow- 
ing account of the movement upon it, and the condition of 
affairs after his troops were established there : 

Headquarters Muldraugh's Hill, ]_ 
September 27, ]861. J 

Captain Oliver D. Green, Adjutant-General. 

Sir: When I left Louisville on the cars in charge of the Home Guards, 
followed by Rosseau's hrigade, I understood my orders to be to station parties 
aloug the road at all the bridges, secure the road and occupy Muldraugh's 
Hill. * 

This is not an isolated hill, but a range separating the waters of the Rolling 
Fork of Salt Creek and Green River, the ascent from the north being very 
abrupt, and the descent to the south being very gradual. 

Our position is far from being a strong one when held against a superior 
force. Roads will enable the enemy with cavalry to pass round us and cut 
ofl'our communications and starve us out. I have no safe line of retreat, but 
must stand our ground let what will happen. 

Our opponents, led by General Buckner, who is familiar with the ground, 
are now supposed to be along the railroad from Green River to Bowling 
Green. Their forces are variously estimated from seven thousand to twenty 
thousand men ; and, I doubt not, they have fifteen thousand, some well and 
some poorly armed, but all actuated by the one purpose to destroy us. I am 
fully alive to the danger of our position and to all its disadvantages, especially 
that of supplies. Our provisions have been hauled up the rugged valley of 
Clear Creek by hired wagons, and by some which were brought along by the 
Thirty-ninth Indiana. We can barely supply our wants, and are liable at 
any moment to have these wagons seized. The reason I came to Muldraugh's 
Hill was for effect. Had it fallen into the hands of our enemy the cause 
would have been lost, and even with it in our possession for a week nobody 
has rallied to our support. I expected, as we had reason to, that the people 
of Kentucky would rally to our support, but, on the contrary, none have 
joined us, while hundreds, we are told, are going to Bowling Green. The 
railroad from Bowling Green toward us is broken at Nolin, ten miles off, and 
and at another trestle beyond some seven miles. I doubt if this was done by 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 23 

Buckner's orders, but rather by the small parties of guards left to protect 
them and who are scared at our approach. I have from time to time given 
you telegraphic notice of these events, and must now await the develop- 
ments 

We should have here at least twenty thousand men, but that has been an 
imposibility. Truly yours, 

W. T. Sherman, Brigadier- General. 

From this first letter it appears how "the cause would have 
been lost" if the enemy had gained Muldraugh's Hill. The 
second one shows how the conduct of the Union troops after 
securing the Hill, was about to "ruin our cause." 

Headquarters Muldraugh's Hill, 1 
September 29, 1861. j 
General Robert Anderson, Louisville, Ky. 

Dear General : I am sorry to report that in spite of my orders and 
entreaties, our troops are committing depredations that will ruin our cause. 
Horses and wagons have been seized, cattle, sheep, hogs, chickens, taken by 
our men, some of whom wander for miles around. I am doing and have 
done all in my power to stop this, but the men are badly disciplined and give 
little heed to my orders or those of their own regimental officers. "We have 
received no accessions from the country, and I have only a lew weak, scattered 
camps, such as Curran Pope's at New Haven, and General Ward's at Green- 
burg. Of course, the chief design of our occupying Muldraugh's Hill was to 
aflbrd an opportunity for the people to organize and arm, but I can not learn 
that such is the ease. 

A great many people come into our camps, take the oath of allegiance and 
go away. I have no doubt spies could enter our camp and we can not con- 
ceal the strength of our command. Although Buckner is not at Green River 
he has many locomotives and ears there, and can march from there in a day 
or a day and a half, and I feel uneasy about our communications. The 
Home Guards have all returned, leaving us whom they deem outsiders alone, 
and the whole country would raise round about us, leaving us with an 
ambush all the way. To be effective, a force here should be very large, too 
large to be attacked in position. As to us we could make a good fight, but 
would soon be starved out. I know how you are situated and will do my 
best, and only want you not to draw too strong inferences from the destruc- 
tion of the Green River bridges. This was, no doubt, intended as an obstruc- 
tion to our advance, until other designs of their's were completed, hut as soon 
as Buckner is ready, he will surely advance on Elizabethtown where lie live-. 
I hear nothing of Thomas' moves or those at Padueah. Our lines are broken 
and I have sent down to examine. W. T. Sherman. 



24 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

The third letter was written a few days before he was 
relieved by General Buell : 

Hradquarters Department of the Cumberland, ) 
Louisville, November 6, 1861. } 
General L. Thomas, Adjutant- General. 

Sir : General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily the situation 
of affairs here. * * * * We should have here a very large force, 
sufficient to give confidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should 
be done — possess ourselves of all the State. But all see and feel we are 
brought to a stand still, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our 
present force it would be simple madness to cross Green River, and yet 
hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner the other columns are in peril, 
not so much in front as rear; the railroads over which our stores must pass 
being much exposed. I have the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regi- 
ments, yet it is far from being safe, and the moment actual hostilities com- 
mence these roads will be interrupted and we will be in a dilemma. To 
meet this in part, I have put a cargo of provisions at the month of Salt River 
guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weaken the main force 
and endanger the whole. Do not conclude, as before, that I exaggerate the 
facts. They are as stated, and the future looks as dark as possible. It would 
be better if some man of sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order 
according to my convictions. Yours truly, 

W. T. Sherman, Brigadier-General commanding. 

In the light of these letters it would seem as if there had 
really been most "substantial progress" under General Buell 
after General Sherman left Kentucky. 



CHAPTER III. 

SHILOH THE QUESTION OF SURPRISE; UNFAIR TREATMENT 

OF BUELL AND HIS ARMY. 

After the extended discussions over the events preceding 
and attending the battle of Shiloh, in some of which contro- 
versies General Sherman himself participated, and all of which 
have called out extracts from the official records, that, taken 
together, effectually settle some of the earlier questions in 
dispute, it must surprise all readers of the Memoirs to find 
their author ignoring these records, and at this late day pre- 
senting many inaccurate statements in regard to the operations 
about Pittsburgh Landing. 

The main questions at issue have always been whether the 
Union army was surprised at Shiloh; if it was, who was 
mainly responsible, and how far Buell's army can lay claim 
to having made the victory possible? 

General Sherman labors ingeniously, but inaccurately, as 
the official records show, to relieve himself from responsi- 
bility for it, and even attempts to create the impression that 
there was no general surprise. Ever since this battle, most 
who believed that the Union army w r as unexpectedly attacked 
on that occasion, have laid the chief load of responsibility 
upon General Grant, and he through all these years has made 
no effort to shift the burden. But now it will appear through 
the records which these Memoirs have called out, that General 
Sherman was mainly responsible, since he was encamped in 
advance; his division, as he wrote to the United States Service 
Magazine in 1865, "forming as it were the outlying picket," 
so that he was in charge of the picket front looking toward 

(25) 



26 SIIILOH. 

the roads over which an enenry must approach; and while not 
technically in command of the entire camp, in the absence of 
General Grant, whose headquarters were at Savannah, some 
twelve miles distant, he was constantly treated, trusted, and 
consulted by General Grant, as if he were the senior officer at 
the front. General Sherman, holding' steadily till the last, 
and against all evidence, to the belief that no immediate attack 
was probable, by impressing his convictions upon General 
Grant, misled the latter as to the real condition of affairs 
along the front, and thus did the author of the Memoirs 
become primarily responsible for the surprise. 

The records disclose both the blindness which prevailed as 
to the real situation, and where the responsibility for it mainly 
rested, and some comparison of these, with the statements of 
the Memoirs, will set the case in a clear light. 

On the 14th of March General C. F. Smith, then in com- 
mand at Savannah previous to the arrival of General Grant, 
"'instructed me" — writes General Sherman — "to disembark 
my own division and that of General Hurlbut at Pittsburgh 
Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for 
his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in 
person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the 
railroad contemplated by General Halleck's orders." 

"On the 16th we disembarked and marched out about ten miles toward 
Corinth to a place called Monterey or Pea Ridge, where the rebels had a cav- 
alry regiment, which, of course, decamped on our approach, but from the 
people we learned that trains were bringing large masses of men from every 
direction into Corinth."-Page 228, Vol. I. 

It might be supposed that such knowledge would have 
made General Sherman very watchful when he afterward 
encamped at Shiloh. And yet with this important fact ascer- 
tained, when he took position there, instead of camping in 
line of battle, he stationed three of his brigades a mile and a 
half from Hurlbut's division, and the fourth over two miles 
from the rest. Other divisions, as they arrived, selected 



SHILOH. 27 

camps to suit themselves. There was no line of battle deter- 
mined, no rifle pits dug, none of the simplest forms of obstruc- 
tions provided, and no sufficient picketing, as the result 
proved. And Sherman was the senior officer on the main 
front. 

"On the 18th Hurlbut disembarked his division and took post about a mile 
and a half out, near where the roads branched — one leading to Corinth, the 
other toward Hamburgh. On the 19th I disembarked my division and took 
post about three miles back; three of the brigades covering the roads to 
Purdy and Corinth, and the other brigade, .Stuart's, temporarily at a place on 
the Hamburgh road. * * * Within a few days Prentiss' division 
arrived and camped on my left, and afterward McClernand's and W. H. 
L. Wallace's divisions were formed in a line to our rear. * * 

General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah in chief command, and I 
was only responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on the 
roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside and outside my 
lines." 

Of the events immediately preceding the battle, General 
Sherman writes as follows: 

"I always acted on the supposition that we were an invading army; that 
our purpose was to move forward in force, make a lodgment on the Memphis 
& Charleston Road, and thus repeat the grand tactics of Fort Donelson, by 
separating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and on the Mis- 
sissippi River. We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we 
had no orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw 
men timid. The position was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our 
right, a deep, bold stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front, 
and Lick Creek, with a similar confluent on our left, thus narrowing the space 
over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles. 

"At a later period of the war we could have rendered this position impreg- 
nable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and it may be it is well 
we did not. From about the 1st of April we were conscious that the rebel 
cavalry in our front were getting bolder and more saucy; and on Friday, the 
4th of April, it dashed down and carried off one of our picket guards, com- 
posed of an officer and seven men, posted a coupleof miles out on the Corinth 
road. Colonel Buck land sent a company to its relief, then followed himself 
with a regiment, and, fearing lest in- might be worsted, I culled out his whole 
brigade, and followed some four or five miles, when the cavalry in advance 
encountered artillery. I then, after dark, drew back to our lines and reported 
the fact by letter to General Grant at Savannah; but thus far (night of the 
4th) we had not positively detected the presence of infantry, lor cavalry regi- 



28 SHILOH. 

ments generally had a couple of guns along, and I supposed the guns that 
opened on us on the evening of Friday, April 4th, belonged to the cavalry 
that was hovering along our whole front. 

"Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event, the weather 
being wet and mild, and the roads back to the steamboat landing being heavy 
witli mud ; but, on Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good deal of 
picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out along my lines, and, about fqur 
hundred yards to the front of Appier's regiment, received from some bushes 
in a ravine to the left front, a volley, which killed my orderly, Holliday. 
About the same time I saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on 
us as far as the eye could reach. All my troops were in line of battle ready, 
and the ground was favorable to us. I gave the necessary orders to the bat- 
tery (Waterhouse's ) attached to Hildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men 
to reserve their fire till the rebels had crossed the ravine of Owl Creek, and 
had begun the ascent; also sent staff officers to notify Generals McClernand 
and Prentiss of the coming blow. Indeed, McClernand had already sent three 
regiments to the support of my left flank, and they were in position when the 
onset came. 

" In a few minutes the battle of ' Shiloh ' began with extreme fury and lasted 
two days."— Pages 229-230, Vol. I. 

In August following the battle of Shiloh, when its events 
were fresh in his mind, General Sherman was sworn as a wit- 
ness in the trial of Colonel Thos. Worthington, Forty-sixth 
Ohio Volunteers, who had severely criticized the management 
of the former previous to the battle. The following extracts 
from the official report of that testimony bear upon the ques- 
tions under consideration; and some of them flatly contra- 
dict the statements of the book. This is notably the case upon 
the very important point whether Sherman had reason to know 
as early as Friday before the fight, that the enemy was in force 
in his immediate front. 

General W. T. Sherman, sworn and examined: 

"He (Colonel Worthington) says 'a slight abattis might have prevented an 
attack.' What business was it of his whether his superior officer invited an 
attack or not? The Army Regulations will show him that no fortification 
can be made except under order of the commanding general. To have 
erected fortifications would have been an evidence of weakness, and would 
have invited an attack. * * * And here I mention, for future 
history, that our right flank was well guarded by Owl and Snake Creeks, our 
left by Lick Creek, leaving us simply to guard our front. No stronger posi- 



SHILOH. 29 

tion was ever held by an army. Therefore, on Friday, two days before the 
battle, when Colonel Worthington was so apprehensive, I knew there was 
no hostile party within six miles, though there was reason to expect an 
attack. I suppose Colonel McDowell, like myself, had become tired of his 
constant prognostications, and paid no attention to him, especially When we 
were positively informed by men like Buckland, Kilby Smith, and Major 
Kicker, who went to the front to look for enemies, instead of going to the 
landing; and here I will state that Pittsburgh Landing was not chosen by 
General Grant, but by Major-General Smith. I received orders from Gen- 
ersl Smith, and took post accordingly ; so did General Hurlbut ; so did his 
own division. The lines of McClernand and Prentiss were selected by 
Colonel McPherson. I will not insult General Smith's memory by criti- 
cizing his selection of a field. It was not looked to so much for defense as 
for ground on which our army could be organized for offense. We did 
not occupy too much ground. General Buell's forces had been expected 
rightfully for two weeks, and a place was left for his forces, although Gen- 
eral Grant afterward had determined to send Buell to Hamburgh as a separate 
command. 

" But even as we were on the 6th of April, you might search the world over 
and not find a more advantageous field of battle — flanks well protected, and 
never threatened, troops in easy support ; timber and broken ground giving 
good points to rally, and the proof is that forty-three thousand men, of whom 
at least ten thousand ran away, held their ground against sixty thousand 
chosen troops of the South with their best leaders. On Friday, the 4th, nor 
officer, nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington looked for an attack, as I 
can prove. 

"On Friday, April 4th, our pickets were disposed as follows: McDowell's 
brigade, embracing Worthington's regiment, looked to Owl Creek Bridge, and 
had nothing to do with any other road. Buckland and Hildebrand covered 
our line to the main Corinth road. Pickets, one company to a regiment, 
were thrown forward a mile and a half to the front, videttes a mile further, 
making a chain of sentinels. About noon of that day, Buckland's adjutant 
came to my tent and reported that a lieutenant and seven men of his guard 
had left their posts and were missing — probably picked up by a small cavalry 
force which had hovered around for some days, and which I had failed to 
bag. I immediately dispatched Major Kicker with all my cavalry in a tre- 
mendous rain to the front. Soon after I heard distant musketry, and finally 
three cannon shots, which I knew must be the enemy, as we had- none there. 
This was the first positive information any intelligent mind on that field had 
of any approaching force. Before that, no scout, no officer, no responsible 
man, had seen an infantry or artillery soldier nearer than Monterey, five 
miles out. For weeks and months we had heard all sorts of reports, just as 
we do now. For weeks old women had reported that Beauregard was coming, 
sometimes with one hundred thousand ; sometimes with three hundred thou- 
sand ; when, in fact, he did not leave Corinth until after even Colonel Worth- 



30 SHILOH. 

ington had been alarmed for safety. As soon as I heard the cannon, I and 
my staff were in the saddle and off to the front. We overtook a party of 
Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigades going forward to the relief of the 
pickets. On reaching a position in advance of the guard-house, a mile and a 
half from Shiloh, they deployed into line of battle and I awaited the return 
of my cavalry and infantry, still to our front. 

" Colonel Buckland and Major Bicker soon returned and reported encoun- 
tering infantry, artillery, and cavalry near the fallen timbers six miles in 
front of our camp. We then knew that we had the elements of an army in 
our front, but did not know its strength or destination. The guard was 
strengthened, and, as night came on we returned to camp, and not a man in 
camp but knew we had an enemy to the front before we slept that night. 
But even I had to guess its purpose. No general could have detected or 
reported the approach of an enemy more promptly than was done." 

The positive contradiction between these statements, and 
those of the book which deny that infantry and artillery 
had been discovered as early as Friday afternoon, will be 
observed. 

On that very afternoon, however, General Sherman had 
written to General Grant, giving the result of the cavalry 
reconnoissance. That this did not agree with the present 
statement, that up to the night of the 4th, "we had not 
positively detected the presence of infantry," the following 
report by General Grant will show : 

Headquarters Department West Tennessee, \ 
Savannah, April 5, 1862. J 

General H. W. Haeleck, Commanding Department of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo. 

General: Just as my letter of yesterday to Captain McLean, Assistant- 
Adjutant-General, was finished, notices from Generals McClernand's and Sher- 
man's Assistant-Adjutant-Generals were received, stating that our outposts 
had been attacked by the enemy apparently in strong force. I immediately 
went up, but found all quiet The enemy took two officers and four or five 
of our men prisoners, and killed four. We took eight prisoners, and killed 
several; number of the enemy wounded not known. They had with them 
three pieces of artillery, and cavalry and infantry. How much can not, of 
course, be estimated. 

I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack being made upon us (general 
one), but will be prepared should such a thing take place. General Nelson's 
division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's column will arrive 
to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg, 



SHILOH. 31 

some four or five miles above Pittsburgh, when they all get here. From that 
point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction can he formed with the 
troops from Pittsburgh at almost any point. * 

I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant. 

U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

Immediately after the battle, General Sherman appears to 
have been won over to the idea that an abattis might be valu- 
able as a protection to his camp, for in a compilation of his 
orders, made under his own direction, the very first of them 
which appears after the engagement, contains the following 
paragraph : 

"Each brigade commander will examine carefully his immediate front; fell 
trees to afford his men a barricade, and clear away all underbrush for two 
hundred yards in front, so as to uncover an approaching enemy; with these 
precautions, we can hold our camp against any amount of force that can be 
brought against us." 

There is no indication that General Sherman considered 
this order either an evidence of weakness, or an invitation to 
attack, or as calculated to make his "raw men timid." 

That General Halleck supposed the officers in charge of 
the camp had taken means to strengthen their position, is 
shown by the following telegram: 

Headquarters Department (if the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, April 8, 1862. J 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

The enemy attacked our works at Pittsburgh, Tennessee, yesterday, but was 

repulsed with heavy loss. No details given. 

H. W. Halleck, Major-Gem nil. 

General Buckland and Major Bicker have both written an 
account of the reconnoissance on the 4th. Starting at '2 r. m., 
General Buckland had come up with the enemy's cavalry 
about two miles in front of the camp. Of what happened, 
what was seen, and what reported to General Sherman, Gen- 
eral Buckland thus writes: 

"We pursued about a mile, when the enemy commenced firing artillery 



32 SHILOH. 

at ua. We discovered that he had a large force of infantry and artillery. 
We therefore concluded to march back to camp with as little delay as 
possible. , 

"When we reached the picket lines, General Sherman was there with several 
regiments in line of battle. As I rode up to General Sherman at the head 
of my column, with about fifteen prisoners close behind me, the General 
asked me what I had been doing. His manner indicated that he was not 
pleased. I replied that I had accidentally got into a little fight, and there 
were some of the fruits of it, pointing to the prisoners. He answered that 
I might have drawn the whole army into a fight before they were ready, and 
ordered me to take my men to camp. Soon after reaching camp, one of 
General Sherman's aids came and said the General desired me to send him a 
written statement of what I had done and seen that day, which I did the same 
evening. General Sherman afterward informed me that he sent the state- 
ment to General Grant the same night. 

"The next day, Saturday April 5th, I visited the picket line several times, 
and found that the woods were swarming with rebel cavalry along the entire 
front of my line, and the pickets claimed to have discovered infantry and 
artillery. Several times during the day I reported these facts to General 
Sherman. Colonel Hilderbrand, of the Third Brigade, and other officers, 
visited the picket line with me during the day. It was well understood all 
that day and night throughout Sherman's division, that there was a large 
rebel force immediately in our front. I consulted with Colonels Cockrell and 
Sullivan as to the proper measures to prevent a surprise. The pickets were 
strengthened, and Colonel Cockrell sent two companies of the Seventieth Ohio 
to take a position where they could best support the pickets in case of an 
attack. I also established a line of sentinels from my camp to the reserve of 
the pickets. Every officer in my brigade was fully aware of the danger, and 
such precautions were taken that a surprise was impossible." * * * 

Concerning the same reconnoissance, Major Kicker wrote as 
follows : 

* « * » "When we got back to the picket lines we found General Sher- 
man there with infantry and artillery in line of battle, caused by the heavy 
firing of the enemy on us. General Sherman asked me what was up. I told 
him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's army, that he was 
advancing on us. General Sherman said it could not be possible, Beauregard 
was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations and attack us in ours — 
mere reconnoissance in force." 

General Bragg's official report shows that this reconnoitering 
party was really pushed up to the immediate vicinity of three 



SHILOH. 33 

corps of the Confederate army. Of the movement from 
Monterey to the battle-field, Bragg says: 

"Moving from there, the command bivouacked for the night near the 
Meckey House, immediately in rear of Major-General Hardee's corps, Major- 
General Polk's being just in our rear * * * A reconnoissance in 
some force from the enemy made its appearance during the evening in front 
of General Hardee's corps, and was promptly driven back." 

The following extracts from various official reports of the 
battle, bear pointedly upon the question of a surprise. General 
John McArthur, commanding Second Division, says: 

"We had been in line but a few moments when the enemy made their ap- 
pearance and attacked my left wing." 

Colonel R. P. Buckland, Fourth Brigade, Sherman's divis- 
ion, says: 

"Between six and seven o'clock on Sunday morning, I was informed that 
our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the 
brigade on the color line, which was promptly done. About this time I was 
informed that the pickets were being driven in. I ordered the Forty -eighth 
Regiment, Colonel Sullivan, to advance in support of the pickets, which he 
did, but discovered that the enemy had advanced in force to the creek, about 
eighty to one hundred rods in front. I immediately ordered the brigade to 
advance in line of battle. We had marched about thirty to forty rods, when 
we discovered the enemy and opened fire upon him along the whole line, 
which checked his advance and caused him to fall back." 

Colonel J. R. Cockerell, commanding Seventieth Ohio, says : 

"On Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, an alarm was made in the front of 
this brigade, and I called my regiment from breakfast and formed it in line 
of battle on the color line. I then heard heavy firing on the left and in front 
of our line, and advanced my regiment about two hundred paces in the 
woods, and formed line of battle in pursuance of your order. I ordered my 
regiment to open fire, with the left thrown back, and did great execution 
among the enemy, who retired into the hollow." 

Colonel Hilderbrand, commanding Third Brigade, Sher- 
man's division, says: 

" Early on the morning of Sunday, 6th inst., our pickets were fired on, and 
3 



34 SHILOH. 

shortly after seven o'clock the enemy appeared in force, presenting himself in 
columns of regiments at least four deep. He opened upon our camp a heavy 
fire from infantry, which was immediately followed by shell. Having formed 
my brigade in line of battle, I ordered an advance. The Seventy-seventh and 
Fifty-seventh Regiments were thrown forward to occupy a certain position, 
but encountered the enemy in force within three hundred yards of oui 
camp." 

Captain Samuel E. Barrett, commanding First Regiment 
Illinois Artillery, says: 

"We were stationed near the outposts, and on the alarm being given, at 
about half past seven o'clock on Sunday morning, the battery was promptly 
got in readiness, and in ten minutes thereafter commenced firing on the right 
of the log church, some one hundred yards in front of General Sherman's 
headquarters, where the attack was made by the enemy in great force." 

Lieutenant-Colonel Parlin, commanding Forty-eighth Ohio 
Infantry, says : 

" On the morning of the 6th our regiment met the enemy about two hun- 
dred yards in front of our color line; they came upon us so suddenly that for 
a short time our men wavered, but soon rallied again, when we kept him 
back for two hours and until General Sherman ordered us to fall back to the 
Purdy road." 

As to the distances of the picket from his front, and the 
limits reached by his reconnoissance, it is notable that General 
Sherman fixes them much further from camp than all the 
other officers who have given testimony or made statements 
upon these points. 

An officer of General Beauregard's staff, who was helping 
direct the rebel advance, wrote thus of the matter: 

"The total absence of cavalry pickets from General Grant's army was a mat- 
ter of perfect amazement. There were absolutely none on Grant's left, where 
Breckinridge's division was meeting him, so that we were able to come up 
within hearing of their drums entirely unperceived. The Southern generals 
always kept cavalry pickets out for miles, even when no enemy was supposed 
to be within a day's march of them The infantry pickets of Grant's forces 
were not above three-fourths of a mile from his advance camps, and they were 
too few to make any resistance." 

The officers of General Thomas' army, who had charge of 



SHILOH. 35 

the pickets a few days after the battle, rode over the line from 
which the rebels moved to the attack. Every whore were signs 
of the deliberation with which the enemy formed his forces. 
The routes by which each corps and division of the first line 
was to march to its position in the woods, were blazed upon 
the trees, and the entire force of the enemy went into line for 
the attack wholly undisturbed, and with as much order and 
precision, as if forming upon markers for a grand review. 
And the time that the enemy was thus forming his lines, 
scarcely out of rifled cannon range, " passed in our camps,"' 
says General Sherman, "without any unusual event." 

Enough has been presented to show upon how slight a 
foundation that position of the book is built, by which General 
Sherman seeks to controvert the idea that " our army was 
taken completely by surprise" at Shiloh. 

Two brief extracts from his own official report of the battle, 
dated on the field, April 10th, will show on what day and at 
what hour he, the trusted officer on the field, became satisfied 
that the rebels intended to attack: 

"On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down 
to our front, yet I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demon- 
stration. * * * * 

"About 8 A. M. (Sunday) I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of 
infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, 
and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined 
attack on our whole camp." 

It is unnecessary to do more than call attention to some 
most absurd points made by General Sherman. 

No rifle pits were dug or abattis laid down, because the army 
regulations stood in the way. 

The line did not occupy too much ground, although space 
enough had been left for Buell's forces. 

Although all the elements of an army were known to be in 
the front on Friday, yet no one knew its destination, and even 
General Sherman had to guess its purpose. 

And for all this bungling, blundering, and criminal careless- 



36 SHILOH. 

ness, General Sherman some years later had this excuse, in a 
letter to the United States Service Magazine : 

"It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the 
two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not 
then a question of miltary skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and 
I am convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise, 
at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, 
had we not shown our enemies, that rude and untutored as we then were, we 
could fight as well as they." 

A well ordered line of battle, some rifle pits, and a vigilant 
watch for an approaching enemy, followed by such fighting 
as these precautions would have insured, might have made 
even a better impression upon the rebels with a great saving 
of life. 

At Shiloh, for the first time since General Buell had obtained 
an " honorable position " for General Sherman in Louisiana, 
these two officers met on the battle-field. This time General 
Buell came when sorely needed, to aid Sherman and his asso- 
ciates in securing honorable victory. All would suppose that 
when the author of the Memoirs sat down to write his version 
of Shiloh he would at least have done bare justice to General 
Buell and his army, but the reader will look for it in vain. 
Whatever his impressions at the time may have been, the pub- 
lic discussions which have since taken place, and the whole 
official history of the movements, which was at his disposal, 
afforded every means of correcting previous errors. Although, 
toward the close of that first disastrous day, Grant's whole 
army was praying for " night or Buell/' and Grant about noon 
was urging Buell on as follows: — "If you will get upon the 
field, leaving all your baggage over the river, it will be a 
move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us," — 
General Sherman finds little to recognize or praise in the 
gallantry and efficient aid rendered in time of need by 
his former friend, and has cold words of disparagement 
instead. 

The closing portion of his chapter on Shiloh, is chiefly de- 



SHILOH. 37 

voted to matters connected with General Buell and his forces, 
and is as follows : 

* * * " General Grant did not make an official report of the battle < »f 
Shiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by the reports of division 
commanders and subordinates. Probably no single battle of the war gave 
rise to such wild and damaging reports. It was publicly asserted at the North 
that our army was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us i:i 
our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant was drunk; 
that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter 
annihilation, etc. These reports were in a measure sustained by the published 
opinions of Generals Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the steam- 
boat landing from the east just before night-fall of the 6th, when there was 
a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that 
our army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw General Grant, 
who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were des- 
perately engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy, 
and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction, and he told me 
that things did not look as well over on the left. He also told me that on 
his way up from Savannah that morning, he had stopped at Crump's Landing, 
and had ordered Lew. Wallace's division to cross over Lick Creek, so as to come 
up on my right, telling me to look out for him. He again came to me just 
before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine, 
near the steamboat landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected 
under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the 
battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offen- 
sive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at 
the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated and whoever assumed the 
offensive was sure to win. General Grant also explained to me that General 
Buell had reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburgh Land- 
ing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was 
speaking to me. 

"About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I 
was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his staff. I was 
dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me a good many signifi- 
cant inquiries about matters and things generally. By the aid of a manu- 
script map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as they had 
been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained to him that 
my right then covered the bridge over Lick Creek, by which we had all day 
been expecting Lew. Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on 
his left, and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the landing, ami 
had not seen our men — of whose existence, in fact, he seemed to doubt. I 
insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and thought that 
McClernand had as many more, and that with what was left of Hurlbut's, 
W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss' divisions, we ought to have eighteen 



38 SHILOH. 

thousand men fit for battle. I reckoned that ten thousand of our men were 
dead, wounded, or prisoners, and that the enemy's loss could not be much 
less. Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his 
army, containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived, and could cross over 
in the night and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued that, with these 
reenforcements, we could sweep the field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and 
repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the 
boat landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, 
lest he should become involved in our general disaster. He did not, of course, 
understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my map, 
which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. He handed it to 
Major Michler to have it copied, and the original returned to me, which 
Michler did two or three days after the battle. Buell did cross over that 
night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus 
gaining the battle decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and 
kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who, as usual, 
maintained an imperturbable silence. 

" After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and sanitary com- 
mission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee to bring relief to the 
thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for whom we had imperfect means 
of shelter and care. These people caught up the camp stories, which, on their 
return home, they retailed through their local papers, usually elevating their 
own neighbors into heroes, but decrying all others. Among them was Lieu- 
tenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, who published in Bellefontaine, Ohio, a 
most abusive article about General Grant and his subordinate generals. As 
General Grant did not, and would not, take up the cudgels, I did so. My 
letter in reply to Stanton, dated June 10, 18G2, was published in the Cincin- 
nati Commercial soon after its date. To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton 
replied, and I further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862. These letters 
are too personal to be revived. By this time the good people of the North 
had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in the field more faith 
and support. Stanton was never again elected to any public office, and was 
commonly spoken of as 'the late Mr. Stanton.' He is now dead, and I doubt 
not in life he often regretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame 
by abusing the army leaders, then, as now, an easy and favorite mode of 
gaining notoriety, if not popularity. Of course, subsequent events gave 
General Grant and most of the other actors in that battle their appropriate 
place in history, but the danger of sudden popular clamor is well illustrated 
by this case. 

"The battle of Shiloh,or Pittsburgh Landing, was one of the most fiercely 
contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of 
McClemand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman aggregated 
about thirty-two thousand men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on 
the theory that, as soon as Buell arrived, we would march to Corinth to attack 
the enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney John- 



SHILOH. 39 

stem, was, according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousand 
strong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question fought skill- 
fully from early morning till about 2 p. M., when their commander-in-chief 
was killed by a Minie-ball in the calf of his leg, which penetrated the boot 
and severed the main artery. There was then a perceptible lull for a couple of 
hours, when the attack was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and con 
tinned up to dark. Early at night the division of Lew. Wallace arrived from 
the other side of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot. A very small part 
of I ieneral Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee River that evening, 
and their loss was trivial. 

"During that night the three divisions of McCook, Nelson, and Crittenden 
were ferried across the Tennessee, and fought with us the next day (7th.) 
During that night, also, the two wooden gun-boats, Tyler, commanded by 
Lieutenant Gwin, and Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular 
navy, caused shells to be thrown toward that part of the field of battle known 
to hi' occupied by the enemy. Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss 
as ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. Our aggregate loss, made up 
from official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven thousand four 
hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand and twenty-two pris- 
oners ; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen, of which 
twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in Buell's army, leaving for that of 
Grant ten thousand and fifty. This result is a fair measure of the amount 
of fighting done by each army." 

And this of an army that occupied three-fourths of the line 
of battle on the second day, and carried it steadily forward 
till victory was attained! Instead of this last unworthy sen- 
tence, General Sherman might have had the fairness to say 
that, as Grant's force for the first day's fight consisted of five 
divisions, aggregating about thirty-two thousand men, and as 
Lew. Wallace's division, about six thousand strong, came up 
for the second day's fight — while Buell had only one brigade 
in action after 5 o'clock the first day, and only three divisions 
of eighteen thousand men the second day — the losses of each 
army were about in proportion to their respective numbers, 
and the time each was engaged. But it has never heretofore 
answered General Sherman's purpose to state the facts about 
Buell's army at Shiloh, and now he is attempting to perpetu- 
ate exploded errors. 

The statement that General Grant made no official report 
of the battle of Shiloh is a good illustration of the careless 



40 SHILOH. 

manner in which General Sherman has prepared his book. 
Not only did Grant make such a report, but it was written 
before the reports of any of the division commanders had 
been handed in, as is shown by their respective dates, so that 
it is valuable as containing General Grant's own understand- 
ing of the events of the battle. It has long been in the 
regular files, with the reports of one hundred and sixteen 
other officers, upon the part taken by their commands in this 
battle. It was printed in the Rebellion Record for 1862. 

And, as General Sherman, since the publication of his 
Memoirs, still maintains that General Grant made no official 
report of Shiloh, it is proper to present its formal official 
marks. It opens and closes as follows : 

Headquarters District of West Tennessee, | 
Pittsburgh, April 9th, 1S62. j 

Captain N. H. McLean, A. A. Gen. Dept. of the Mississippi, St. Louis, Mo 

Captain : It becomes my duty again to report another battle fought 

between two great armies — one contending for the maintenance of the best 

government ever devised, the other for its destruction. It is pleasant t<? 

record the success of the army contending for the former principle. 

(Then follows the body of the report.) 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Gkant, Major- General commanding. 

The document was forwarded to the War Department from 
General Halleck's headquarters at St. Louis, thus officially 
certified : 

Headquarters Department of the Mississippi, ) 
St. Louis, April 14th, 1S62. } 
Official copy. 

J. C. Kelton, Assistant Adjutant- General. 

On account of some delay, it was not transmitted to the 
Senate when that body called for all the reports of the battle. 
Those forwarded in obedience to the call, were not described 
by Mr. Stanton in his letter accompanying them, as all the 
reports, but as "all the reports (one hundred and sixteen in 
number) which have yet been received by this Department." 



SHILOH. 41 

It now occupies its proper place in the files with the other 
reports of that battle. 

A paragraph from this report sets forth the part taken by 
General Buell's forces in repelling the assault near the steam- 
boat landing, about the close of the first day's action, which 
is wholly ignored in General Sherman's account of Shiloh. 
Says General Grant: 

"At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy 
to turn our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This point 
was guarded by the gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwinn and 
Shirk, U. S. N., commanding, four 20-pounder Parrott guns and a battery of 
rifled guns. As there is a -deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cav- 
alry, and very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops were stationed 
here except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their sup- 
port. Just at this moment the advance of Major-General Buell's column (a 
part of the division under General Nelson) arrived, the two Generals named 
both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of 
attack, and the enemy soon driven back." 

It is, to say the least, quite improbable that when General 
Grant was detailing to Sherman the desperate attack at the 
ravine spoken of in his report, and had seen Buell's troops, 
with Buell and Nelson both present, advance and push back 
the enemy with the assistance of the gun-boats and the heavy 
artillery, he not only forgot to mention to Sherman the fact 
that Buell and part of his troops were across and had been 
engaged at the ravine, but should tell him that Buell was 
actually on the other side of the river. 

General Buell's official report agrees exactly with that of 
General Grant, in regard to the attack at the landing. In 
speaking of his arrival, which was at 1 o'clock in the after- 
noon of the 6th, General Buell says : 

"Finding General Grant at the landing, I requested him to send steamers 
to Savannah to bring up General Crittenden's division, which had arrived 
during the morning, and then went ashore with him. * In the 

meantime the enemy had made such progress against our troops that his 
artillery and musketry began to play into the vital spot of the position, and 
some persons were killed on the bank at the very landing. General Nelson 



42 SHILOH. 

arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at this opportune moment. It was 
immediately posted to meet the attack at that point, and with a battery of 
artillery, which happened to be on the ground, and was brought into action, 
opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the gun-boats also 
contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point was not 
renewed, night having come on, and the firing ceased on both sides." 

Concerning the actors in the battle, General Grant says : 

"Of the part taken by each separate command I can not take special 
notice in this report, but will do so more fully when reports of division com- 
manders are handed in. 

"General Buell coming on the field with a distinct army long under his 
command, and which did such efficient service, commanded by himself in 
person on the field, will be much better able to notice those of his command, 
who particularly distinguished themselves, than I possibly can." 

In this report General Grant says nothing of himself, and 
all that he could of good about others. There was no attempt 
here, nor has he ever attempted since to evade his full respon- 
sibility for Shiloh, but has trusted to time for a proper distri- 
bution of both honor and blame. 

General Halleck's congratulatory order issued a week after 
the battle thus recognized the presence and the action of 
Buell's troops on the first day : 

" 1. The Major-General commanding this department thanks Major-General 
Grant and Major-General Buell, and the officers and men of their respective 
commands, for the bravery and endurance with which they sustained the gen- 
eral attacks of the enemy on the 6th, and for the heroic manner in which on 
the 7th instant they defeated and routed the entire rebel army. The soldier? 
of the Great West have added new laurels to those which they had already 
won on numerous fields." 

The report made to General Halleck by General Grant on 
the evening of the 5th, that one of Buell's divisions had then 
arrived, and two others would arrive the next day, renders 
unnecessary the further 'discussion of a question indirectly 
presented by General Sherman. In previous controversies, it 
has been strenuously maintained by him, that General Grant 
ordered an advance for the second day without regard to the 



SHILOH. 43 

arrival of Buell's troops. The report to Halleck shows that 
this was impossible. 

The connection sought to be established between the letters 
of Lieutenant-Governor Stanton upon the battle of Shiloh, 
and his non-election to public office after writing them, is cer- 
tainly a curious conceit to indulge over the grave of such a 
man. 

This treatment of the battle of Shiloh is a fair sample of 
the entire work. The two volumes, as will be shown by the 
records, teem with inaccuracies and instances of great injus- 
tice done to associate generals and cooperating armies. 



CHAPTER IV. 

117 K A AND SECOND CORINTH — GENERAL ROSECRANS MIS- 
REPRESENTED. 

Hostile criticism of Generals Buell, Rosecrans, and 
Thomas, the successive commanders of the Army of the Ohio, 
forms one of the salient features of the Memoirs. General 
Rosecrans particularly distinguished himself in the battles of 
Iuka and Corinth, in the autumn following the first occupa- 
tion of the latter place. From General Sherman's account, 
however, the reader would suppose that General Rosecrans 
had behaved badly in both these actions. Of the battle at 
Iuka, he says : 

"In the early part of September the enemy in our front manifested great 
activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13th General Van 
Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized the town of Iuka, which 
was promptly abandoned by a small garrison under Colonel Murphy. Price's 
force was about eight thousand men, and the general impression was that he was 
en route for Eastport, with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in the 
direction of Nashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career for Ken- 
tucky. 

" General Grant determined to attack him in force, prepared to regain 
Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it. He had drawn Ord to Corinth, and 
moved him by Burnsville on Iuka, by the main road twenty-six miles. Gen- 
eral Grant accompanied this column as far as Burnsville. At the same time 
he had dispatched Rosecrans by roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to 
approach Iuka by the two main roads coming into Iuka from the south, viz., 
the Jacinto and Fulton roads. 

" On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four miles out of 
Iuka. His orders contemplated that he should not make a serious attack 
until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south ; but, as usual, Rose- 
crans had encountered difficulties in the confusion of roads. His head 
of column did not reach the vicinity of Iuka till 4 p. M. of the 19th, and then 

(44) 



IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 45 

his troops were long drawn out on the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton 
road clear for Price's use. Price perceived his advantage, and attacked with 
vehemence the head of Rosecrans' column, Hamilton's division, heating it 
back, capturing a battery, and killing and disabling seven hundred and 
thirty -six men, so that when night closed in Rosecrans was driven to the 
defensive, and Price, perceiving his danger, deliberately withdrew by the Ful- 
ton road, and the next morning was gone. Although General Ord must have 
been within four or six miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound, and he 
or General Grant did not know of it till advised the next morning by a cour- 
ier who had made a wide circuit to reach them. General Grant was much 
offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair; but in my experience 
these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the very best kind of 
troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance can be placed, 
which is not the case in northern Mississippi. If Price was aiming for Ten- 
nessee he failed, and was therefore beaten. He made a wide circuit by the 
south and again joined Van Dorn." * * * 

To what extent this action was a reverse for General Rose- 
crans, and in what degree General Grant was offended, the 
reports of the last-named officer will show : 

Iuka, Miss., September 20, 1862. 
To Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

General Rosecrans, with Stanley and Hamilton's divisions of Missouri cav- 
alry, attacked General Price south of this village about two hours before 
dark yesterday, and had a sharp fight until night closed in. 

General Ord was to the north with an armed force of about five thousand 
men, and had some skirmishing with rebel pickets. This morning the fight 
was resumed by General Rosecrans, who was nearest to the town, but it was 
found that the enemy had been evacuating during the night, going south. 
Hamilton and Stanley, with the cavalry, are in full pursuit. 

This will, no doubt, break up the enemy, and possibly force them to aban- 
don much of their artillery. The loss on either side in killed and wounded 
is from four to five hundred. 

The enemy's loss in arms, tents, etc., will be large. We have about two 
hundred and fifty prisoners. I have reliable information that it was Price's 
intention to move over east of Tennessee. In this he has been thwarted. 
Among the enemy's loss are General Little, killed, and General Whitfield, 
wounded. I can not speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by 
General Rosecrans in the attack, and of the endurance of the troops under 
him. General Ord's command showed untiring zeal, but the direction taken 
by the enemy prevented them taking the active part they desired. Price's 
force was about fifteen thousand. U. S. Grant, Major-General. 



46 IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 

Subsequently, General Grant made an extended report of 
this battle, which bears date October 22d. The chief ex- 
pression in it which can be construed into dissatisfaction 
with General Rosecrans' movements, is where he says, speak- 
ing of the delay of his column through the fault of a guide, 
" this caused some disappointment and made a change of plans 
necessary," and before closing his report he calls attention to 
the fact that this delay was "the fault of a guide." 

This report sums up the movement and its results as 
follows : 

On the 16th of September we commenced to collect our strength to move 
upon Price at Iuka, in two columns ; the one to the right of the railroad, 
commanded by Brigadier-General (now Major-General) W. S. Rosecrans ; 
the one to the left, commanded by Major-General O. E. C. Ord. On the 
night of the 18th the latter was in position to bring on an engagement in one 
hour's march. The former, from having a greater distance to march, and 
through the fault of a guide, was twenty miles back. On the 19th, by making 
a rapid march, hardy, well disciplined, and tried troops arrived within two 
miles of the place to be attacked. Unexpectedly, the enemy took the initia- 
tive and became the attacking party. The ground chosen was such that a 
large force on our side could not be brought into action ; but the bravery and 
endurance of those brought in was such that, with the skill and presence of 
mind of the officer commanding, they were able to hold their ground till 
night closed the conflict. During the night the enemy fled, leaving our 
troops in possession of the field, with their dead to bury and wounded to care 
for. If it was the object of the enemy to make their way into Kentucky, 
they were defeated in that; if to. hold their position until Van Dorn could 
come up on the south-west of Corinth and make a simultaneous attack, they 
were defeated in that. Our only defeat was in not capturing the entire army, 
or in destroying it, as I had hoped to do. 

It was a part of General Hamilton's command that did the fighting, 
directed entirely by that cool and deserving officer. 

I commend him to the President for acknowledgment for his services. 

* * * * I can not close this report without paying a tribute to all 
the officers and soldiers comprising this command. Their conduct on the 
march was exemplary and all were eager to meet the enemy. The possibility 
of defeat I do not think entered the mind of a single individual, and I believe 
this same feeling now pervades the entire army which I have the honor to 
command. * * * * U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

In his account of the battle of Corinth, which took place 



IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 47 

about two weeks after the action at Iuka, General Sherman is 
still more unjust to General Rosecrans. The battle was a 
brilliant and most decisive one, and General Rosecrans' con- 
duct throughout, such as merited and secured the highest 
praise, and a few days after his return from a long pursuit 
of the enemy, he was relieved and promoted to the com- 
mand of the Army of the Cumberland, in place of General 
Buell. 

In regard to the affair at Corinth the Memoirs say : 

"Still by the 1st of October, General Grant was satisfied that the enemy 
was meditating an attack in force on Boliver or Corinth; and on the 2d 
Van Dorn made his appearance near Corinth, with his entire army. On the 
3d he moved down on that place from the north and north-west. 

"General Rosecrans went out some four miles to meet him, but was worsted 
and compelled to fall back within the line of his forts. These had been 
begun under General Halleck, but were much strengthened by General Grant, 
and consisted of several detached redoubts bearing on each other, and inclos- 
ing the town and the depots of stores at the intersection of the two railroads. 
Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and on the 
morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence. 

"Our men, covered by good parapets, fought gallantly, and defended their 
posts well, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy, so that by noon the rebels 
were repulsed at all points and drew off, leaving their dead and wounded in 
our hands. * * * * 

"Meantime, General Grant at Jackson, had dispatched Brigadier-General 
McPherson with a brigade directly for Corinth, which reached General 
Rosecrans after the battle ; and in anticipation of his victory, had ordered 
him to pursue instantly, notifying him that he had ordered Ord's and 
Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across to Pocahontas, so as to strike the rebels 
in flank. On the morning of the 5th, General Ord reached Hatchie River 
at Davis' bridge, with four thousand men ; crossed over and encountered the 
retreating army, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners, dispersing 
the rebel advance and forcing the main column to make a wide circuit by 
the south in order to cross the Hatchie River. 

"Had General Rosecrans pursued promptly and been on the heels of this 
mass of confused and routed men, Van Dorn's army would surely have been 
utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dorn regained Holly Springs somewhat 
demoralized. 

"General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next morning, the 
5th, and it was then too late. 

"General Grant was again displeased with him, and never became fully 
reconciled. General Rosecrans was soon after relieved, and transferred to 



48 IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 

the Army of the Cumberland in Tennessee, of which he afterward obtained 
the command in place of General Buell, who was removed. 

"The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was, indeed, a 
decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed the whole 
aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. From the timid defensive, we were at 
once enabled to assume the bold offensive. In Memphis I could see its effects 
upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained 
a death-blow." 

The several insinuations against General Rosecrans (who 
had struck this death-blow), which the above extracts contain, 
are placed in their true light, through the telegrams sent by 
General Grant at the time of the movement, and his full 
report made later: 

Jackson, October 5, 1862. 
General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

Yesterday the rebels under Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell were repulsed 
from their attack on Corinth with great slaughter. The enemy are in full 
retreat, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. Rosecrans telegraphs 
that the loss is serious on our side, particularly in officers, but bears no com- 
parison with that of the enemy. General Hackleman fell while gallantly 
leading his brigade. General Oglesby is dangerously wounded. McPherson 
reached Corinth with his command yesterday. Rosecrans pursued the retreat- 
ing enemy this morning, and should he attempt to move toward Boliver, 
will follow him to that place. Hurlbut is at the Hatchie with five or six 
thousand men, and is no doubt, now with the pursuing column. From seven 
hundred to a thousand prisoners, beside wounded, are left on our hands. 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

Jackson, October 5, 1862. 
General H. W. Haeeeck, Washington, D. C. 

General Ord, who followed Hurlbut and took command, met the enemy 
to day on the south side of the Hatchie, as I understand from a dispatch, and 
drove them across the stream and got possession of the heights with our 
troops. Ord took two batteries and about two hundred prisoners. A large 
portion of Rosecrans' forces were at Che wall a. At this distance every thing 
looks most favorable, and I can not see how the enemy are to escape without 
losing every thing but their small arms. I have strained every thing to take 
into the fight an adequate force, and to get them to the right place. 

U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

Jackson, October 6, 1862. 
General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 
Generals Ord and Hurlbut came on the enemy's rear yesterday, Hurlbut 



IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 49 

having driven in small bodies the day before. After several hours hard fight- 
ing they drove the enemy five miles back across the Hatchie toward Corinth, 
capturing two batteries, about three hundred prisoners, and many small 
arms. I immediately apprised General Rosecrans of these facts, and directed 
him to urge on the good work. The following dispatch just received : 

Chewalla, October 6, 1S62. 
" To Major-General Grant. 

"The enemy are totally routed, throwing every thing away. We are fol- 
lowing sharply. W. S. Rosecrans." 

Under previous instructions, Hurlbut is also following. McPherson is in 
the lead of Rosecrans' column. Rebel General Martin said to be killed. 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

Jackson, October 8, 18G2. 
General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

Rosecrans has followed rebels to Ripley. Troops from Bolivar will occupy 
Grand Juction to-morrow. With reinforcements rapidly sent in from the 
new lines, I can take any thing on the Mississippi Central road. I ordered 
Rosecrans back last night, but he is so adverse to returning that I have 
directed him to remain still, until you can be heard from. 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

General Rosecrans' protest against giving up the pursuit, 
thus referred to by General Grant, was as follows : 

Headquarters, Jonesboro, Miss., ) 
October 7, 1862, midnight. j 
Major-General Grant, Jackson, Tenn. 

Yours, 8:30 p. M., received. I most deeply dissent from your views as to 
the policy of pursuit. We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army 
which held the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads lead- 
ing south to the Gulf, through the most populous parts of this State, into 
which we can now pursue them by the Mississippi Central or Mobile & Ohio 
Road. The effect of returning to our old position will be to give them up 
the only corn they have in the country west of Alabama, including Tuseum- 
bia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance, and reoceupy 
their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, bar- 
ren and worthless, on a long front, of which they can harass us until bad 
weather precludes any effectual advance, except along the railroads, where 
time, fortifications, and rolling stock will render them superior to us. 

Our force, including what can be spared with Hurlbut, will garrison 

Corinth and Jackson, and enable us to push them. Our advance will cover 

even Holly Springs, which will be ours when we want it. All that is needful 

is to combine, push, and whip them. We have whipped, and should now 

4 



50 IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 

push to the wall, all the forces in Mississippi, and capture the rolling stock 
of the railroads west of the Alabama & Mobile. Bragg's army alone could 
repair the damage we have it in our power to do them. But I beseech you 
to bend every thing to push them while they are broken, weary, hungry, and 
ill supplied. Draw every thing from Memphis to help move on Holly 
Springs. Let us concentrate, and appeal to the governors of the States to 
rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold in our rear, and we 
can make a triumph of our start. Respectfully and truly, 

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major- General 

In reply to this he received an order from the general com- 
manding, directing him to desist from pursuit, and return with 
his command cautiously, but promptly, to Corinth. 

Washington, 10 A M., October 8, 1862. 
Major-General U. S. Grant. 

Why order a return of your troops? Why not reenforce Rosecrans, and 
pursue the enemy into Mississippi, supporting your army on the country? 

H. W. Haleeck, General-in-Chief. 

Jackson, October 8, 1862. 
General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

An army can not subsist itself on the country except in forage. They did 
not start out to follow but a few days, and are much worn out; and I have 
information, not only that the enemy have reserves that are on their way ti 
join the retreating column, but that they have fortifications to retreat to in 
case of need. The Mobile road is also open to the enemy to near Rienzi, and 
Corinth would be exposed by the advance. Although partial success might 
result from further pursuit, disaster would follow in the end. If you say so, 
however, it is not too late yet to go on, and I will join the moving column and 
go to the farthest extent possible. Rosecrans has been reenforced with every 
thing on hand, even at the risk of this road against raids. 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

It was decided, however, to order General Rosecrans back, 
on the ground that he was not strong enough, or sufficiently 
prepared, for such a pursuit as he designed to make. 

The following extract from orders issued by General Grant 
at Jackson, October 7th, shows that he then thought General 
Rosecrans had accomplished all possible for him to do in the 
place assigned him. 



IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 51 

Headquarters Department op West Tennessee,) 
Jackson, Tenn., October 7. j 

[General Order No. 88.] 

It is with heartfelt gratitude the General commanding congratulates the 
Armies of the West for another victory, won by them on the 3d, 4th, and 5th 
inst., over the combined armies of Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell. * 
While one division of the army, under Major-General Rosecrans, was 
resisting and repelling the onslaught of the rebel hosts at Corinth, another 
from Bolivar, under Major-General Hurlbut, was marching upon the enemy's 
rear, driving in their pickets and cavalry, and attracting the attention of a 
large force of infantry and artillery. * * * * 

To these two divisions of the army all praise is due, and will be awarded 
by a grateful country. 

Between them there should be, and I trust is, the warmest bonds of brother- 
hood. Each was risking life in the same cause, and on this occasion risking 
it also to save and assist the other. No troops could do more than these 
separated armies. Each did all possible for it to do in the place assigned 
it. * * * * 

By command of Major- General Grant, 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

General Grant closed his formal report of this battle as 
follows: 

As shown by the reports, the enemy was repulsed at Corinth, at 11 A. M. on 
the 4th, and not followed until next morning. 

Two days' hard fighting without rest, probably, had so fatigued the troops as 
to make earlier pursuit impracticable. I regretted this as the enemy wc mid 
have been compelled to abandon most of his artillery and transportation in the 
difficult roads of the Hatchie crossing had the pursuit commenced then. 

The victory was most triumphant as it was however, and all praise is due 
officers and men for their undaunted courage and obstinate resistance against 
an enemy outnumbering them as three to two. 

When it became evident that an attack would be made, I drew off' from the 
guard along the line of the railroad all the troops that could possibly be 
spared (six regiments) to reenforce Corinth and Bolivar, as before stated; 
four of these were sent under General McPherson to the former place and 
formed the advance in the pursuit. Two were sent to Bolivar, and gave that 
much additional force to be spared to operate on the enemy's rear. 

When I ascertained that the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Hatchie, 
I ordered a discontinuance of the pursuit. Before this order readied them, 
the advance infantry force had reached Ripley, and the cavalry had gone 
beyond possibly twenty miles. This I regarded, and yet regard, as absolutely 
necessary to the safety of our army. They could not have possibly caught 



52 IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 

the enemy before reaching his fortifications at Holly Springs, and where a gar- 
rison of several thousand troops was left that were not engaged in the battle 
of Corinth. Our own troops would have suffered for food, and suffered greatly 
from fatigue. Finding that the pursuit had followed so far, and that our 
forces were very much scattered, I immediately ordered an advance from Boli- 
var to be made, to cover the return of the Corinth forces. They went as far 
south as Davis' Mills, about seven miles south of Grand Junction, drove a 
small rebel garrison from there, and entirely destroyed the railroad bridges at 
that place. 

The accompanying reports show fully all the casualties and other results 
of these battles. 

I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major-General commanding. 

The following is the close of General Rosecrans' report of 
this battle : 

Thus by noon ended the battle of the 4th of October. 

After waiting for the enemy's return a short time, our skirmishers began to 
advance, and found that their skirmishers were gone from the field, leaving 
their dead and wounded. Having ridden over it and satisfied myself of the 
fact, I rode all over our lines, announcing the result of the fight in person ; and 
notified our victorious troops that after two days of fighting, two almost 
sleepless nights of preparation, movement, and march, I wished them to re- 
plenish their cartridge boxes, haversacks, and stomachs, take an early sleep 
and start in pursuit by daylight. Returning from this I found the gallant 
McPherson with a fresh brigade on the public square, and gave him the same 
notice with orders to take the advance. 

The results of the battle briefly stated are : We fought the combined rebel 
forces of Mississippi, commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villipigue, and 
Rust in person, numbering, according to their own authorities, thirty-eight 
thousand men. 

We signally defeated them with little more than half their numbers, and 
they fled leaving their dead and wounded on the field. The enemy's loss in 
killed was fourteen hundred and twenty-three officers and men; their loss in 
wounded, taking the general average, amounts to fifty-six hundred and ninety- 
two. 

We took twenty-two hundred and forty-eight prisoners, among whom are 
one hundred and thirty -seven field officers, captains, and subalterns, represent- 
ing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen 
batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, seven 
battalions, and thirteen batteries besides separate companies. 

We took, also, fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, thirty-three 
hundred stands of small arms, forty-five hundred rounds of ammunition, and a 
large lot of accouterments. 



IUKA AND SECOND CORINTH. 53 

The enemy blew up several ammunition wagons between Corinth and 
Chewalla, and beyond Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages were 
destroyed, and the ground was strewn with tents, officers' mess chests, and small 
arms. 

We pursued them forty miles in force and sixty miles with cavalry. Our 
loss was only three hundred and fifteen killed, and eighteen hundred and 
twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing. 

It is said the enemy was so demoralized and alarmed at our advance they 
set fire to the stores at Tupello, but finding we were not close upon them they 
extinguished the fire and removed the public stores, except two car loads of 
bacon which they destroyed. * * * * 

W. S. Eosecrans, Major- General. 

Another report of General Rosecrans shows that General 
McPherson with his fresh troops, reached him just before sun- 
set after the battle, and together with the whole command 
began the pursuit at daylight the next morning. 

Rosecrans' force in the battle of Corinth was fifteen thou- 
sand seven hundred infantry, and two thousand five hundred 
cavalry, an aggregate of eighteen thousand two hundred 
against an enemy of thirty-eight thousand. 

General Sherman admits that "beyond doubt the rebel army 
lost at Corinth fully six thousand men." 

The records set forth with sufficient clearness the brilliant 
character of the battle, the energy of the pursuit, and the satis- 
faction felt by General Grant at the results. So far as the 
differences which arose between Generals Grant and Rosecrans 
about this time, grew out of these movements, they ap- 
pear to have had their origin chiefly in General Rosecrans' 
insisting upon pursuing the enemy beyond where General 
Grant considered it prudent to do so, and persisting in express- 
ing his opinions against those of his commanding officer. 
But whatever the causes of difference were, General Grant's 
report, setting forth that an earlier pursuit than the one 
made was probably impracticable, is a full answer to General 
Sherman's version of the cause of trouble. 



CHAPTER V. 

CHICKASAW BAYOU PLUNGING AN ARMY THROUGH BEEP 

SWAMPS AGAINST IMPREGNABLE BLUFFS. 

The attack upon Vicksburg from the Yazoo River and 
Chickasaw Bayou in December, 1862, was under the sole 
direction of General Sherman. 

The movement had been proposed by General Grant on the 
4th of December, and the approval of the plan telegraphed 
by Halleck on the 5th. On the 8th Grant telegraphed that 
Sherman would be in command of the river expedition. To 
this Halleck replied: 

War Department, ) 
Washington, December 9, 1862. j 
Major-General Grant, Oxford, Miss. 

* * * * The President may insist upon designating a separate 
commander, if not, assign such officers as you may deem best. Sherman 
would be my choice as the chief, under you. 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

After General Sherman left Memphis and before his ex- 
pedition failed, the President had acted as General Halleck 
surmised. The following telegram upon that point will also 
show from its date, that the subsequent removal of General 
Sherman had no connection with his failure : 

War Department, ) 
Washington, December 18, 1862. J 
Major-General Gkant, Oxford, Miss. 

* * * * It is the wish of the President that General McClernand's 
corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have 
the immediate command, under your direction. 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

This campaign was the first after Shiloh, where General 
Sherman was entrusted with great responsibilities. General 
(54^ 



CHICKASAW BAYOU. 55 

Grant's order assigning him to the command, left both the 
details of the preparations and the plans of the movement 
entirely in his hands, as will appear from the first paragraph 
of that order: 

Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, i 
Department of the Tennessee, Oxford, Miss., December 8, 1862. )' 

Major-Gen. W. T. Sherman, commanding Right Wing Army in the Fidd, present. 

General: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable to Memphis, 
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. On your 
arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and 
that portion of General Curtis' forces at present east of the Mississippi River, 
and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own way. 

As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of 
Vicksburg, and with the cooperation of the gun-boat fleet under command 
of Fl a "-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner 
as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate. * * * * 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

On the same day Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "General 
Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. 
He will have a force of about forty thousand men." 

On the 22d of December this army rendezvoused at Friar's 
Point, ready to move up the Yazoo River to the rear of 
Vicksburg. On the 27th, the four divisions, Steele's, M. L. 
Smith's, Morgan's, and A. J. Smith's, aggregating over forty- 
two thousand men, were landed in front of the bluffs over- 
looking the swamps through which ran Chickasaw Bayou. 
To flounder through this boggy low land, cross the bayou, 
and storm the heights beyond, was the task Sherman laid out 
for his army. It was his first attempt to command more than 
a division in action, and he had not before directed a battle. 
Though the rebels had been reenforced in consequence of the 
failure of Grant's cooperative movement from Holly Springs, 
they were still far inferior in numbers to Sherman's army. 
Their position, however, was impregnable. The high bluffs 
were strengthened from base to summit with rifle-pits and 
heavier parapets, and to assault seemed madness then to many 
of the officers, and appears so still when all the facts can be 



66 CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

coolly considered. But Sherman decided upon this manner 
of attack, and forty thousand men were moved through bogs 
and bayous to assault a position of which he now says in his 
Memoirs : 

"The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their hands 
caves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of the enemy, who, 
right over their heads, held their muskets outside the parapet vertically and 
fired down." 

Extracts from General Sherman's own account show the 
nature and difficulties of the ground, and the character of the 
whole attack : 

"The place of our disembarkation was, in fact, an island, separated from 
the high bluff known as Walnut Hills, on which the town of Vicksburg 
stands, by a broad and shallow bayou — evidently an old channel of the 
Yazoo. On our right was another wide bayou known as Old River, and on 
the left still another, much narrower, but too deep to be forded, known as 
Chickasaw Bayou. All the island was densely wooded, except Johnson's 
plantation, immediately on the bank of the Yazoo, and a series of old cotton- 
fields along Chickasaw Bayou. There was a road from Johnson's plantation 
directly to Vicksburg, but it crossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by 
bridges, which had been destroyed ; and this road debouched on level ground 
at the foot of the Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts well prepared 
and defended by heavy artillery. On this road I directed General A. J. 
Smith's division, not so much by way of a direct attack as a diversion and 
threat. 

"Morgan was to move to his left to reach Chickasaw Bayou, and to follow 
it toward the bluff, about four miles above A. J. Smith. Steele was on 
Morgan's left across Chickasaw Bayou, and M. L. Smith on Morgan's right. 
We met light resistance at all points, but skirmished on the 27th up to the 
main bayou that separated our position from the bluffs of Vicksburg, which 
were found to be strong by nature and by art, and seemingly well defended. 
On reconnoitering the front in person, during the 27th and 28th, I became 
satisfied that General A. J. Smith could not cross the intervening obstacles 
under the heavy fire of the forts immediately in his front, and that the main 
bayou was impassable, except at two points — one near the head of Chickasaw 
Bayou, in front of Morgan, and the other about a mile lower down, in front 
of M. L. Smith's division. 

"During the general reconnoissance of the 28th, General Morgan L. Smith 
received a severe and dangerous wound in his hip, which completely disabled 
him and compelled him to go to his steamboat, leaving the command of hia 
division to Brigadier-General D. Stuart ; but I drew a part of General A. J. 



CHICKASAW BAYOU. 57 

Smith's division, and that General himself, to the point selected for passing 
the hayou, and committed that special task to his management. 

"General Steele reported that it was physically impossible to reach the 
bluffs from his position, so I ordered him to leave but a show of force there, 
and to return to the west side of Chickasaw Bayou in support of General 
Morgan's left. He had to countermarch and use the steamboats in the Yazoo 
to get on the firm ground on our side of the Chickasaw. 

"On the morning of December 29th all the troops were ready and in 
position. The first step was to make a lodgment on the foot-hills and bluffs 
abreast of our position, while diversions were made by the navy toward 
Haines' Bluff, and by the first division directly toward Vicksburg. I 
estimated the enemy's forces, then strung from Vickburg to Haines' Bluff, 
at fifteen thousand men, commanded by the rebel Generals Martin Luther 
Smith and Stephen D. Lee. Aiming to reach firm ground beyond this bayou, 
and to leave as little time for our enemy to reenforce as possible, I determined 
to make a show of attack along the whole front, but to break across the 
bayou at the two points named, and gave general orders accordingly. I 
pointed out to General Morgan the place where he could pass the bayou, and 
he answered, 'General, in ten minutes after you give the signal I'll be on 
those hills.' He was to lead his division in person, and was to be supported 
by Steele's division. The front was very narrow, and immediately opposite, 
at the base of the hills, about three hundred yards from the bayou, was a 
rebel battery, supported by an infantry force posted on the spurs of the hill 
behind. To draw attention from this, the real point of attack, I gave instruc- 
tions to commence the attack at the flanks. 

" I went in person about a mile to the right-rear of Morgan's position, at a 
place convenient to receive reports from all other parts of the line, and about 
noon of December 29th gave the orders and signal for the main attack. A 
heavy artillery fire opened along our whole line, and was replied to by the 
rebel batteries, and soon the infantry fire opened heavily, especially on A. J. 
Smith's front and in front of General George W. Morgan. One brigade 
(DeCoureey's) of Morgan's troops crossed the bayou safely, but took to cover 
behind the bank, and could not be moved forward. Frank Blair's brigade, 
of Steele's division, in support, also crossed the hayou, passed over the space 
of level ground to the foot of the hills ; but, being unsupported by Morgan, 
and meeting a very severe cross-fire of artillery, was staggered, and gradually 
fell hack, leaving about five hundred men behind wounded and prisoners, 
among them Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward Governor of Missouri. 
Thayer's brigade, of Steele's division, took a wrong direction, and did not 
cross the bayou at all, nor did General Morgan cross in person. This attack 
failed, and I have always felt that it was due to the failure of General < r. W. 
Morgan to obey his orders, or to fulfill his promise made in person. Had lie 
used with skill and boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair's, 
he could have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have opened the 
door for our whole force to follow. Meantime the Sixth Missouri Infantry, 



58 CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

at heavy loss, had also crossed the bayou at the narrow passage lower down, 
but could not ascend the steep bank ; right over their heads was a rebel bat- 
tery, whose fire was in a measure kept down by our sharp-shooters (Thirteenth 
United States Infantry), posted behind logs, stumps, and trees, on our side of 
the bayou. 

"The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their hands 
caves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of the enemy, who, 
right over their heads, held their muskets outside the parapet vertically and 
fired down. So critical was the position that we could not recall the men till 
after dark, and then one at a time. Our loss had been pretty heavy, and we 
had accomplished nothing, and had inflicted little loss on our enemy. At 
first I intended to renew the assault, but soon became satisfied that, the 
enemy's attention having been drawn to the only two practicable points, it 
would prove too costly, and accordingly resolved to look elsewhere for a point 
below Haines' Bluff, or Blake's plantation." * * * * 

Two succeeding efforts to secure a new position from which 
to attack failed, and two days afterward, as Pemberton was 
moving reinforcements into Vicksburg and out to Sherman's 
front, the expedition was abandoned, with a total loss of about 
two thousand men in killed and wounded. On returning to 
the mouth of the Yazoo, Sherman found McClernand there 
with orders to relieve him. 

He thus concludes his account: 

"Still my relief, on the heels of a failure, raised the usual cry at the North 
of ' repulse, failure, and bungling.' There was no bungling on my part, for I 
never worked harder, or with more intensity of purpose in my life; and 
General Grant, long after, in his report of the operations of the siege of 
Vicksburg, gave us all full credit for the skill of the movement, and described 
the almost impregnable nature of the ground; and although in all my official 
reports I assumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that, had General 
Morgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank Blair's brigade 
on that day, we should have broken the rebel line, and effected a lodgment on 
the hills behind Vicksburg. General Frank Blair was outspoken and indig- 
nant against Generals Morgan and DeCourcey at the time, and always abused 
me for assuming the whole blame. But had we succeeded, we might have 
found ourselves in a worse trap, when General Pemberton was at full liberty 
to turn his whole force against us." 

And so, according to General Sherman himself, bad as 
the assault at Chickasaw Bavou turned out to be, success 



CHICKASAW BAYOU. 59 

might have proved still worse. But had an army of forty-two 
thousand men gained a position in rear of Vicksburg, it might, 
with the cooperation of the gun-boats, have held its own against 
Pemberton and all the forces he then could bring:. 

No amount of blame distributed among division command- 
ers can conceal the recklessness with which an army was pushed 
through swamps and bayous against inaccessible bluffs, and the 
best answers to all Sherman's unjust attacks upon officers who 
fought with him there, are found in his own report of the 
action : 

Headquarters Right Wing Thirteenth Army Corps,) 
Camp, Milliken's Bend, La., January 3, 1863. J 

Colonel J. H. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General to Major- General Grant, 

Oxford, Miss., at last reliable accounts. 

Sir : * * * As soon as we reached the point of debarkation 

DeCourcey's, Stuart's, and Blair's brigades were sent forward in the direction 
of Vicksburg about three miles, and on the 27th the whole army was disem- 
barked and moved out in four columns : Steele's above the mouth of Chicka- 
saw Bayou ; Morgan, witli Blair's brigade of Steele's division, below the same 
bayou; Morgan L.Smith on the main road from Johnson's plantation to 
Vicksburg, with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou about a 
mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it ; and A. J. Smith's divis- 
ion keeping on the main road. All the heads of columns met the enemy's 
pickets and drove them toward Vicksburg. During the night of the 27th the 
ground was reconnoitered as well as possible, and it was found as difficult as 
it could possibly be from nature and art. Immediately in our front was a 
bayou, passable only at two points, on a narrow levee, or a sand bar, which 
was perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharp-shooters that lined the levee, 
or parapet, on its opposite bank. 

Behind this was an irregular .strip of bench, or table-land, on which were 
constructed a series of rifle pits and batteries, and behind that a high, abrupt 
range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle 
trenches, and the crowns of the principal hills presented heavy batteries. 

The county road, leading from Vicksburg to Yazoo City, runs along the 
foot of these hills, and answered an admirable purpose to the enemy as a cov- 
ered way, along which he moved his artillery and infantry promptly to meet 
us at any point at which we attempted to pass this difficult bayou. Never- 
theless that bayou, with its levee parapets, backed by the lines of rifle pits, 
batteries, and frowning hills, had to be passed before we could reach terra 
finiKi, and meet our enemy on any thing like fair terms. 

Steele, in his progress, followed substantially an old levee back from the 
Yazoo to the foot of the hills north of Thompson's Lake, but found that, in 



60 CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

order to reach the hard land, he would have to cross a long corduroy cause- 
way, with a hattery enfilading it, others cross-firing it, with a similar line of 
rifle pits and trenches before decribed. He skirmished with the enemy on the 
morning of the 28th, whilst the other columns were similarly engaged, bat on 
close and critical examination of the swamp and causeway in front, with the 
batteries and rifle pits well manned, he came to the conclusion that it was 
impossible for him to reach the county road without a fearful sacrifice. As 
Boon as he reported this to me officially, and that lie could not cross over from 
his position to the one occupied by our center, I ordered him to retrace his 
steps and cross back in steamboats to the south-west side of Chickasaw Bayou, 
and to support General Morgan, which he accomplished during the night 
of the 28th, arriving in time to support him and take part in the assault of 
the 29th. 

General Morgan's division was evidently on the best of all existing roads 
from Yazoo River to the firm land. He had attached to his train the pon- 
toons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the ford, or crossing, which 
I knew was in his front, the same by which the enemy's pickets had retreated. 
This pontoon bridge was, during the night, placed across a bayou supposed to 
be the main bayou, but which turned out to be an inferior one, and it was, 
therefore, useless; but the natural crossing remained, and I ordered him to 
cross over with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of the 
hill by a determined assault. On the 28th a heavy fog, during the early part 
of the day, enveloped the whole country, but General Morgan advanced 
DeCourcey's brigade and engaged the enemy. Heavy firing of artillery and 
infantry were sustained, and his column moved on until he encountered the 
real bayou. This again checked his progress, and was not passed until the 
next day. 

At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the bayou was a 
narrow sand spit, with abattis thrown down by the enemy on our side, with the 
same deep and boggy bayou, with its levee parapet, and system of cross bat- 
teries and rifle pits on the other side. To pass it by the flank would have 
been utter destruction, for the head of column would have been swept away 
as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank. General M. L. Smith, 
whilst reconnoitering it early on the morning of the 28th, was, during the 
heavy fog, shot in the hip by a chance rifle bullet, which disabled him, and 
lost to me one of my best and most daring leaders, and to the Unites States 
the services of a practical soldier and enthusiastic patriot. I can not exag- 
gerate the loss to me personally and officially of General Morgan L. Smith at 
that critical moment. His wound in the hip disabled him, and he was sent to 
the boat. General D. Stuart succeeded to his place and to the execution of 
his orders. General Stuart studied the nature of the ground in his front and 
6aw all its difficulties, but made the best possible disposition to pass over his 
division, the Second, whenever he heard General Morgan engaged. 

To his right, General A. J. Smith had placed Burbridge's brigade of his 
division next to Stuart, with orders to make rafts and cross over a portion of 



CHICKASAW BAYOU. 61 

his men ; to dispose his artillery so as to fire at the enemy across the bayou, 
and produce the effect of a diversion. His other brigade, Landrum's, occupied 
a key position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed well for- 
ward into the tangled abattis, within three-fourths of a mile of the enemy's 
forts, and in plain view of the city of Vicksburg. 

Our boats still lay at our place of debarkation, covered by the gun-boats 
and by four regiments of infantry, one of each division. Such was the dispo- 
sition of our forces during the night of the 28th. 

The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts, seven miles above us on 
the Yazoo, at the first bluff, near Snyder's house, called Drumgould's Bluff; 
his left, the fortified city of Vicksburg; and his line connecting these was near 
fourteen miles in extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened by a 
year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated and skilled officers. 

My plan was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the center, 
near Chickasaw Creek, at the head of a bayou of the same name; and once in 
position to turn to the right (Vicksburg), or left (Drumgould's Bluff), according 
to information then obtained. I supposed their organized forces to amount to 
about fifteen thousand, which could be reenforced at the rate of about four 
thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of 
Pemberton's forces at Grenada, or Rosecrans those of Bragg in Tennessee. 
Not one word could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be 
pushing south, or of General Banks, supposed to be ascending the Missis- 
sippi. 

Time being every thing to us, I determined to assault the hills in front of 
Morgan on the morning of the 29th ; Morgan's division to carry the position 
of the hills, Steele's division to support him and hold the county road. I 
had placed General A. J. Smith in command of his own division (First) and 
that of M. L. Smith (Second), with orders to cross on the sand spit, under- 
mine the steep bank of the bayou on the further side, and carry at all events 
the levee parapets and first line of rifle pits to prevent a concentration on 
Morgan. 

It was near twelve o'clock (noon) when Morgan was ready, by which time 
Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him and took 
part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was close at hand. All the troops 
were massed as close as possible, and all our supports were well in hand. 

The assault was made and a lodgment effected on the hard table-land near 
the county road, and the heads of the assaulting columns reached different 
points of the enemy's works, but then met so withering a fire from the rifle 
pits and cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the columns 
faltered and finally fell back to the point of starting, leaving many dead, 
wounded, and prisoners in the hands of enemy. 

For a more perfect understanding of this short and desperate struggle I 
refer to the reports of Generals Morgan, Blair, Steele, and others inclosed. 

General Morgan's first report to me was that the troops were not discour- 
aged at all, though the losses in Blair's and DeCourcey's brigades were heavy, 



62 CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

and he would renew the assault in half an hour; but the assault was not 
again attempted. 

I urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack, though it had to he made 
across a narrow sand bar, and up a narrow path in the nature of a "breach," 
as a diversion in favor of Morgan, or real attack, according to its success. 

During Morgan's progress he passed over the Sixth Missouri under circum- 
stances that called for all the individual courage for which that admirable 
regiment is justly famous. Its crossing was covered by the United States 
regulars deployed as skirmishers up to the near bank of the bayou, covered 
as well as possible by fallen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharp- 
shooters that showed a mark above the levee. 

Before this crossing all the ground opposite was completely swept by our artil- 
lery, under the immediate supervision of Major Taylor, Chief of Artillery. 

The Sixth Missouri crossed over rapidly by companies, and lay under the 
bank of the bayou, with the enemy's sharp-shooters over their heads within a 
few feet, so near that these sharp-shooters held out their muskets and fired 
down vertically upon, our men. 

The orders were to undermine this bank and make a road up it, but it was 
impossible; and after the repulse of Morgan's assault I ordered General A. J. 
Smith to retire this regiment under cover of darkness, which was successfully 
done. Their loss was heavy, but I leave to the brigade and division com- 
manders to give names and exact figures. 

Whilst this was going on Burbridge was skirmishing across the bayou at 
his front, and Landrum pushed his advance through the close abattis or 
entanglement of fallen timber close up to Vicksburg. 

When the night of the 29th closed in we stood upon our original ground, 
and had suffered a repulse. The effort was necessary to a successful accom- 
plishment of my orders, and the combinations were the best possible under 
the circumstances. 

I assume all the responsibility and attach fault to no one, and am gener- 
ally satisfied with the high spirit manifested by all * * * * 

The naval squadron, Admiral Porter, now holds command of the Missis- 
sippi to Vicksburg and the Yazoo up to Drumgould's Bluff, both of which 
points must in time be reduced to our possession, but it is for other minds 
than mine to devise the way. 

The officers and men comprising my command are in good spirits, disap- 
pointed of course at our want of success, but by no means discouraged. We 
reembarked our whole command in the sight of the enemy's batteries and 
army unopposed, remaining in full view a whole day, and then deliberately 
moved to Milliken's Bend. 

I attribute our failure to the strength of the enemy's position, both natural 
and artificial, and not to his superior fighting; but, as we must all in the 
future have ample opportunities to test this quality, it is foolish to dis- 
cuss it. 

I will transmit with this detailed reports of division and brigade com- 



CHICKASAW BAYOU. 63 

manders, with statements of killed, wounded, and prisoners, and names as far 
as can be obtained. 

The only real fighting was during the assault by Morgan's and Steele's 
divisions, and at the time of crossing the Sixth Missouri, during the afternoon 
of December 29th, by tin- Second Division. 

Picket skirmishing and rifle practice across Chickasaw Bayou was constant 
for four days. This cost us the lives of several valuable officers and men, and 
many wounded. I have the honor to be, 

Your obedient servant, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General command! rig. 

Accompanying this report is a list of casualties, which 
shows the following losses of each division: 

Killed. Wounded. Missing. 

A.J.Smith's 1 1 

M.L.Smith's 26 103 6 

George W. Morgan's 62 447 386 

F.Steele's 102 431 364 

Total 191 982 756 

An aggregate of nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, con- 
cerning which General Sherman made the following indorse- 
ment : 

" My belief is that, of the missing, four hundred were taken prisoners after 
reaching the enemy's trenches, and the remainder will turn up on boats not 
their own." 

From this report of General Sherman's it will be seen that 
the very divisions to which he now attributes his failure, and 
upon whose commanders he visits severe censure, were the 
identical troops and officers he reported at the time as having 
done his hardest fighting, and accomplished every thing it 
was possible to perform. 

The reports of these division commanders, whom he then 
commended, in turn relieve the brigade officers he now abuses 
from the blame he attempts to fix upon them, and show that 
the conduct of Generals Morgan, DeCourcey, and Thayer, and 
the fighting of their troops were such as should have com- 
manded high praise, even from General Sherman. 



64 CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

Immediately after this action General George Morgan was 
assigned to an equal command with General Sherman, namely, 
that of the First Corps, Army of the Mississippi, Sherman 
taking the Second Corps, while General McClernand succeeded 
him in command of the army. 

It would be difficult to find material for more severe criti- 
cisms of the statements made in the Memoirs, concerning the 
failure at Chickasaw Bayou, than is contained in this report 
of Sherman's, written when the facts were vividly present to 
his mind. 






CHAPTER VI. 

CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA INJUSTICE TO ROSE- 

CRANS, THOMAS, AND THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

In a previous chapter it has been seen how coldly, unjustly, 
and almost contemptuously General Sherman's book treats of 
Buell and his army at Shiloh — a general and an army that, 
beyond all room for question, brought salvation to Grant's 
forces, to which sore disaster had come through a dis- 
graceful surprise, for which Sherman was in person largely 
responsible. 

Following him in his book through his excuses for bloody 
failure at Chickasaw Bayou, his protest against Grant's 
plan for capturing Vicksburg from the rear, and his assertion 
that it might have been taken six months earlier by another 
route, we find him again misrepresenting and sneering at the 
Army of the Ohio, under its successive commanders, Rose- 
crans and Thomas, then operating about Chattanooga under 
its new title, the Army of the Cumberland. 

With the records of the war at his control, and at his very 
elbow, this is the version of Rosecrans' movement on, and 
capture of Chattanooga, which General Sherman puts forth : 

"While we were thus lying idle in camp on the Big Black, the Army of 
the Cumberland, under General Rosecrans, was moving against Bragg at 
Chattanooga; and the Army of the Ohio, General Burnside, was marching 
toward East Tennessee. 

"General Rosecrans was so confident of success that he somewhat scattered 
his command, seemingly to surround and capture Bragg in Chattanooga; but 
the latter, reenforced from Virginia, drew out of Chattanooga, concentrated 
his army at Lafayette, and at Chickamauga fell on Rosecrans, defeated him 
and drove him into Chattanooga. 

5 (65) 



66 CHATTANOOGA AND CH1CKAMAUGA. 

" The whole country seemed paralyzed by this unhappy event ; and the 
authorities in Washington were thoroughly stampeded. From the East the 
Eleventh Corps (Slocum) and the Twelfth Corps (Howard) were sent by rail 
to Nashville, and forward under command of General Hooker. Orders were 
also sent to General Grant by Halleck to send what reinforcements lie could 
spare immediately toward Chattanooga. 

"Bragg had completely driven Rosecrans' army into Chattanooga. The 
latter was in actual danger of starvation, and the railroad in his rear seemed 
inadequate to his supply. The first intimation which I got of this disaster 
was on the 22d of September, by an order from General Grant to dispatch 
one of my divisions immediately into Vieksburg to go toward Chattanooga, 
and I designated the First, General Osterhaus' — Steele, meantime, having 
been appointed to the command of the Department of Arkansas, and had 
gone to Little Rock. General Osterhaus marched the same day, and on the 
23d I was summoned to Vieksburg in person, where General Grant showed 
me the alarming dispatches from General Halleck, which had been sent from 
Memphis by General Hurlbut, and said, on further thought, that he would 
send me and my whole corps. But, inasmuch as one division of McPherson's 
corps (John E. Smith's) had already started, he instructed me to leave one of 
my divisions on the Big Black, and to get the other two ready to follow at 
once. I designated the Second, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles 
A. Smith, and the Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Corse." — Page 
346, Vol. I. 

Before considering General Sherman's story further, a state- 
ment of General Rosecrans' operations, which is sustained by 
the record, may properly be considered : 

General Rosecrans, with his magnificent army, had, by his 
brilliant strategy, driven Bragg without serious battle out of 
Murfreesboro, out of Tullahoma, out of Wartrace, and finally 
across the Tennessee, here a deep and wide river, where he 
took post in the fortified city of Chattanooga. 

The ojective point of Rosecrans' next campaign was the 
latter city. Two plans were open to him. He could cross 
the river above, in the face of Bragg's army, and assault the 
place. Had he done this, and at the cost of never so bloody 
a battle wrested that stronghold from Bragg, the whole nation 
would have applauded, and the movement been so plain that 
even General Sherman might have been compelled to write 
it correctly, notwithstanding his prejudices against the Arm}' 
of the Cumberland. 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 67 

The other course open to Rosecrans was the one he adopted, 
namely, to cross the Tennessee far below the city, and the 
three intervening mountain ranges, come down in the rear of 
Chattanooga, and force Bragg to evacuate it. 

Long before the single line of railroad could bring him the 
needed supplies for such a campaign, Halleck, who knew 
nothing of the ground and its great difficulties, was telegraph- 
ing from Washington peremptory orders to move. But, wait- 
ing till he had twenty-five days' scant supplies, Rosecrans cut 
loose from his base and crossed the Tennessee under great 
disadvantages, one of his largest divisions actually crossing in 
canoes and upon rafts constructed by the men, many of the 
soldiers piling their clothes, guns, and cartridge-boxes on two 
or three rails, and pushing the whole over before them as they 
swam the half mile of deep water. The three ranges were all 
difficult in the extreme; but finally the main part of the army 
came down from Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove, 
in rear of Chattanooga, and Bragg, giving up the city without 
a blow, being unable to hold it and at the same time confront 
Rosecrans with any portion of his force, evacuated it and 
retreated to Lafayette, behind Pigeon Mountains. Here, 
he was virtually reenforced by Longstreet from Virginia, 
although the forces of the latter were still only within sup- 
porting distance, and not, as General Sherman writes, before 
he evacuated Chattanooga. And because he was thus reen- 
forced he set out to re-occupy the city he had abandoned, and 
which he knew to be Rosecrans' objective point. Then 
occurred the widely misunderstood and misrepresented battle 
of Chickamauga. 

Bragg, strengthened by Longstreet, started to interpose 
between Rosecrans and the stronghold he had lately evacu- 
ated. Rosecrans was also marching to occupy it as the 
objective point of his campaign. Thus marching, the heads 
of the two armies met where their respective roads to Chatta- 
nooga intersected, about six miles from the city, and facing 
toward each other and closing together like the blades of a 



68 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

pair of shears, these armies fought two days for Chatta- 
nooga. 

The key positions of the whole movement were the passes 
in Missionary Ridge, which controlled the roads to Chatta- 
nooga, and these lay less than two miles from the field, and 
directly on the roads both armies were pushing over toward 
the city. 

The history of the fighting is well known. The breaking 
of the right on the second day has been widely treated as if it 
were the rout of the Union forces. But Thomas, who 
remained with the largest part of the army intact, fought 
through to the close of the battle with his lines unbroken. 
The last divisions of our line to leave the field were in undis- 
turbed possession of their ground, and withdrew quietly and 
unmolested. Thomas left the field mainly because the passes 
which controlled Chattanooga — the objective point of the 
campaign — were in his rear, and if he did not occupy them 
that night the chances were that the rebels would do so, and 
thus make successful their plan of battle, which was to turn 
the Union left and interpose between Rosecrans and Chatta- 
nooga. 

The rebels did not follow till noon of the next day, and 
finding our army in the passes did not attack it. The follow- 
ing day Rosecrans' army marched undisturbed into Chatta- 
nooga, and Union troops held it till the close of the war. 

Chickamauga, then, was the battle for Chattanooga; and 
at the end of a campaign which, when impartial history is 
written, will assuredly rank among the most brilliant for its 
strategy, the prize for which Rosecrans contended was won. 
The troops which fought longest and suffered most never 
looked upon the battle as a defeat, and were fully satisfied 
with the part they had played. To the Army of the Cumber- 
land it was but the battle for, and the winning of Chattanooga. 
And this, though Sherman's readers would not dream of it, is 
how it came to pass that " Bragg had completely driven Rose- 
crans' army into Chattanooga." 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 69 

General Rosecrans' movements which secured Chattanooga 
resembled in many of their main features those by which 
Sherman captured Atlanta. Rosecrans had successively 
flanked Bragg out of all positions from Murfreesboro to 
Chattanooga, and instead of assaulting this he moved to the 
rear, compelled its evacuation, fought for it in the open field, 
and occupied it. Sherman, chiefly by flanking Johnston, 
drove him back upon Atlanta. After many assaults, against 
the earnest advice of Thomas and others who wished him to 
go the rear and compel an evacuation, he finally yielded and 
marched to Lovejoy's and Jonesboro, leaving Slocum to watch 
for the evacuation of Atlanta, as Crittenden had watched for 
Rosecrans at Chattanooga. 

The movement drew Hood out of Atlanta, and Slocum 
marched in, as Crittenden had passed into Chattanooga when 
Rosecrans' army flanked Bragg out of it. Sherman's army, 
at the moment of occupation, was quite as much scattered 
below Atlanta, as Rosecrans' had been south of Chattanooga. 
Suppose some story-teller of the war had then written : 
"Hood had completely driven Sherman's army into At- 
lanta !" If it be answered that Sherman marched back to 
his objective point without a fight, the scales may still settle 
even, for Sherman did not start to flank till after serious 
battle, while Rosecrans avoided assaulting a stronghold in the 
outset. 

After these misrepresentations of the movement by which 
the Army of the Cumberland won this rebel stronghold on 
the Tennessee, the reader will be better prepared for the mis- 
statements written in regard to the same army when it passed 
under the command of General Thomas, and took part in the 
battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. That 
army had well nigh starved in carrying out its purpose to 
hold the city it had taken. Thousands of horses and mules 
had died for want of food. There were brigade headquarters 
where the officers lived chiefly on parched corn ; there were 
regimental headquarters where the daily food was mush or 



70 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

gruel; there were officers of high rank, who lived for days on 
sour pork and wormy and moldy bread. But the lofty spirit 
of these men was unbroken, and no army stood any where 
during the rebellion whose faith in final victory was stronger 
than the faith of these soldiers under George H. Thomas ; and 
yet at this late day, and in the light of the immortal charge 
they, as an army, made up the heights of Missionary Ridge, 
the General of the armies affirms that General Grant doubted 
whether they would come out of their trenches for a fight. 

But let General Sherman speak for himself as he does on 
page 361 of his first volume. Before perusing it let the 
reader bear in mind that the line of supplies of Thomas' army 
had been fully opened before Sherman arrived, through the 
cooperation of Generals Howard and Slocum, and without 
any help from him, and that the suffering for food was entirely 
at an end and not a present thing, as his words imply; that 
Chattanooga was no longer besieged, except as a rebel army 
was in front of it, while the communications to the rear, 
though not all that could be wished, were still ample to enable 
General Thomas to hold the place. 

Says General Sherman, speaking of his arrival : 

"Of course I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant, Thomas, and all, 
who realized the extraordinary efforts we had made to come to their relief. 

"The next morning we walked out to Fort Wood, a prominent salient of 
the defenses of the place, and from its parapet we had a magnificent view of 
the panorama. Lookout Mountain, with its rebel Hags and batteries, stood 
out boldly, and an occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin 
Point gave life to the scene. These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, 
and I was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside the lines. 
All along Missionary Kidge were the tents of the rebel beleaguering force ; 
the lines of trench from Lookout up toward the Chickamauga were plainly 
visible, and rebel sentinels in a continuous chain were walking their posts in 
plain view, not one thousand yards off. 'Why,' said I, 'General Grant, 
you are besieged ;' and he said, ' it is too true.' Up to that moment I had 
no idea that things were so bad. The rebel lines actually extended from the 
river below the town to the river above, and the Army of the Cumberland 
was closely held to the town and its immediate defenses. General Grant 
pointed out to me a house on Missionary Kidge where General Bragg's head- 
quarters were known to be. He also explained the situation of affairs gen- 



CHATTANOOGA AND OHICKAMAUGA. 71 

erally; that the mules and horses of Thomas' army were so starved that 
they could not haul his guns ; that forage, corn, and provisions were so scarce 
that the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were given to favor- 
ite horses; that the men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized by the 
battle of Chickamagua that he feared they could not be got out of their 
trenches to assume the offensive; that Bragg had detached Longstreet with a 
considerable force u>> into East Tennessee to defeat and capture Burnside; 
that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious 
to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force him to recall 
Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches 
that he wanted my troops to hurry up to take the offensive first ; after winch, 
he had no doubt the Cumberland Army would right well. Meantime the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, under General Hooker, had been advanced from 
Bridgeport along the railroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet pa^s 
Lookout Mountain. A pontoon bridge had been thrown across the Ten- 
nessee Elver at Brown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled into Chat- 
tanooga from Kelly's and Wauhatchee." 

And this from a General whose own army alone, of the 
three engaged, failed in this very battle of Chattanooga to 
execute what was expected of it, and what it was ordered to 
do. It fought splendidly and persistently, but failed to gain 
a foothold on the main ridge upon Bragg's extreme right. 
Hooker carried Lookout, Thomas advancing and supporting 
his left as it swept around the mountain and reached down- 
ward toward the city. Thomas' men needed no example from 
Sherman; had not seen his army, saw none of his fighting, 
and knew very little of his movements, rose early from their 
bivouacks the day after Lookout, swung round over the plains 
and woods which the rebels had occupied, to make sure of 
their retreat to Missionary Ridge, then faced the ridge for 
two miles, formed that grand storming party, and, in the face 
of an army with sixty cannon in position, climbed those 
rugged heights and drove Bragg into sudden, unexpected, 
and rapid retreat. It was more than two hours after the battle 
was thus ended, by these men, who, forsooth, it was feared 
would not come out of their trenches to fight till Sherman 
had set thorn an example, before Sherman himself heard that 
the victory had been gained. And ten years after he assumes 



72 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUG-A. 

to sneer at the men who formed Thomas' storming army at 
Missionary Ridge. Let the official record answer him ! Gen- 
eral Grant, without waiting till Thomas' men could see Sher- 
man fight and take courage, ordered an assault on the ridge. 
And, on this point, the records afford the means of correcting 
a common error in regard to this movement. The matter 
will be briefly presented here, although not mentioned in the 
Memoirs. 

It has been frequently said that, after all, the Army of the 
Cumberland carried the ridge only by chance, and that no 
orders were given for going beyond the line of rifle pits at 
its base, but that the forward movement from that point was 
caused by a portion of the line starting on without orders, 
and thus leading the whole toward the summit. 

General Grant, however, in his report states the character 
of the orders he gave General Thomas, and shows that the 
storming of the ridge was intended from the first : 

"His (Hooker's) approach was intended as the signal for storming the 
ridge in the center with strong columns, but the time necessarily consumed 
in the construction of the bridge near Chattanooga Creek detained him to a 
later hour than was expected. * * * * Thomas was accordingly 
directed to move forward his troops, * * * * with a double line of 
skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole 
force, and carry the rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when 
carried to reform his lines in the rifle pits, with a view of carrying the top of 
the ridge." 

The form in which General Thomas communicated this 
order to his own troops, is shown by a paragraph from the 
report of General Baird who commanded his left division : 

"I had just completed the establishment of my line, and Avas upon the left 
of it, when a staff officer from Major-General Thomas brought me verbal 
orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which bordered the 
foot of Mission Ridge, within striking distance of the rebel rifle pits at its 
base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from 
Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He added this was 
preparatory to a general assault on the mountain; that it was doubtless 
designed by the Major-General commanding that I should take part in this 
movement; so that I would be following his wishes were I to push on to the 
summit." 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 73 

"General Rosecrans was so confident of success that he 
somewhat scattered his command/' say the Memoirs. There 
was another thing of which General Rosecrans was confident, 
and which a just or accurate writer should have mentioned when 
dealing out severe criticism. He had been notified from Wash- 
ington, early in August, that Burnside would move through 
East Tennessee with an effective force of twelve thousand 
men upon his left, and was informed almost daily, belli re 
and after the battle of Chickamauga, that he would be on the 
ground for cooperative movements. The record history of 
this failure on the part of Burnside, is necessary to any fair 
review of Rosecrans' campaign against Chattanooga, and 
enough to show its real bearing will now be presented. 

The dispatches which follow are from General Halleck 
at Washington, to Burnside on the march and in East Ten- 
nessee : 

"August 5th. — You will immediately move with a column of twelve thousand 
men hy the most practicable route on East Tennessee, making Knoxville or 
its vicinity your objective point. * :;: * * You will report by 
telegraph all the movements of your troops. As soon as you reach East 
Tennessee you will endeavor to connect with the forces of General Rosecrans, 
who has peremptory orders to move forward. The Secretary of War repeats 
his orders, that you move your headquarters from Cincinnati to the field, and 
take command of the troops in person." 

"September 5th. — Nothing from you since August 31st. Keep General 
Rosecrans advised of your movements, and arrange with him for coop- 
eration." 

"September 11th. — Connect witli General Rosecrans at least with your 
cavalry. * * * * General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton or some 
point upon the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, also the mountain 
passes on the west. This being done it will be determined whether the 
moveable forces shall move into Georgia and Alabama, or into the Valley 
of Virginia and North Carolina." 

"September 13th.— It is important that all the available forces of your 
command lie pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scattered forces 
should be centered there. As long as we hold Tennessee, Kentucky is per- 
fectly safe. Move down as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga to connect 
with Rosecrans. Bragg may hold the passes in the mountain to cover At- 
lanta, and move his main army through Northern Alabama to reach the 
Tennessee River, and turn Rosecrans' right and cut off his supplies. In that 
case he will turn Chattanooga over to you, and move to intercept Bragg." 



74 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

"September 14</t. — There are reasons why you should reenforce General 
Eosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed that the enemy will 
concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." 

"September 15th. — From information received here to-day it is very prob- 
able that three divisions of Lee's army have been sent to reenforce Bragg. 
It is important that all the troops in your department be brought to the 
front with all possible dispatch, so as to help General Eosecrans." 

September ISth. — * * * * A part, at least, of Longstreet's corps 
is going to Atlanta. It is believed that Bragg, Johnston, and Hardee, with 
the exchanged prisoners from Vicksburg and Port Hudson are concentrating 
against Eosecrans. You must give him all the aid in your power." 

" September $th. 

" Major- General Btjknside, KnoxviMe. 

"General Eosecrans is on the Chickamauga Eiver, twenty miles south of 
Chattanooga. He is expecting a battle, and wants you to sustain his left. 
Every possible effort must be made to assist him." 

"September 19th. — General Meade is very confident that another part of 
Ewell's corps has gone to East Tennessee. The forces said to be collecting at 
Jonesboro are probably those that were at Wytheville, Newbern, etc., under 
Sam. Jones and Jackson." 

"September 20th. — General Eosecrans had a severe battle yesterday, and 
expects another to-day. It is of vital importance that you move to his left 
flank." 

" September 21st. — General Eosecrans telegraphed, at 9 o'clock this morning, 
that, if your troops do not join him immediately, they will be obliged to move 
down the north side of the Tennesse Eiver. As the enemy has driven General 
Eosecrans back to near Chattanooga, Bragg may throw a force off into East 
Tennessee between you and General Eosecrans. The extent of the defeat and 
loss is not known here. 

" General Eosecrans will require all the assistance you can give him to 
hold Chattanooga." 

" September 22d. — Yours of yesterday is received. I must again urge you to 
move immediately to Eosecrans' i - elief. I fear your delay has already 
prompted Bragg to prevent your communication. Do not allow your troops 
to be caught by the enemy south of the Tennessee Eiver. To all appearances 
your only safety is to move down on the north side. Sam. Jones is not likely 
to move from Danville unless reenforced. If the enemy should cross the 
Tennessee above Chattanooga you will be separated from Eosecrans, who 
may not be able to hold out on the south side." 

" AVashington, September 27th, j 
Headquarters of the Army, j 

" Your orders before leaving Kentucky, and frequently repeated telegrams 
after, were to connect your left on General Eosecrans' right, so that, if the 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 75 

enemy concentrated on one, the other would be able to assist. General Rose- 
crans was attacked on Chickamauga Creek and driven back to Chattanooga, 
which he holds, waiting for your assistance. Telegram after telegram has 
been sent to you to go to his assistance with all available force, you being the 
judge of what troops it was necessary, under the circumstances, to leave in 
East Tennessee. The route by which you were to reach General Rosecrans 
was also left to your discretion. When he was forced to fall back on Chatta- 
nooga you were advised, not ordered, to move on the north side of the Ten- 
nessee River, lest you might be cut up by the enemy on the south side. The 
danger of the latter movement being pointed out to you, you were left to de- 
cide for yourself. The substance of all telegrams from the President and from 
me was: you must go to General Rosecrans' assistance with all your available 
forces, by such route as, under the advice given you from us, and such infor- 
mation as you can get, you might deem most practicable. The orders are 
very plain, and you can not mistake their purport. It only remains for you 
to execute them. General Rosecrans is holding Chattanooga, and awaiting 
reinforcements from you. East Tennessee must be held at all hazards, if 
possible. 

"The President has just signed his telegram, which is added, in which I 
fully concur." 

" October 1st. — Yours of yesterday is received, the purport of all your in- 
structions have been that you should hold some point near the upper end of 
the valley, and with all the remainder of your available force, march to the 
assistance of General Rosecrans. The route of march and all details were 
left to your own judgment. Since the battle of Chickamauga and the retreat 
of our forces to Chattanooga, you have been repeatedly informed that it would 
be dangerous to attempt to form a connection on the south side of the Ten- 
nessee River, and consequently that you ought to march on the northern side. 
* reneral Rosecrans has now telegraphed to you that it is not necessary to join 
him at Chattanooga, but only to move down to such a position that you can 
come to his assistance if lie should require it. You are in direct communica- 
tion with him, and can learn his condition, and needs, sooner than I can. 

" Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object 
is to hold East Tennessee by forcing the enemy south of the mountains and 
barring the passes against his return." 

" October 3d. — General Rosecrans reports that enemy's cavalry have 
crossed the river below Kingston, for a raid upon his connections. I can only 
repeat what I have so often urged, the importance of your communicating 
with General Rosecrans' army on the north side of the river, so far as to 
command the crossing." 

"October "^/(^J^pan only repeat former instructions, to leave sufficient force 
in the upper end of the-valley to hold Jones in check, and with the remainder 
to march down on the north side of the Tennessee River, guarding the fords, 
and connecting with General Rosecrans. I can not make them plainer." 

" October Uth. — I have received no dispatch from you since the 7th until this 



76 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

morning, and have no information of the condition of affairs and the position 
of your troops. When you were urged to move down the river to General 
Rosecrans' assistance, that operation was deemed safe and of great importance. 
The condition of affairs may now be different. You certainly should hold 
Kingston, and as far below as may seem prudent. 

" Hood will probably send a part of his army to the south-west. Whether 
to Bragg or by Abingdon is uncertain. I think your available force at Kings- 
ton and above should be held in readiness to move up the valley, should the 
enemy appear in force in south-west Virginia. A copy of this is sent to Gen- 
eral Grant." 

"October l%ih. — General Rosecrans still calls for your cooperation with him 
at Chattanooga, and again suggests that Kingston should be made your main 
point of defense. In this I agree with him. If he can not hold Chattanooga, 
you can not hold East Tennessee, as that place threatens the gateway from 
Georgia. Why is it that you make no report of your position and move- 
ments? We are left entirely in the dark in regard to your army." 

"October 2i.th. — It now appears pretty certain that Ewell's corps has gone to 
Tennessee, and its probable object is Abingdon. His force is estimated at from 
twenty to twenty -five thousand. It is reported that he left Lee's army on 
Monday last, but did not pass through Richmond. It is therefore most proba- 
ble that he passed through Lynchburg taking the road to Abingdon." 

The following telegrams were sent by Mr. Lincoln to Gen- 
eral Burnside : 

Washington, D. C, September 2]*t., 2 A. M. 
To General Burnside, Knoxville : 
Go to Rosecrans with your full force without a moment's delay. 

A. Lincoln. 

September 21st. — If you are to do any good to Rosecrans, it will not do tc 
waste time with Jonesboro. It is already too late to do the most good that 
might have been done, but I hope it will still do some good. Please do not 
wait a moment. A. Lincoln. 

September 27. 

To Burnside, at Knoxville. 

Your dispatch just received. My orders to you meant simply that you 
should save Rosecrans from being crushed out, believing if he lost li is posi- 
tion you could not hold East Tennessee in any event, and that if he held his 
position East Tennessee was substantially safe in any event. 

This dispatch is in no sense an order. General Halleck will answer you 
fully. 

September 27. 
To General Burnside, Knoxville. 

It was suggested to you, not ordered, that you move to Rosecrans on the 
north side of the river, because it was believed that the enemy would not 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 77 

permit you to join him if you should move on the south side. Hold your 
present position, send Roseerans what you can spare in the quickest and safest 
way ; in the meantime hold the remainder as nearly in readiness to go to 
him as you can consistently with the duty it is to perform while it remains. 

East Tennessee can he no more than temporarily lost so long as Chatta- 
nooga is firmly held. A. Lincoln. 

It would be unjust to General Burnside to present these 
dispatches from the record without his excuses for never aid- 
ing Roseerans. September 6th he telegraphed Halleck from 
Knoxville: 

" We are making some movements to aid Roseerans. A bearer of dispatches 
leaves here this evening or to-morrow with papers." 

September 17th he telegraphed concerning a force which he 
had at Athens communicating with Roseerans. 
On the 19th: 

" Am now sending on men that can he spared to aid Roseerans. I shall 
go on to-day to Jonesboro. As soon as I learn the result of our movement 
to the east will go down by railroad and direct the movement of the rein- 
forcements for Roseerans. I have directed every available man in Kentucky 
to be sent down." 

On the 20th, from Knoxville : 

" Dispatch of 18th received. You may be sure that I will do all I can for 
Roseerans. Arrived here last night, and am hurrying troops in his direction. 
I go up the road to-night for a day." 

September 21st he telegraphed General Halleck from Mor- 
ristown : 

" Before I knew of the necessity of sending immediate assistance to Rose- 
erans I had sent a considerable portion of my force to capture or drive out a 
large force of the enemy under General Sam. Jones, stationed on the road 
from Bristol to Jonesboro, * * * * when the urgent dispatches 
from Roseerans and yourself caused me to send back Brigadier-General 
Whick's division and Colonel Woolford's brigade of cavalry, with orders to 
move as rapidly as possible until they joined Rosecran's left flank. * * * 
"When you remember the size of our forces, and amount of work we had to 
do, and the length of line occupied, you will not be surprised that I have not 
helped General Roseerans, more particularly as I was so far impressed with 



78 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

the truth of the statement that Bragg was in full retreat. It has not seemed 
possible for me to successfully withdraw my forces from the presence of Jones, 
if he should be beaten back or captured. Yet, upon the receipt of your 
dispatch, if it were possible to get our force from there down to General 
Rosecrans within three or four days I should make the attempt, and shall, at 
the risk of being too late, order every available man in that direction. I am 
sure that I am disposed to give him every possible assistance. I sincerely 
hope that he will be able at least to check the enemy for seven or eight days, 
within which time I shall be able to make considerable diversion in his favor. 
I hope that my action will meet with the approval of the Department." 

Thus it was that Burnsicle failed Rosecrans. 

These dispatches throw a new light upon the difficulties 
with which General Rosecrans contended ; and as this record 
was open to General Sherman, it would have been just to 
make it prominent in connection with his severe strictures. 
But there is another part of the record, with which even his 
memory must have been charged, that, had he written with 
fairness, would have been produced. Though no reader of 
the Memoirs would suspect it, General Sherman himself, when 
ordered from Vicksburg to Rosecrans' relief, was more than 
a month late with his troops. In fact, according to the 
notification sent Rosecrans by Halleck of the time named 
at Memphis for Sherman's arrival at Chattanooga, he was 
seven weeks behind, his command having reached only Mem- 
phis from Vicksburg at that date. At this point General 
Sherman in person was delayed by severe family affliction, 
but this did not retard the forward movement of his troops. 
While his book does not indicate that he was behind time, 
much stress is laid upon the statement that he was ordered to 
repair the railroad as he advanced, and no prominence is 
given to the fact that a most rapid advance, as well as a 
repair of the railroads, was repeatedly insisted upon. But it 
was not until General Grant himself had reached Chattanooga, 
and sent back word to Sherman to "drop all work on the 
Memphis and Charleston railroad, cross the Tennessee, and 
hurry eastward with all possible dispatch till you meet further 
orders from me," that any signs of haste were developed in 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 79 

his movements. General Grant had taken command, and 
relieved Rosecrans, and from that time forward General Sher- 
man used almost superhuman efforts to reach Chattanooga. 

The dispatches which set forth this most unfortunate delay 
are as follows: 

Headquarters op the Army, I 
Washington, D. C, September 13, 1863. j 
Major-General Ghaut or \ — , , , 
Major-General Sherman,] yiCKS0W 9- 

It is quite possible that Bragg and Johnston will move through Northern 
Alabama to the Tennessee River to turn General Rosecrans' right and cut 
off his communication. All of General Grant's available forces should be 
sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to cooperate with Rose- 
crans, should the rebels attempt that movement. 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

War Department, September 14, 1S63. 
Major- General Hurlbut, Memphis. 

There are good reasons why troops should be sent to assist General Rose- 
crans' right wing with all possible dispatch. Communicate with Sherman to 
assist you, and hurry forward reinforcements as previously directed. 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

War Department, September 15, 1863. 
Major-General Hurlbut, Memphis. 

All troops that can possibly be spared in Western Tennessee and on the 
Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assist General Rosecrans 
on the Tennessee River. Urge General Sherman to act with all possible 
promptness. If you have boats send tbem down to bring up his troops. 
Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army has been sent 
to reenforce Bragg. II. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

War Department, September 19, 1863. 
Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga. 

* * * On the 15th Hurlbut says he is moving forward toward 
Decatur. I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from Vicksburg. * 
* * * II. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

War Department, September 19, 1863. 
Major-General Hurlbut, Memphis. 

Give me definite information of the number of troops sent toward Decatur, 
and where they are. Also what other troops are to follow, and when. Has 
nothing been heard from the troops ordered from Vicksburg? No effort 
must be spared to support Rosecrans' right and guard the crossings of the 
Tennessee River. II. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 



80 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

Cairo, III., September 21, 12 M., 1863. 
Major-General Halleck. 

General-in-Chief : I received your telegram of the 16th on the 18th, and 
forwarded it immediately to Sherman. I have sent twelve boats, and more 
will be sent to bring up his corps. The water is so low in the Ohio and Ten- 
nessee rivers that I think they must march from Corinth. I have ordered 
one million rations, and plenty of spare wagons to Corinth ready as they' 
come up. * * * * I hold the cavalry of my corps to cover Sher- 
man's movements. * * * * I have an abundance of rolling stock 
to Corinth, aiid from thence to Chattanooga should not take more than eight 
days of hard marching; * * * * with the best possible speed it will 
not be possible for Sherman to get into communication with General Rose- 
crans in less than fourteen days from this date at the best, and probably 
twenty days. * * * * S. E. Htjrlbtjt, Major- General. 

War Department, September 28, 1863. 
Major- General Rosecrans, Chattanooga. 

Grant's forces were ordered to move by Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia 
to Decatur, and thence as might be found necessary to cooperate with you. 
•:■:- s :s :■:- The or der was received on the 18th, and steamers sent to Vicks- 
burg to bring up the troops. They calculated to be able to communicate with 
you in fourteen days from that time. Since then nothing has been heard of 
them, there being no telegraph line. The troops from here will probably 
reach you first. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

War Department, September 29, 1863. 
Major- General Grant, VicJcsburg. 

The enemy seems to have concentrated upon General Rosecrans all his 
available forces from every direction. To meet him it is necessary that all 
the forces that can be spared in your department be sent to General Rose- 
crans' assistance. He wishes them sent by Tuscumbia, Decatur, and Athens. 
As this requires the opening and running of the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad east of Corinth, an able commander like Sherman or McPherson 
should be selected. H. W. Halleck, Major- General. 

On the 29th of September Hooker reported the head of his 
column passing from Cincinnati to Louisville, and on the 2d 
of October he telegraphed Mr. Stanton from Nashville: "The 
last of the infantry of the Eleventh Corps reached their des- 
tination yesterday. The Twelfth are now passing through 

this city." 

Washington, September 30, 1863. 
Major- General Hurlbtjt, Memphis. 
• * * ah available forces must be pushed on toward General Rose- 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICK AM AUGA. 81 

crans as fast as possible. Your attention must be directed particularly to the 
repairing of the railroad and the transportation of supplies toward Decatur. 

H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

October 2d, Hurlbut telegraphed Halleck: 

"A supply train of four hundred wagons is ready at Corinth, and thirty 
days' rations for twenty thousand men." 

War Department, October 4, 1863. 
Major- General Hurlbtjt, Memphis. 

As fast as troops arrive they should be pushed forward, first to Corinth and 
then to Tuscumbia, repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. * * 
* * From there you will move by Florence on Athens or Decatur, on 
the north side of the river, or directly to Decatur, repairing the railroad 
according as it may be found most practicable or expeditious. Time is all 
important. The railroad must be kept up and guarded in order to secure the 
supplies of your army. * * * * Should General Sherman be 
assigned by General Grant to the command, you will furnish him with this 
and all other orders. H. W. Halleck, Major-General. 

On the 10th of October Sherman, then near Corinth, re- 
ported the situation to Halleck, and asked : " whether I shall 
give preference to securing this railroad or reaching the neigh- 
borhood of Athens with expedition. The latter I can surely 
accomplish, the former is problematical." 

The troops from the Army of the Potomac having commu- 
nicated with General Rosecrans by way of Bridgeport, Gen- 
eral Sherman was instructed on the 14th, by Halleck in reply, 
to take care of his railroad. 

General Grant, during all this time, had been absent in 
New Orleans. He reached Memphis on his return October 
5th, proceeded to Cairo, and thence to Louisville to receive 
orders, where he was directed to take command at Chatta- 
nooga, relieving Rosecrans by Thomas. He started at once 
for the front, and shortly after his arrival, ordered Sherman to 
drop every thing on the railroad, and come on with dispatch. 

He thus reported his action to Halleck: 

Chattanooga, October 26, 2 P. M. 
Majoi -General Halleck. 

General-in-Chief : I have sent orders to General Sherman to move east 
6 



82 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

toward Stevenson, leaving every thing unguarded, except by way of the Army 
of the Cumberland east of Bear Creek. The possibility of the enemy break- 
ing through our lines east of this, and the present inability to follow him 
from here if he should, is the cause of this order. Sherman's forces are the 
only troops I could throw in to head such a move. 

U. S. Gkant, Major- General. 

From these most urgent dispatches it is evident that a 
prompt movement of Sherman's relieving column, as well as 
the repair of the railroad, was expected by the authorities at 
Washington. 

The railroad was in fair condition from the start as far as 
Corinth, as General Sherman says, and one of his divisions 
had reached that point on the 2d of October, as he also 
relates. On the 27th of that month he was at Bear Creek, 
only thirty miles east of Corinth, where he was " still busy in 
pushing forward the repairs to the railroad bridge," and 
"patching up the many breaks between it and Tnscumbia," 
when he received the dispatch from General Grant at Chat- 
tanooga, by way of Huntsville, to drop railroad work and 
hurry to Chattanooga with all possible speed. 

All this time Rosecrans' army had been suffering for sup- 
plies — a suffering which Sherman, by prompt movement, 
might in great degree have prevented. But instead, before 
he could move his small command from Corinth, two corps 
had been sent from the Army of the Potomac, and, as Halleck 
surmised, had reached and relieved Rosecrans first; in fact 
had done so before Sherman began to exhibit any special 
activity in his advance. Thus Sherman failed Rosecrans. 
How much that was unfortunate in the situation, which he now 
treats as if it were altogether the fault of Rosecrans, might 
have been avoided had he then moved with due haste to his 
assistance ! 

Returning to Rosecrans' movement, and following him for 
a time, it will be seen that, with twenty-five days' supplies and 
ammunition for two great battles he had crossed the Tennes- 
see, passed over three difficult mountain ranges, and coming 
down into the valley south of Chattanooga, compelled Bragg 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAGUA. 83 

to evacuate the place. Crittenden's corps was left to observe 
the movements of Bragg, and pass round the point of Lookout 
into the city in case the enemy left it. 

This, however, was in no sense a military occupation of the 
place, and Crittenden marched through to join Rosecrans 
below, where he was concentrating his flanking force to inter- 
pose it between the enemy and Chattanooga, and so occupy 
this city, which was the objective point of his campaign. The 
fact of one corps of his army having passed through Chatta- 
nooga, led to the general belief at the time that Rosecrans' 
army had taken the place, marched out to attack Bragg at 
Chickamauga, been defeated, and driven back into the city. 
This view was entertained at the time in Washington, although 
the Army of the Cumberland, with the exception of Critten- 
den's forces, never saw Chattanooga till two days after the 
battle of Chickamauga. 

Upon receiving the news that Crittenden's corps had 
entered Chattanooga, General Halleck telegraphed : 

Washington, September 11, 1863. 
Major-General Eosecrans, Chattanooga. 

After holding the mountain passes in the west, and Dalton or some other 
point on the railroad to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be 
decided whether your army shall move further south into Georgia and 
Alabama. * * * H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

This exploded view of the real situation General Sherman 
now revives. 

In his next statement that Bragg reenforced from Virginia, 
drew out of Chattanooga, fell on Rosecrans at that place, 
defeated him and drove him into the city, the records are 
once more against him. 

Bragg evacuated Chattanooga September 7th, and retreated 
to Lafayette. The reinforcements from Virginia were so near 
that point on the 15th it was resolved to march back toward 
Chattanooga and attack Rosecrans wherever found. A part 
of Longstreet's Virginia troops under Hood arrived at Dalton 
on the 18th, and participated in the first day's fight at Chicka- 



84 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

inauga, but Longstreet himself, with the rest of his command, 
did not arrive till midnight after the first day's battle. A 
brief extract from his official report is pertinent: 

" Headquarters near Chattanooga, ) 
"October, 1863. J 

" Our train reached Catoosa platform, near Ringgold, about two o'clock in 
the afternoon of the 19th of September. As soon as our horses came up, 
about four o'clock, I started with Colonel Sorrel and Colonel Manning of my 
staff to find the headquarters of the Commanding General. We missed our 
way and did not report until near eleven o'clock at night. * * * * 
As soon as the day of the 20th had dawned, I rode to the front to find my 
troops. The line was arranged from right to left as follows: Stewart's, 
Johnson's, Hinman's, and Preston's divisions, Hood's division (of which only 
three brigades were up), was in rear of Jackson, Kenshaw's and Humphries' 
brigades. McLaws' division was ordered forward from Ringgold the night 
before, but did not get up. General McLaws had not arrived from Rich- 
mond." 

The impression sought to be created that Rosecrans' army 
was driven off the field is erroneous. Soon after four o'clock 
of the second day, General Thomas having received notice 
from General Rosecrans that rations and ammunition would 
be sent to meet him at Rossville, determined to hold the field 
until night and then withdraw and take possession of the passes 
there. At half after five he began the movement, and the 
divisions which commenced to withdraw at that time were 
attacked at the moment, but retired without confusion or 
serious losses. The last of the line maintained its position 
until after nightfall, and retired after the fighting for the day 
had ended. 

Of the close of the battle and its results General Rosecrans 
in his official report, says: 

"At nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line, and sunk 
into quietude, without attempting to renew the combat. General Thomas 
considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity of ammunition, 
food, and water, and having orders from the General commanding to use his 
discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived in good 
order, took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chattanooga, and 
offering the enemy battle during all the next day, and repulsing his recon- 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 85 

noissanee. On the night of the 21st we withdrew from Rossville, took firm 
possession of the objective point of our campaign — Chattanooga — and pre- 
pared to hold it." 

Coming down to the time when Rosecrans had been relieved, 
and General Thomas was in command in Chattanooga, General 
Sherman, in writing of his own arrival there on November 
14th, and a conversation with General Grant the next day, 
represents the latter as informing him that forage and provis- 
ions were then extremely scarce, and that he feared Thomas' 
troops could not be drawn out of the trenches for a fight. 

That General Grant could not have made such a statement 
about supplies is evident from the following dispatches sent 
more than two weeks before Sherman's arrival : 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
Chattanooga, October 26, 1863. J 

Major- General Halleck:, Washington. 

s « * « General Thomas had also set on foot, before my arrival, 

a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout 

Mountain to Bridgeport. If successful, and I think it will be, the question 

of supplies will be fully settled. * * * * 

U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

Chattanooga, October 28, 1863. 
Major- General Halleck:, Washington. 

General Thomas' plan for securing the river and Southside road hence to 
Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may 
now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time I think 
all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and prep- 
arations may commence for offensive operations. 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

That General Grant had no doubt of the capacity of Gen- 
eral Thomas' troops to fight, is proved by the following 
telegram dated a week before Sherman arrived in person, and 
a fortnight before his troops came up : 

Chattanooga, November 7, 1863, 1:30 P. M. 
To General Halleck, Washington. 

* * I have ordered Thomas to attack the enemy at the north 
end of Missionary Kidge, and when that is carried, to threaten or attack the 



86 CHATTANOOGA AND CHIOKAMAUGA. 

enemy's line of communication between Cleveland and Dalton. This move 
will be made on Monday morning. I expect Sherman will reach Huntsville 
to-day. I have repeated orders to him to hurry forward with the Fifteenth 
Army Corps. U. S; Grant, Major- General. 

It will be noted that the point of attack thus assigned to 
General Thomas, before the arrival of Sherman, was that 
afterward committed to Sherman's troops, and which in spite 
of splendid fighting they failed to carry. Thus General Grant 
not only believed Thomas' men fully competent to do what 
was afterward assigned to Sherman, but felt so certain of their 
success that he ordered the movement before Sherman was 
even within supporting distance. 

General Grant subsequently explained to Halleck why the 
attack ordered was not made: 

Chattanooga, November 21, 1863. 
To General Halleck, Washington. 

I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move 
artillery. Now Thomas' chief of artillery says he has to borrow teams from 
Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it is to be used. Sherman 
has used almost superhuman efforts to get up even at this time, and his force 
is really the only one that I can move. Thomas can take about one gun to 
each battery, and can go as far with his infantry as his men can carry rations 
to keep them and bring them back. I have never felt such restlessness 
before as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the 
Cumberland. The Quartermaster-General states that the loss of animals 
here will exceed ten thousand. Those left are scarcely able to carry them- 
selves. U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

And in his formal report of these operations he thus refers 
to the same matter : 

"After a thorough reconnoitering of the ground however, it was deemed 
utterly impracticable to make the movement until Sherman could get up, 
because of the inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then 
at Chattanooga ; and I was forced to leave Burnside for the present to con- 
tend against superior forces of the enemy, until the arrival of Sherman with 
his men and means of transportation." 

Sherman's troops were delayed by the heavy roads and 
broken bridges, so that the orders for a general attack, first 



CHATTANOOGA AND CHICK AM AUGA. 87 

issued for the 21st, were suspended, also the subsequent orders 
for an attack on the 23d, as appears from the following letter 
to General Thomas: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
Chattanooga, November 22, 1863. j 

General: The bridge at Brown's Ferry being down to-day, and the 
excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for 
Sherman to get up either of his two remaining divisions in time for an 
attack to-morrow morning. With one of them up, and which would have 
been there now but for the accident to the bridge, I would still make the 
attack in the morning, regarding a day gained as of superior advantage to a 
single division of troops. You can make your arrangements for this delay. 

U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

Upon receiving this, General Thomas so far from consider- 
ing the presence of Sherman's troops necessary to opening 
the battle, went to Grant, and urged that the attack on 
Lookout Mountain should begin at once. General Thomas 
gives this account of the matter in his official report: 

"Feeling as I did the necessity of avoiding delay, for fear the enemy should 
become advised of our plans, immediately upon the receipt of the above letter 
I went to General Grant, and advised against any further postponement of 
our movement, and suggested that, if needed, the Eleventh Corps, then 
between the two bridges, could be sent to General Sherman to take the 
place of the troops that could not join him, whilst these last, together with 
the troops already in Lookout Valley, would form a column to attack the 
enemy on Lookout Mountain, or at least divert his attention from Sherman's 
crossing above. This met the approbation of the Commanding General, and 
on it was based my order of the 23d to General Hooker, to demonstrate on 
Lookout, and if practicable to carry the position." 

General Grant himself not only agreed to this attack on 
Lookout before Sherman came up, but on the next day, 
Sherman being still behind, ordered an attack by Thomas on 
the left in front of Missionary Ridge. This was made the 
day before Sherman got into position, and General Grant 
telegraphed the following report of it : 

Chattanooga, November 23, 1S63. 
To General IIat.leck, Washington. 

General Thomas' troops attacked the enemy's left at 2 p. M. to-day, carried 



88 CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA. 

the first line of rifle pits running over the knoll twelve hundred yards in 
front, taking about two hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded. Our 
loss small. The troops moved under fire with all the precision of veterans on 
parade. 

Thomas' troops will entrench themselves and hold their position until day- 
light, when Sherman will join in the attack from the mouth of Chickamauga, 
and a decisive battle will be fought. U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

General Grant in his formal report of the battle of Chatta- 
nooga, has this to say upon the point under consideration : 

'Thomas having done on the 23d, with his troops in Chattanooga, what 
was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his advanced positions 
during the day, and pushed the Eleventh Corps forward along the south 
bank of the Tennessee Kiver, across Citico Creek, one brigade of which, with 
Howard in person, reached Sherman just as he had completed the crossing of 
the river." 

General Sherman must have thought all this rather lively 
work for troops that could not be induced to leave their 
trenches till they had been persuaded by the inspiring 
spectacle of his men making a breakfast of the enemy. 

The next day (24th) Hooker, acting under the orders of 
General Thomas, attacked and carried Lookout; Sherman 
attacked, but failed to carry the point he was ordered to 
occupy on the north end of Missionary Ridge. The day 
following this Sherman still struggled unsuccessfully to carry 
his objective point. Thomas' army, that up to this time had 
not even seen Sherman's troops, stormed Missionary Ridge, 
and "it was not till night closed in," as Sherman writes in 
his official report, "that I knew that the troops in Chatta- 
nooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the 
enemy's center. Of course the victory was won, and pursuit 
was the next step." 

The records which this chapter contains were accessible to 
General Sherman when he penned the statements which they 
so effectually refute. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN — UNJUST ARRAIGNMENT OF GEN- 
ERAL W. SOOY SMITH. 

General Sherman relates that in the Winter following 
the battle of Chattanooga, he conceived the idea of a move- 
ment eastward from the line of the Mississippi to penetrate 
the interior, and so break up railroads, and paralyze the rebel 
forces in that section, as to release a large body of troops for 
the coming campaign from Chattanooga. 

Marching from Vicksburg February 3d, 1864, his columns 
reached Meridian on the 14th, remained there till the 20th, 
causing much destruction of roads, rolling-stock, stores, and 
manufacturing establishments of value to the enemy, and arrived 
at Canton, near Vicksburg, on his return, February 26th: 

Much more had been expected at the North from the prep- 
arations made for the movement, and the statements circulated 
as to its object. It was the general belief that the expedition 
was to penetrate as far east as Selma, one of the interior points 
of greatest value to the enemy, and also turn upon Mobile. 
This impression was current at General Grant's headquarters 
and at Washington, and General Grant himself had written to 
Hal leek, under date of January 15th, 1864, in the same letter 
which unfolded his plan for the general Spring campaign as 
follows : 

"I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian with his spare 
force — the cavalry going from Corinth, and destroy the railroads east and 
south of there so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them 
during the rebellion. He will then return, unless the opportunity of going 
into Mobile with the force he has, appears perfectly plain." 

(89) 



90 THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 

And writing on the same subject to Thomas at Chattanooga, 
on the 19th of January, he said : 

"He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far as Meridian at least, and will 
thoroughly destroy the roads east and south from there, and, if possible, will 
throw troops as far east as Selma; or, if he finds Mobile so far unguarded as 
to make his force sufficient for the enterprise, will go there. To cooperate 
with this movement you want to keep up appearances of preparation of an 
advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary even to move a column as 
far as Lafayette. 

This, it will be observed, was written by the General who 
ordered the Meridian expedition to an officer whom he desired 
to cooperate with it. 

So, while General Sherman insists that he had no intention 
of going through to Mobile, and that he wanted Banks to keep 
up a show of attack in that direction, it is evident that Grant 
had such a move in mind for him when the orders for the 
expedition were given. 

The general verdict of failure which met Sherman on his 
return, called for prompt excuse, and the best at hand was 
found in the fact that the cavalry force from Memphis, 
under General Sooy Smith, had not reached Meridian as was 
intended. 

The Memoirs give this version of General Smith's operations : 

" At Memphis I found Brigadier-General W. Sooy Smith with a force of 
about twenty-five hundred cavalry, which he had, by General Grant's 
orders, brought across from Middle Tennessee, to assist in our general pur- 
pose as well as to punish the rebel General Forrest, who had been most active 
in harassing our garrisons in West Tennessee and Mississippi. 
* a * a chief part of the enterprise was to destroy the rebel cavalry 
commanded by General Forrest, who were a constant threat to our railway 
communications in Middle Tennessee, and I committed this task to Brigadier- 
General W. Sooy Smith. General Hurlbut had in his command about seven 
thousand five hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, to 
Corinth, Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregate cavalry force 
of about seven thousand ' effective ' out of these and the twenty-five hundred 
which General Smith had brought with him from Middle Tennessee. With 
this force General Smith was ordered to move from Memphis straight for 
Meridian, Mississippi, and to start by February 1st. I explained to him 
personally the nature of Forrest as a man, and of his peculiar force; told 



THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 91 

him that in his route he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked 
witli a vehemence for which he must be prepared, and that, after lie had 
repelled the first attack, he must, in turn, assume the most determined offen- 
sive, overwhelm him, and utterly destroy his whole force. I knew that For- 
rest could not have more than four thousand cavalry, and my own movement 
would give employment to every other man of the rebel army not imme- 
diately present with him, so that he (General Smith) might safely act on the 
hypothesis I have stated. 

"Having completed all these preparations in Memphis, being satisfied that 
the cavalry force would be ready to start by the 1st of February, and having 
seen General Hurlbut with his two divisions embark in steamers for Vicks- 
burg, I also reembarked for the same destination on the 27th of January. 
* The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the 
roads inland, so to paralyze the rebel forces, that Ave could take from the 
defense of the Mississippi River the equivalent of a corps of twenty thousand 
men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign; and this was actually done. 
At the same time I wanted to destroy General Forrest, who, with an irregular 
force of cavalry, was constantly threatening Memphis and the river above, 
as well as our routes of supply in Middle Tennessee. In this we failed 
utterly, because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, which were 
clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instructions to him of January 
27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to him at the same time. 
Instead of starting at the date ordered, February 1st, he did not leave Mem- 
phis till the 11th, waiting for some regiment that was ice bound near Co- 
lumbus, Kentucky; and then, when he did start, he allowed General Forrest 
to head him off" and to defeat him with an inferior force near West Point, 
below Okalona, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. 

"We waited at Meridian till the 20th to hear from General Smith, but 
hearing nothing whatever, and having utterly destroyed the railroads in and 
around that junction, I ordered General McPherson to move back slowly 
toward Canton. With Winslow's cavalry and Hurlbut's infantry I turned 
north to Marion, and thence to a place called 'Union,' whence I dispatched 
the cavalry farther north to Philadelphia and Louisville, to feel as it were 
for General Smith, and then turned all the infantry columns toward Canton, 
Mississippi. 

"On the 26th we all reached Canton, but we had not heard a word of Gen- 
eral Smith, nor was it until sometime after (at Vicksburg) that I learned the 
whole truth of General Smith's movement and of his failure. Of course I 
did not, and could not, approve of his conduct, and I know that he yet chafes 
under the censure. I had set so much store on his part of the project that I 
was disappointed, and so reported officially to General Grant. General 
Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though I still regard him as 
a most accomplished gentleman and a skillful engineer. Since the close of 
the war he has appealed to me to relieve him of that censure, but I could 
not do it, because it would falsify history." 



92 THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 

It would not have falsified history, however, if General Sher- 
man had said, that instead of waiting for a regiment which was 
ice bound near Columbus, Ky., General Smith, by General Sher- 
man's personal and positive directions, was awaiting the arrival 
of Warring's entire brigade of cavalry, composed of the Fourth 
Missouri, Second New Jersey, Seventh Indiana, Nineteenth 
Pennsylvania, and a battery of the Second Illinois Cavalry. 

Further than this, General Smith was distinctly informed by 
Sherman, before the departure of the latter, that it would be 
necessary to wait for this brigade in order to make up the 
requisite force with which to meet Forrest. General Sherman 
also assured him that his own movement on Meridian and 
the contemplated operations there did not of necessity depend 
upon a junction with the cavalry from Memphis. And this is 
shown to have been General Sherman's view, when he himself 
reached Meridian four days after the date he had fixed for his 
own and General Smith's arrival at that point, by the order 
he then issued. This was dated eight days after the time men- 
tioned for a union of the forces there, and declares that all the 
objects of the expedition had been fully attained: 

[Special Field Orders No. 20.] 

Headquarters Department op the Tennessee, ) 
Meridian, Miss., February 18th, 1S64. j 

1. Having fulfilled, and well, all the objects of the expedition, the troops 
will return to the Mississippi River to embark in another equally important 
movement. 

2. • * * * The march will begin on the 20th instant, and the corps 
commanders will not pass Union and Decatur until they have communicated 
with each other by couriers across at these points. * * * * 

4. The march should be conducted slow; about fifteen miles per day, and 
in good order. * * * * There is no seeming danger, but every pre- 
caution should be taken against cavalry dashes at our trains. '*' 

By order of Major- General W. T. Sherman, 

L. M. Dayton, Aid-de-Camp. 

From General Smith's report, it appears that Warring's 
brigade did not reach him until the 8th. It had marched two 
hundred and fifteen miles, over a country covered with snow 
and ice, and been obliged to cross rivers, where in some in- 



THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 93 

stances it was necessary to build boats to ferry the command, 
and where at times the men were compelled to dismount and 
harness the horses to the artillery and the ammunition wagons 
in order to draw them through. Three days would seem 
scarcely enough to refit a brigade after such a march, but in 
that time it again started under General Smith. 

A vigorous campaign was then made against Forrest, and 
pushed as far as was prudent or possible. The delay in starting 
had made it impracticable to reach General Sherman at Meri- 
dian, by the time he had set for returning, and so General Smith 
withdrew to Memphis. As a result of his expedition, he re- 
ported between one and two million bushels of corn destroyed, 
two thousand bales of cotton burned, thirty miles of railroad 
destroyed, three thousand horses and mules, and fifteen hundred 
negroes brought out of the enemy's country, besides the forage 
and subsistence taken for his mounted force of seven thousand. 

General Sherman in his report of the Meridian expedition, 
made a few days after his return to Vicksburg, maintained that 
he had accomplished all he undertook, notwithstanding the 
delay in General Smith's movements. 

This portion of his report is as follows : 

"I inclose herewith my instructions to General Smith, with a copy of his 
report, and must say it is unsatisfactory. The delay in his starting to the 
11th of February, when his orders contemplated his being at Meridian on the 
10th, and when he knew I was marching from Vicksburg is unpardonable, and 
the mode and manner of his return to Memphis was not what I expected 
from an intended bold cavalry movement. * * * * I returned (to 
Canton) from Vicksburg, on the 6th inst., found all my army in, and learned 
that General Smith had not started from Memphis at all till the 11th of Feb- 
ruary, had only reached West Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march 
back to Memphis being too rapid for a good effect. 

" Nevertheless, on the whole, we accomplished all I undertook." 

General Smith, at the time of this ^expedition, was Grant's 
chief of cavalry, and when he was temporarily placed under 
the orders of Sherman for the Meridian campaign, he was 
engaged, in conjunction with other troops, in watching and 
operating against Forrest's command. He made full report to 



94 THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 

General Grant of his operations under Sherman, and was com- 
mended for what he accomplished. As an evidence that Gen- 
eral Sherman himself had lost no confidence in him, he was re- 
tained by that officer as chief-of-stafif, when he succeeded Grant 
in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and 
was entrusted with the work of organizing the cavalry force 
for the Atlanta campaign, continuing active in the field during 
the first three months of that movement, when disabling sick- 
ness compelled him to leave the service. And yet General 
Sherman now writes : " General Smith never regained my con- 
fidence as a soldier." 

The reports on file in the War Department regarding Gen- 
eral Smith's movement are voluminous. His instructions 
contain no mention of February 1st being the day absolutely 
fixed for his starting, as now claimed in the Memoirs, and the 
reasons, both for the delay, and the subsequent return to Mem- 
phis, are of such a character as to fix no stain upon his record. 

The Memoirs, in fixing the force with which he was to 
move at " about seven thousand," show that General Sherman 
expected General Smith to wait for Warring's brigade, since, 
without it, his force would only have numbered about five 
thousand. Instead of Forrest's strength being then estimated 
in Memphis at " not more than four thousand cavalry," it was 
believed to be, and in fact was, fully six thousand. Instead 
of being defeated at West Point " with an inferior force," 
General Smith was not defeated there at all ; and further, he 
moved back from that place partly because the rebel cavalry 
force, which Sherman had not kept employed in his own 
front, was moving to join Forrest against him. 

But aside from this expected reenforcement of the enemy 
the various reports disclose abundant reason for turning back 
from West Point. The force in General Smith's front was 
fully equal to his own, and was posted behind a river which 
became impassable when so held. The enemy's left was cov- 
ered by a swamp and river, and a movement in that direction 
was impracticable, while his right was protected by the Tom- 



THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 95 

bigbee River which General Smith could not cross. His 
command was encumbered with a large body of negroes 
that he had gathered up in pursuance of orders and was in 
honor bound to protect. A rebel brigade was moving to the 
rear to occupy a strong point in his line of retreat. At 
this time General Sherman was retiring from Meridian, 
and had it been possible for General Smith to advance beyond 
West Point it would have been a move upon Polk's whole 
army, resulting in utter defeat. 

General Smith penetrated further into the enemy's territory 
than General Sherman, and, in proportion to the strength of 
his command, inflicted heavier losses upon the enemy than 
Sherman. 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

RESACA THE FAILURE THERE ATTRIBUTED TO McPHERSON. 

It is ungenerous in General Sherman to cast imputations 
upon General McPherson, the commander of the Army of 
the Tennessee, since this General and his army, often at sore 
cost, saved Sherman from himself, and won laurels for him to 
wear. 

It is well known among many who participated in it, that 
the prominent officers of the three armies which began the 
Atlanta campaign, considered its opening moves at Dalton 
and Resaca as grave and needless failures. The feeling was 
that Sherman, with his one hundred thousand men, should 
have brought Johnston's forty-five thousand to decisive battle 
in front of Resaca. 

General Sherman, in his book, labors to show first, that at 
the outset he fully intended to do this; and second, that the 
failure of his plan resulted from McPherson's timidity at a 
moment when this officer had an opportunity to insure brill- 
iant success — such as does not occur twice in a single life. 

As will be remembered, the enemy held a strongly fortified 
position in front of Dalton. The road from Chattanooga 
passed from the west through a deep gorge called Buzzard's 
Roost, in the mountain range which separated the two armies. 
Its sides were precipitous, finally taking the form of palisades. 
The range was Rocky Face. The gorge was partly com- 
manded from the Union side by Tunnel Hill. About fifteen 
miles south, Snake Creek Gap, which had been almost entirely 
neglected by the enemy, opened through the ridge midway 
upon the roads leading from Dalton to Resaca. 
(96) 



RESACA. 97 

Of the position, General Sherman writes as follows : 

"The position was very strong, and I know that such a general as was my 
antagonist (Joseph Johnston), who had heen there six months, had fortified it 
to the maximum. 

" Therefore, I had no intention to attack the position seriously in front, but 
depended on McPherson to capture and hold the railroad to its rear, which 
would force Johnston to .detach largely against him, or rather, as I expected, 
to evacuate his position at Dalton altogether. 

" My orders to Generals Thomas and Schofield were merely to press strongly 
at all points in front, ready to rush in on the first appearance of ' let go,' and, 
if possible, to catch our enemy in the confusion of retreat." 

And yet against this front, which he il had no intention 
of attacking seriously," he moved Thomas with over sixty 
thousand, and Schofield with over thirteen thousand, while 
McPherson with twenty-four thousand was sent to Johnston's 
rear through Snake Creek Gap, not with orders to remain on 
his line of communications, but to break his railroad and then 
retire to Snake Creek Gap, or return to the main army as he 
should deem best. 

Which was the diversion? Were Thomas and Schofield 
making it in Buzzard Roost and upon impregnable Rocky 
Face, with over seventy-four thousand men, while McPherson 
was marching to the predetermined battle-field, in the rear of 
Dalton, with twenty-four thousand ? 

The attack began on the 7th of May. On that day Thomas 
carried Tunnel Hill. Of all the operations on the front 
during the 8th and 9th, when Thomas and Schofield were 
assaulting precipices, the Memoirs have nothing except the 
single sentence : "All the movements of the 7th and 8th were 
made exactly as ordered." 

The history then proceeds: 

"I had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on. the 9th, 
McPherson's head of column entered and passed through Snake Creek per- 
fectly undefended, and accomplished a complete surprise to the enemy. At 
its further debouche he met a cavalry brigade, easily driven, which retreated 
hastily north toward Dalton, and doubtless carried to Johnston the first 
6erious intimation that a heavy force of infantry and artillery was to his 
7 



98 RESACA. 

rear, and within a few miles of his railroad. I got a short note from Mc- 
Pherson that day (written at 2 p. M., when he was within a mile and a halt 
of the railroad above and near Eesaca), and we all felt jubilant. I renewed 
orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instant pursuit of what I 
expected to be a broken and disordered army, forced to retreat by roads to 
the east of Resaca, which were known to be very rough and impracticable. 

" Tbat night I received further notice from McPherson that he had found 
Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had fallen back 
three miles to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and was there fortified. I 
wrote him next day the following letters, copies of which are in my letter- 
book ; but his to me were mere notes in pencil, not retained." 

The letters referred to are both dated May 11th. The 
material points affecting the question under discussion, are as 
follows : 

"General : I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 6 :30 p. M. 
of yesterday. You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General 
Hooker is in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army 
in check should he abandon Dalton. He can not afford to abandon Dalton, 
for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he observes that we are 
close at hand waiting for him to quit. He can not afford a detachment 
strong enough to fight you, as his army will not admit of it. 

" Strengthen your position ; figbt anything that comes ; and threaten the 
safety of the railroad all the time. But, to tell the truth I would rather the 
enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he may find in his rear a 
larger party than he expects in an open field. At all events we can then 
choose our own ground, and he will be forced to move out of his works. I 
do not intend to put a column into Buzzard Roost Gap at present. 

" McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but bad not 
done the full measure of his work. He had in hand twenty-three thousand 
of the best men of the army, and could have walked into Resaca (then held 
only by a small brigade), or he could have placed his whole force astride the 
railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of all of 
Johnston's army, with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his 
heels. Had he done so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured 
to attack him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring 
Place, and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and 
wagons at the very beginning of the campaign. 

" Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at the criti- 
cal moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid. Still, he was per- 
fectly justified by his orders, and fell back and assumed an unassailable 
defensive position in Sugar Valley, on the Resaca side of Snake Creek Gap. 
As soon as informed of this, I determined to pass the whole army through 
Snake Creek Gap, and to move on Resaca with the main army." 



RESACA. 99 

That McPherson moved promptly through Snake Creek 
Gap when ordered, is shown by the fact that he did not even 
wait for food for men or horses, as will appear from the fol- 
lowing extract from the report of General G. M. Dodge, of 
the Sixteenth Army Corps, who had the advance in the move- 
ment on Resaea : 

" During the entire day the command acted under the personal direction 
of Major-General McPherson, and promptly obeyed and executed all his 
orders. My transportation had not yet reached me. I had with the entire 
corps, since leaving Chattanooga, only seventeen wagons, and I had marched 
out in the morning without rations, most of the command having been 
without food since the clay before at noon ; thus a march of sixteen miles 
was made by the command, the men and animals whereof had had nothing 
to eat for a day and a half." 

A report of General Dodge also shows that a detachment 
of his troops passed through the Gap, moved out to the rail- 
road the night of the 8th, and found it clear of the enemy; 
that the next day his entire corps carried a hill close to 
Resaea, moved in force to the railroad, and from this point 
was withdrawn to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap. This was 
in accordance with the positive order of General Sherman to 
General McPherson. 

After the slur upon McPherson's courage, the book relates 
that on the 11th, there being signs of the enemy evacuating 
Dalton, orders were given for the movement of all the army 
through Snake Gap, except the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's 
cavalry, which were left in front of Buzzard's Roost. During 
the 12th and 13th, the greater part of Thomas' and Schofield's 
army passed through the gap and were deployed against 
Resaea, where, now writes General Sherman, the enemy, "as 
J anticipated, had abandoned all his well-prepared defenses 
at Dalton, and was found inside of Resaea with the bulk of 
his army, holding his divisions well in hand, acting purely on 
the defensive, and fighting well at all points of conflict. 
* * * On the 14th we closed in." 



100 RESACA. 

He thus closes the account of these opening operations of 
the Atlanta campaign : 

" On the night of May loth Johnston got his army across the bridges, set 
them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight Our loss up to that time 
was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred and seventy-five 
wounded — mostly light wounds that did not necessitate sending the men 
to the rear for treatment. That Johnston had deliberately designed in 
advance to give up such a strong position as Dalton and Resaca, for the 
purpose of drawing us further south, is simply absurd. Had he remained 
in Dalton another hour it would have been his total defeat, and he only 
evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. The movement by us 
through Snake Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My army about 
doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural positions of 
artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated action. We were compelled to 
grope our way through forests, across mountains, with a large army, neces- 
sarily more or less dispersed Of course I was disappointed not to have 
crippled his army more at that particular stage of the game ; but, as it 
resulted, these rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse 
of a conquering army. Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, 
immediate pursuit was begun." 

Thus, seven days after the movement began, General Sher- 
man had finally accomplished what General Thomas, who, 
assisted by General Schofield, had thoroughly reconnoitered 
the position in February, had urged should be done at the 
first, as will now appear from the record history of Buzzard 
Roost and Resaca. 

On the 28th of February, 1864, before General Sherman 
had succeeded General Grant in the command of the Military 
Division of the Mississippi, General Thomas, who was in 
command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, 
telegraphed General Grant at Nashville, proposing the follow- 
ing plan for a Spring campaign : 

"I believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and 
Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the 
line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta." 

In a subsequent report upon the campaign, dated March 10, 
1864, General Thomas thus speaks of this proposition : 

" The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval, 



RESACA. 101 

and if obtained, it was my intention (having acquired by the reconnoissance 
of February 23d, 24th, and 25th, a thorough knowledge of the approaches 
direct upon Dalton, from Ringgold and Cleveland), to have made a strong 
demonstration against Buzzard Roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention 
to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and cavalry 
through Snake Creek Gap upon his communications, which I had ascertained 
from scouts he had, up to that time, neglected to observe or guard. With 
this view I had previously asked for the return to me of Granger's corps and 
my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already initiated preparations for 
the execution of the above movement as soon as the Spring opened sufficiently 
to admit of it." 

On the 17th of March General Grant was made Lieutenant- 
General, and was succeeded in command at Nashville by 
General Sherman. In the same report General Thomas con- 
tinues: 

"Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military Division of 
the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga, to consult 
as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a Spring campaign. At 
that interview I proposed to General Sherman that if he would use McPherson 
and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton, by 
the direct roads through Buzzard Roost Gap, and from the direction of 
Cleveland, I would throw my whole force through Snake Creek Gap, which 
I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the enemy's communications between 
Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force him 
either to retreat toward the east, through a difficult country, poorly supplied 
with provisions and forage, with a strong probability of total disorganization 
of his force, or attack me; in which latter event I felt confident that my army 
was sufficiently strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position 
on his communications before he could be made aware of my movemeiit. 
General Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my 
army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying 
point for the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to 
operate from. 

"(Later, when the campaign in Georgia was commenced, the Army of 
the Tennessee was sent through Snake Creek Gap to accomplish what 
I had proposed doing with my army, but not reaching Snake Creek Gap 
before the enemy had informed himself of the movement, McPherson was 
unable to get upon his communications before Johnston had withdrawn 
part of his forces from Dalton, and had made dispositions to defend 
Resaca.") 

Such is General Thomas' brief account of this movement. 



102 EESACA. 

Below will be found its history as presented in General 
Sherman's own dispatches, to which scarcely any allusion 
is made in his book. 

On the 24th of April General Sherman wrote as follows 
to General Grant, informing him of the intention to attack 
Johnston in position at Dalton : 

"At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at 
Dalton we must attack him in position." 

Headquarters Military Division or the Mississippi, \ 
In the Field, Chattanooga, May 1, 1864. J 

General Grant, Culpepper, Va. 

* The first move will be Thomas, Tunnel Hill ; Schofield, 

Catoosa Springs ; and McPherson, Villanow. Next move will be battle. 

* * * * W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, } 
In the Field, Chattanooga, May 4, 1864. J 

General Grant, Culpepper, Va. 

Thomas' center is at Ringgold, left at Catoosa, right at Leets' tan-yard. 
Dodge is here, Fifteenth corps at Whiteside, Schofield closing up on Thomas. 
All move to-morrow, but I hardly expect serious battle till the 7th. Every 
thing very quiet with the enemy. Johnston evidently awaits my initiative. 
I will first secure Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his com- 
munications, attacking at the same time in front, cautiously, and in force. 
W. T. Sherman, Major- General commanding. 

May 5th, he notified General McPherson of the move 
which Thomas and Schofield were directed to make against 
Rocky Face, and directed him to march to Snake Creek Gap, 
secure it, attack the enemy boldly from it, attempt to so 
break the railroad that it would require some days to repair 
it, and then " withdraw to Snake Creek Gap and come to us, 
or wait the developments according to your judgment and 
the information you may receive." In the same order Gen- 
eral Sherman expresses the hope that "the enemy will fight 
at Dalton." 

In the forenoon of May 7th, he directed General Schofield 
to "see if Rocky Face Ridge can be reached from your 
position," and at two o'clock, " reconnoiter the ridge to-night 



RESACA. 103 

and make a lodgment to-morrow morning, but don't be drawn 
into battle." 

On the 8th, General Thomas was ordered a to get, if pos- 
sible, a small force on Rocky Face Ridge," and General 
Schofield "to follow from Lee's along down Rocky Face to 
the enemy's signal station, if possible." 

On the same day, the 8th, he telegraphed from Tunnel 
Hill, in front of Buzzard Roost, to General Halleck, at 
Washington : 

" I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through whose 
gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night McPherson will be in 
Snake Creek Gap threatening Resaca, and to-morrow all will move to the 
attack. Army in good spirits and condition. I hope Johnston will fight here 
instead of drawing me far down into Georgia." 

On the 9th he telegraphed General J. D. Webster, at Nash- 
ville : 

"Have been fighting all day against rocks and defiles. General McPherson 
was at 2 p. M. within two miles of Resaca, and will there break the road, and 
leave Johnston out of rations. To-morrow will tell the story." 

And on the 9th, at 8 r. m., from Tunnel Hill, to General 
Halleck as follows : 

"We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to 
keep Johnston's army busy, while McPherson could march to Resaca to 
destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to 2 p.m., 
when he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. 

" After breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of 
Snake Creek Gap and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats 
south. I will pitch in again early in the morning." 

Which shows conclusively that Sherman ordered McPherson 
back to Snake Gap, and that the charge of timidity is gratui- 
tous. It also shows that on the night of the 9th, Sherman 
was still expecting to attack by Rocky Face and Buzzard 
Roost. 

On the 9th, General Thomas, from his headquarters at 
Tunnel Hill, sent to General Sherman the following statement 



104 RESACA. 

of Captain Merril, Chief Engineer of the Department of the 
Cumberland, who had just returned from Geary's camp: 

"He says that Geary attempted to carry Mill Gap by assault, but was 
repulsed with a loss probably of two hundred to three hundred killed and 
wounded; that the enemy were still in force (only infantry), but strongly 
posted ; that it is impossible to obtain possession of the gap by direct assault, 
or only at the expense of fearful loss; that Geary's last orders were to with- 
draw into the valley, and encamp beyond artillery range. Geary was not 
making an attempt to turn the position. The only way to do so is to get a 
force upon the mountain "somewhere" where the enemy can not defend it so 
strongly." 

On the 10th he wrote from Tunnel Hill to General Thomas: 
" I think you are satisfied that your troops can not take Rocky 
Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the 
jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us." 

And later in the same day : 

" I propose to leave hereabouts one of your corps, say Howard's, the cav- 
alry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General Stoneman, to keep up 
the feint of a direct attack on Dalton, through Buzzard Roost, as long as 
possible ; and with all the remainder of the three armies to march to, and 
through, Snake Creek Gap, and to attack the enemy in force from that quar- 
ter. * * * * we will calculate all to go to Snake Creek and close 
up on General McPherson during the day after to-morrow." 

At 7 a. m. of the 10th this telegram was sent to Halleck: 

" I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and make 
this dispatch that you may understand Johnston acts purely on the defen- 
sive. I am attacking him on his strongest fronts, viz.: west and north, till 
McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round through 
Snake Creek Gap and interpose between him and Georgia. I am not driving 
things too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry that are rapidly com- 
ing up to me from the rear — Stoneman on my left and Garrard on my right, 
both due to-day. 

"Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching against McPher- 
son, but to-day I will be more easy, as I believe McPherson has destroyed 
Resaca, when he is ordered to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, 
and act against Johnston's flank when he does start. All are in good con- 
dition." 

On the 10th of May, for the first time, he notified General 



EESACA. 105 

McPherson of his intention to attack in force, through Snake 
Creek Gap, as follows : " The Buzzard Roost Gap is so well 
defended, and naturally is so strong, that I will undertake to 
attack Johnston through Snake Creek Gap. * * * * 
we may not be able to put our project in operation by the 
day after to-morrow, but we will all get ready. * * * 
* Do you think Johnston has yet discovered the nature of 
your forces?" 

On the 10th he also telegraphed General Halleck as fol- 
lows : 

"General McPherson reached Eesaca, but found the place strongly fortified 
and guarded, and did not break the road. According to his instructions, he 
drew back to the debouche of the gorge, where he has a strong defensive posi- 
tion, and guards the only pass into the valley of the Oostanaula available to 
us. Buzzard Boost Gap, through which the railroad passes, is naturally and 
artificially too strong to be attempted. I must feign on Buzzard Boost, but 
pass through the Snake Creek Gap and place myself between Johnston and 
Besaca, where we will have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary 
move. Certain that Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no 
hurry." 

So it was not until some days after the attack began that he 
came to the conclusion, as he tells Halleck, that he "must 
feign on Buzzard Roost," but attack through Snake Creek 
Gap, which statement — as well as several dispatches already 
quoted — conflicts pointedly with the assertion that, from the 
first he " had no intention to attack the position seriously in 
front," 

General Sherman having refrained from hurrying, and 
Johnston having virtually escaped him, he telegraphed to 
General Halleck on the 14th: " By the flank movement on 
Resaca we have forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton, and are 
on his flank and rear; but the parallelism of the valleys and 
mountains does not give us all the advantages of an open 
country; but I will press him all that is possible." And on 
the 15th: " We intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satis- 
fied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape ; if he does, my 



106 RESACA. 

bridges are down, and we will be after him." And on the 
16th: "We are in possession of Resaca. * * * * 
Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry are trying to get 
into the rear of the enemy, and I hope will succeed. Our 
difficulties will increase beyond the Etowah, but if Johnston 
will not fight us behind such works as we find here, I will 
fight him on any open ground he may stand at." 

It is easy to see what good ground there was for the opinion 
which prevailed in the Army of the Cumberland, that the 
failure of these first movements of the Atlanta campaign re- 
sulted from General Sherman's refusal to accept the advice 
of General Thomas, and persisting, instead, in pushing two 
armies for three days against " precipices," only to be obliged, 
when it was too late, to try the plan of Thomas, and failing 
solely because of delay. 

The injustice of the attempt to lay the responsibility of the 
failure upon General McPherson can also be clearly seen in 
the light of these records. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

KENESAW UNGENEROUS TREATMENT OF THOMAS — INACCU- 
RATE STATEMENTS. 

There was no military movement made by Sherman, from 
the time he began the Atlanta campaign till the end of the 
war, which brought such severe criticism upon him from the 
armies which he commanded as the assault upon Kenesaw 
Mountain. By the almost universal verdict along the lines, 
it was adjudged an utterly needless move, and so an inexcus- 
able slaughter. Before the assault he had Thomas, with sixty 
thousand men, in front of the enemy's center. That enemy 
was not over forty-five thousand strong, and he had Schofield 
and McPherson, with over thirty-five thousand, to operate on 
the flank, and force the evacuation of Kenesaw without a 
battle, exactly as was done a few days after the assault. And 
these three armies, which had been fighting for three years, 
did not appreciate then, and have never appreciated Sher- 
man's reasons for hurling two of them against an impregnable 
mountain, which were mainly, as he wrote, to teach his own 
army that it was sometimes necessary to assault fortified lines, 
and show r the enemy that, on occasion, "he would assault, and 
that boldly." 

And it cost over two thousand veterans killed and wounded 
to teach those who survived such a lesson as this! 

Those who read Sherman's Memoirs from the stand-point 
of the three armies then operating under him, will naturally 
look for his account of Kenesaw, and all material points are 
hereby given in full : 

" During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right 

(107) 



108 KENESAW. 

as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspond- 
ingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success 
would give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, 
McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not, with pru- 
dence, stretch out any more ; and, therefore, there was no alternative but to 
attack ' fortified lines,' a thing carefully avoided up to that time. I reasoned, 
if we could make a breach any where near the rebel center, and thrust in a 
strong head of column, that with the one moiety of our army we could hold 
in check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in 
flank and overwhelm the other half. The 27th of June was fixed as the day 
for the attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close com- 
munication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on the top of a 
hill to the rear of Thomas' center, and had the telegraph wires laid to it. 
The points of attack were chosen, and the troops were all prepared with as 
little demonstration as possible. About 9 A. M. of the day appointed the 
troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious 
fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy met us 
with determined courage and in great force. McPherson's attacking column 
fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but could not reach the summit. 
About a mile to the right, just below the Dallas road, Thomas' assaulting 
column reached the parapet, where Brigadier-General Harker was shot down 
mortally wounded, and Brigadier-General Daniel McCook (my old law part- 
ner) was desperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterward died. 

"By 11:30 the assault was, in fact, over, and had failed. We had not 
broken the rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns held their 
ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches, and there covered themselves 
with parapet. McPherson lost about five hundred men and several valuable 
officers, and Thomas lost nearly two thousand men. * * * * 

" While the battle was in progress at the center, Schofield crossed Olley's 
Creek on the right, and gained a position threatening Johnston's line of 
retreat; and to increase the effect, I ordered Stoneman's cavalry to proceed 
rapidly still further to the right to Sweetwater. Satisfied of the bloody cost 
of attacking intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army 
to the railroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Marietta, or to the 
Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the one afterward so suc- 
cessfully practiced at Atlanta. All the orders were issued to bring forward 
supplies enough to fill our wagons, intending to strip the railroad back to 
Allatoona, and leave that place as our depot, to be covered as well as possi- 
ble by Garrard's cavalry. General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming 
it risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I had 
resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General Halleck on 
July 1st: 

"General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of 
Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and to-morrow 
night propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right, back of 



KENESAW. 109 

General Thomas. This will bring my right within three miles of the Chat- 
tahoochee River, and about five miles from the railroad. By this movement 
I think I can force Johnston to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to 
defend his railroad and the Chattahoochee, when I will (by the left flank) 
reach the railroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from the 
railroad witli ten days' supplies in wagons. Johnston may come out of his 
intrenebments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I want, for General 
Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with the enemy south of Kene- 
saw. I think that Allatoona and the line of the Etowah are strong enough 
for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially down the 
Sandtown road straight for Atlanta. 

" McPherson drew out his lines during the night of July 2d, leaving Gar- 
rard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, and moved to the rear of 
the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down the Nickajack; but Johnston 
detected the movement, and promptly abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I 
expected as much, for by the earliest dawn of the 3d of July I was up at a 
large spy-glass, mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States 
Engineers, had at his bivouac close by our camp. I directed the glass on 
Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill cautiously. Soon 
they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly see their movements as 
they ran along the crest just abandoned by the enemy. In a minute I roused 
my staff", and started them off' with orders in every direction for a pursuit by 
every possible road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat, 
especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River. * * * * 

"As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's entire 
army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw, to the right, below 
Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack toward Turner's Ferry 
of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to choose between a direct assault 
on Thomas' intrenched position, or to permit us to make a lodgment on his 
railroad below Marrietta, or even to cross the Chattahoochee. Of course, he 
chose to let go Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp, 
prepared by his orders in advance, on the north and west bank of the Chatta- 
hoochee, covering the railroad crossing and his several pontoon bridges." 

The points of this narrative are very clearly made, but 
most contradictory of each other, as even a causual reading 
will reveal, and wholly at variance in important particulars 
with the official record, as will shortly be made to appear. 
They may be fairly summed up as follows : 

1. During the 25th of June, the assault being on the morn- 
ing of the 27th, General Schofield had extended his right as 
far as prudent. 

2. After a consultation with Thomas, McPherson, and 
Schofield, it was agreed, because the line was then extended 



110 KENESAW. 

as far as prudent, that there was no alternative but to assault 
the mountain. 

3. Notwithstanding it was so imprudent to stretch out any- 
more, that an assault was necessary instead, still Schofield, 
while the assault was in progress, moved off to the right, 
across Olley's Creek, while the cavalry extended his line still 
further, to the Sweetwater. 

4. Satisfied of the bloody cost of assaulting the position at 
Kenesaw, General Sherman concluded to flank it by extending 
his lines to the right as far as Fulton, and possibly to the 
Chattahoochee River, still further beyond. 

5. " General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it 
risky to leave the railroad," but something had to be done, 
and so he (Sherman) decided to extend his lines as above. 

6. The moment Johnston detected this movement, he 
promptly, and as a matter of course, let go Kenesaw and 
Marietta without a fight. 

In answer to the contradictions implied by the third point 
above, it may be claimed that it was the assault which fixed 
Johnston's attention, and required help from his flanks, that 
made it possible for Schofield to extend his lines. But the 
official records show that Schofield was actually prolonging 
his lines the whole day preceding the battle — that is, during 
the 26th — in spite of the statements in the text that, " during 
the 24th and 25th, he had extended his right as far as pru- 
dent." If, on the other hand, it be claimed that Schofield's 
movement on the 26th was to compel the enemy to withdraw 
part of his force from Kenesaw to strengthen the flank in 
front of Schofield, and thus make the assault practicable, it 
would appear that a stronger flanking movement might have 
caused the enemy to withdraw entirely, without the necessity 
of an assault, exactly as did occur a few days after. 

The records have much to say about Kenesaw that is not 
even referred to in the Memoirs. 

The following field dispatches from General Sherman to Gen- 
eral Schofield, who was operating on the right, will be suffi- 



KENE3AW. Ill 

cient to show that the latter was extending his lines during 
the 26th and also during the 27th, the day of the assault : 

Sherman to Schofield, June 26 : " Is the brigade across 
Olley's Creek above the Sandtown road, or at the road?" 

Sherman to Schofield, June 26 : " All right. Be careful of 
a brigade so exposed, but I am willing to risk a good deal." 

Sherman to Schofield, June 26 : " Good bridge should be 
made to-night across Olley's Creek, where the brigade is 
across, and operations resumed there in the morning early." 

Sherman to Schofield, June 27, 11:45 a. m.: "Neither 
McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking; through, 
but each has made substantial progress at some cost. Push 
your operations on the flank and keep me advised." 

The following parts of dispatches to General Thomas bear 
upon the same point: 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1:30 P. M.: " Schofield has 
one division close up on the Powder Spring road, and the 
other (division) across Olley's Creek, about two miles to hia 
right and rear." 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27,4:10 p.m.: "Schofield has 
gained the crossing of Olley's Creek on the Sandtown road, 
the only advantage of the day." 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, evening: "Schofield has the 
Sandtown road, within eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and 
we could move by that flank." 

As will be seen from the extracts quoted from the Memoirs, 
General Sherman claims that the assault was the result of a 
consultation and agreement between himself and Generals 
Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield. As a matter of fact the 
latter did not favor an assault but earnestly discouraged it. 
Two of these officers are now dead, but the field orders of 
General Thomas are accessible, and the whole tenor of these 
disputes General Sherman's claim, as will now appear. 

From his telegraph station, on a hill in rear of Thomas' 



112 KENESAW. 

center, General Sherman communicated with him throughout 
the day. Of these dispatches the following bear upon the 

question at issue: 

Thomas to Sherman, 8 a.m., June 27: "The movement of 
my troops against the enemy's work has commenced." 

Which was answered as follows: 

" Every thing moving well on this flank, and Schofield 
reports the same. Push your troops with all the energy pos- 
sible. W. T. S." 

Thomas to Sherman, in the field, 9 A. m., June 27: "Gen- 
eral Howard reports that he has advanced and is doing well. 
I have not yet received report from Palmer." 

Answered as follows : 

"All well. Keep things moving. 

"9:50 a. m. W. T. S." 

Thomas to Sherman, 10:45 A. M., June 27: "Yours received. General 
Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces of the enemy's breast- 
works, and was repulsed with canister at that range, General Harker losing 
an arm. General Wagner's brigade of Newton's division, supporting Gen- 
eral Harker, was so severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. 
Colonel Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division captured one line of rebel 
breastworks, which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also very severely 
handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. Colonel McCook 
wounded. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all 
too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all we have gained." 

General Sherman upon receiving this urged another attempt 
to break the line, as follows : 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 11:45 A. M.: "McPherson's column marched 
to the top of the hill through very tangled brush, but was repulsed ; it is 
found almost impossible to deploy, but they still hold the ground. I wish 
you to study well the positions, and if it be possible to break the line do it; 
it is easier now than it will be hereafter. I hear Leggett's guns well behind 
the mountain." 



KENESAW. 113 

A little later Sherman again urged Thomas to make a sec- 
ond assault, as the following dispatch shows: 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1:30 P. M.: "McPherson and Schofield are at 
a dead-lock? Do you think you can carry any of the enemy's main line 
to-day ? McPherson's men are up to the abattis, and can't move without 
the direct assault. I will order the assault if you think you can succeed at 
any point. Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Spring road, 
and the other across Olley's Creek, two miles to his right and rear." 

To both of these dispatches General Thomas sent the fol- 
lowing reply, expressing himself decidedly against a second 
assault : 

Thomas to Sherman, 1:40 P. M., 27th June: "Your dispatches 11:45 A. M. 
and 1:30 p. M. received. Davis' two brigades are now within sixty yards of 
the enemy's intrenchments. Davis reports that he does not think he can 
carry the works by assault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can 
hold his position, put in one or two batteries to-night, and probably drive 
them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the same. Their 
works are from six to seven feet high and nine feet thick. In front of How- 
ard they have a very strong abattis. Davis' loss in officers has been very 
heavy. Nearly all the field officers of McCook's brigade, with McCook have 
been killed or wounded. From what the officers tell me I do not think we 
can carry the works by assault at this point to-day, but they can be 
approached by saps and the enemy driven out. 

"Very respectfully, George H. Thomas, Major- General." 

General Sherman replied as follows, still suggesting another 
assault by intimating that the difficulties were not sufficient to 
warrant the use of time enough for regular approaches : 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 2:25 p. M.; ''Secure what advantageous 
ground you have gained ; but is there any thing in the enemy's present position 
that if we should approach by regular saps, he could not make a dozen new 
parapets before our saps were completed? Does the nature of the ground 
warrant the time necessary for regular approaches?" 

To this Thomas returned the following very decided answer: 

Thomas to Sherman, June 27: "Your dispatch of 2:25 received. We still 
hold all the ground we have gained, and the division commanders report 
their ability to hold. They also report the enemy's works exceedingly 
strong; in fact, so strong that they can not be carried by assault, except by 



114 KENESAW. 

immense sacrifice, even if they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the 
best chance is to approach them by regular saps, and if we can find a favorable 
approach to batter them down. We have already lost heavily to-day without 
gaining any material advantage. One or two more such assaults would use 
up this army. G. H. Thomas, Major- General." 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 4:10 p. m.: " Schofield has gained the cross- 
ing of Olley's Creek, on the Sandtown road, the only advantage of the day. 
You may order all ground of value gained to-day to be secured, and prepare 
batteries in the manner proposed by Davis. I doubt if we can resort to 
regular approaches." 

Thomas to Sherman, June 27, 6 p. M : "The assault of the enemy's works 
in my front was well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work 
with the greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due 
only to the strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well manned, 
thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against the assault. We 
have lost nearly two thousand officers and men, among them two brigade 
commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade in Newton's division, 
and Colonel Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade in Jeff. Davis' division, 
both reported to be mortally wounded, besides some six or eight field officers 
killed. Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the 
enemy's breastworks, and all say that had they not been wounded we would 
have driven the enemy from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer 
think that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries 
for enfilading the enemy's works. We took between ninety and one hundred 
prisoners." 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, evening: "Let your troops fortify as close 
up to the enemy as possible. Get good positions for artillery, and group 
your command as conveniently as you can by corps and divisions, keeping 
reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within eleven miles of the Chat- 
tahoochee, and we could move by that flank. The question of supplies will 
be the only one. I regret beyond measure the loss of two such young and 
dashing officers, as Harker and Dan. McCook. McPherson lost two or three 
of his young and dashing officers, which is apt to be the case in unsuccessful 
assaults. Had we broken the line to-day it would have been most decisive; 
but, as it is, our loss is small compared with some of those East. It should 
not in the least discourage us. At times assaults are necessary and inevitable. 
At Arkansas Post we succeeded ; at Vicksburg we failed. I do not think our 
loss to-day greater than Johnston's when he attacked Hooker and Schofield 
the first day we occupied our present ground." 

The excuses made to General Thomas for the assault in the 
last part of the above dispatch are significant. 

The same evening he telegraphed Halleck, intimating as a 



KENESAW. 115 

reason for the assault that the position could not well be 
turned without abandoning the railroad : 

"I can not well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my 
railroad, and we. are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as 
the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies of any 
kind here. I can press Johnston and keep him from reenforcing Lee, but to 
assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can spare." 

And yet at 9 o'clock the same evening he telegraphed Gen- 
eral Thomas : 

"Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our 
railroad? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured 
the way." 

But his excuses to Generals Halleck and Grant a few days 
later cap the climax of all which the records contain in regard 
to Kenesaw. Witness the following : 

Sherman to Halleck, July 9 : " The assault I made was no mistake. I had 
to do it. The enemy, and our own army and officers, had settled down into 
the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the 
moment the enemy was found behind any thing like a parapet, why, every 
body would deploy, throw up counter-works and take it easy, leaving it to 
the 'Old Man' to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one- 
fourth more vigor, mathematically, I would have put the head of George 
Thomas' whole army right through Johnston's deployed line, on the best 
ground for 'go-ahead,' while my whole forces were well in hand on roads 
converging to my then object, Marietta." 

And the following: 

Sherman to Grant, July 12: "I regarded an assault on the 27th June 
necessary, for two good reasons: first, because the enemy, as well as my own 
army, had settled down into the belief that 'flanking' alone was my game; 
and second, that on that day and ground, had the assault succeeded, I could 
have broken Johnston's center and pushed his army back in confusion and 
with great loss to his bridges over the Chattahoochee. We lost nothing in 
morale in the assault, for I followed it up on the extreme right, and compelled 
him to quit the very strong lines of Kenesaw, Smyrna camp ground, and the 
Chattahoochee in quick succession." 

But Sherman states that the enemy lost only eight hundred 



116 KENESAW. 

and eight in killed and wounded during the attack. So it 
could not have been the assault that finally induced him to 
leave, but the "flanking." And this was just as practicable 
before the assault as after it, and was subsequently made with- 
out the cost of a battle. 

The above dispatches and extracts suggest all needed 
comment. 

In the extract from the Memoirs quoted above, there is a 
slur upon General Thomas, which deserves notice. 

Says General Sherman : 

"Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking intrenched lines, I at once thought 
of moving the whole army to a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Mari- 
etta. * * * * General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming 
it risky to leave the railroad " * * 

For this insinuation there is no excuse. The following is 
the telegram from Sherman to Thomas, proposing this very 

move to the latter : 

Headquarters, June 27, 9 P. M. 
General Thomas: 

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our rail- 
road? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way. 

W. T. Sherman, Major- General commanding. 

In the first place, as General Sherman communicated with 
General Thomas upon this subject by telegraph and in cipher, 
it is evident that Thomas could not have shaken his head 
through that medium; and second, while a figurative shaking 
might have been communicated in very plain terms, the dis- 
patches show not only that this indication of dissent was 
wholly wanting, but that on the contrary, Thomas approved 
the plan in the following exceedingly suggestive and emphatic 
manner : 

Headquarters Department op the Cumberland, June 27. 
General Sherman: 

What force do you think of moving with? If with the greater part of 
the army I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve 

feet thick and strongly abattised. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. V. 



KENESAW. 117 

Immediately after the above, Thomas telegraphed the fol- 
lowing- inquiry, having in view, evidently, the possibility that 
his pontoons might be needed : 

General Sherman. June 27. 

How far is Fulton from the crossing of Olley's Creek ? Will we have to 
cross any other streams of much size ? When do you wish to start ? 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General. 

And yet with these telegrams in the record, showing prompt 
approval of his move, and a disposition to cooperate in it 
immediately, General Sherman ventures the above fling at 
General Thomas. 

These last dispatches were answered as follows, Sherman 
to Thomas, June 27th, 9:30 p.m.: "According to Merrill's 
map it is about ten miles. Nickajack the only stream to cross. 
Time for starting day after to-morrow." 

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 9:45 p. m. : u If we move on 
Fulton, we must move with the whole army, leaving our 
railroad on the chance of success. Go where w r e may, we will 
find the breastworks and abattis, unless we move more rapidly 
than we have heretofore." 

The dispatches thus far quoted, have been at all times 
accessible to General Sherman, and they are quite sufficient to 
show that the correct history of the battle at Kenesaw is not 
set forth in his Memoirs. 

Of the immediate effect of the flanking movement on 
Kenesaw, begun on the night of the 2d of July following 
the assault, General Sherman says : 

"As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving MePherson's entire 
army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the right, below 
Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack toward Turner's Ferry of 
the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to choose between a direct assault <>n 
Thomas' intrenched position, or to permit us to make a lodgment on his 
railroad below Marietta, or even to cross the Chattahoochee. Of course he 
chose to let go Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp 
prepared by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the Chatta- 
hoochee, covering the railroad crossing and his several pontoon bridges. 
I confess I had not learned beforehand of the existence of this strong place, 



118 IvENESAW. 

in the nature of a tite-du-pont, and had counted on striking him an effectual 
blow in the expected confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad 
and deep river then to his rear. Ordering every part of the army to pursue 
vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta, just 
quitted by the rebel rear guard, and was terribly angry at the cautious pursuit 
by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our infantry columns. But 
Johnston had in advance cleared and multiplied his roads; whereas ours 
had to cross at right angles from the direction of Powder Springs toward 
Marietta, producing delay and confusion. By night Thomas' head of col mini 
ran up against a strong rear guard intrenched at Smyrna camp ground, six 
miles below Marietta, and there, on the next day, we celebrated our Fourth 
of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed chiefly to hold the 
enemy there till Generals McPherson and Schofield could get well into 
position below him, near the Chattahoochee crossings. It was here that 
General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, lost his leg. * * * * During 
the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside the tSte i 
at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the strongest pieces of held 
fortification I ever saw." 

This "noisy but not desperate battle" of July 4th was 
nothing less than an attack upon the strong works at Smyrna 
camp ground by the Sixteenth Corps under General Dodge, 
who pressed close up, and then sent a storming party of two 
brigades over them. It was one of the most gallant and suc- 
cessful fights of the Atlanta campaign, and one of the very 
few instances where heavy intrench ments were carried by 
direct assault. General Sherman ordered General McPherson 
to attack these lines, and he in turn, forwarded the order to 
General Dodge, directing the latter to move against the works 
if he thought he could carry them. They were stormed, 
General Noyes of Ohio, having prominent command in the 
charging column, and carried. As a consequence, the rebels 
let go the strong line of Smyrna camp ground and retreated.' 



CHAPTER X. 

THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA AND ITS POLITICAL GENERALS. 

General Sherman's recollections fail to supply the inter- 
esting and significant inside history of the battle of Atlanta, 
by which name the action of July 22d was usually known in 
his army. 

Speaking of two of the prominent actors in that battle, he 
says : 

"I regarded both Generals Logan and Blair as 'volunteers,' that looked to 
personal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, 
and not as professional soldiers." 

And again : 

"Both were men of great courage and talent, but were politicians by nature 
and experience, and it may be that for this reason they were mistrusted by 
regular officers like Generals Schofield, Thomas, and myself." 

The first of these paragraphs suggests the reflection whether 
it is any more reprehensible for volunteer generals to be 
actuated by "political ambition," than for professional soldiers 
to look upon " personal fame and glory" as their chief incen- 
tive — for such is the position in which General Sherman leaves 
his friends. The public will not judge them so harshly. 
These two brief extracts form a portion of General Sherman's 
comments upon the battle of Atlanta. 

At the very opening of this action, McPherson then com- 
manding the Army of the Tennessee was killed, and the 
desperate battle was fought through from noon till after night 
by his troops, commanded by these same political Generals 

(110) 



120 ATLANTA. ' 

and volunteers, Logan and Blair, assisted by that other well 
known politcian and volunteer, General Dodge, then command- 
ing the Sixteenth Corps. 

It was preeminently a battle fought and won by the class 
of officers and men thus pointed out by General Sherman. 
These saved one of his armies that day from the results of 
a surprise as great as fell upon him at Shiloh. Under these 
circumstances it would be natural to expect that high soldierly 
sentiment, if possessed by him, would not only have prompted 
a full acknowledgment of such services, unaccompanied by 
any questioning of motives, but would also have led him to 
assume the responsibility for a surprise which belonged solely 
to himself. But the reader of these Memoirs will look in vain 
for the key with which to unlock the mysteries of the situation 
on that day. The official record, however, supplies it. 

Ten pages of the Memoirs are devoted to this action. 

The situation was as follows : On the night of the 21st 
of July Sherman's army had fought its way close up to the 
outer lines of the rebels, established at an average of a little 
over three miles from Atlanta, and north and east of the city. 
Thomas was on the right, with the Army of the Cumberland ; 
Schofield, with the Army of the Ohio, occupied the center, 
and McPherson's Army of the Tennessee held the left. 

It had been ascertained three days before — that is, on the 
18th — that Hood had relieved Johnston, and what was ex- 
pected of the former is shown by the following statement in 
the Memoirs : 

"I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his classmate at 
West Point, about Hood — as to his general character, etc., and learned that 
he was bold, even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme. I inferred 
that the change of commanders meant 'fight.' Notice of this important 
change was at once sent to all parts of the army, and every division com- 
mander was cautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape." 

It would have been fortunate, as the sequel will show, if 
General Sherman had heeded his own cautions. 

On the 20th, Hood made a " furious sally " on the right. 



ATLANTA. 121 

The Union loss was about two thousand, and General Sher- 
man thus states the result : 

"We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, had re- 
pelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard ; and 
the event illustrated the future tactics of our enemy." After 
this the reader would not expect to read of a great surprise. 
Nor will the traces of it be found very clearly marked in the 
book, as will now appear: 

"During the night" (of the 21st) "I had full reports from all parts of our 
line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that 
McPherson was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note 
early in the morning" (of the 22d) "not to extend so much by his left; for we 
had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to 
destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then 
to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered 
McPherson not to extend any further to the left, but to employ General 
Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail 
and tie of the railroad from Decatur up to his skirmish line, and I wanted 
him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard returned from 
Covington (whither I had sent him) to move to the extreme right of Thomas, 
so as to reach, if possible, the railroad below Atlanta, viz.: the Macon road. 

" In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, ' Peach-tree line,' to 
the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced 
rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed the enemy 
intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of Scho- 
field's troops. * * * * Schofield was dressing forward his lines, 
and I could hear Thomas further to the right engaged, when General 
McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a 
double frame building, with a porch, and sat on the step discussing the 
chances of battle and of Hood's general character. McPherson had also 
been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. 
We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious, and prepared at all times 
for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of 
a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, 
and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued 
the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent 
conduct of General Joe. Johnston. McPherson was in excellent spirits, 
well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see 
me about the order I had given him to use Dodge's corps to break up the rail- 
road, * * * saying that before receiving my order he had diverted 
Dodge's two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal 



122 ATLANTA. 

one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith's division 
(Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank. * * * * 
Of course I assented at once. * * * * While we sat there we could 
hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and 
occasionally round shot from twelve or twenty -four pound guns came through 
the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all 
along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left, but 
presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles 
A. Smith's division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward 
Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket compass (which 
I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, Ave became satisfied 
that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, 
and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies, * * * * 
jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back 
word what these sounds meant. * * * * (Soon after) — one of 
McPherson's staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, 
and reported that General McPherson was either ' killed or a prisoner.' He 
explained that when they had left me, a few minutes before, they had ridden 
rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the 
position occupied by General Giles A. Smith's division, and that McPherson 
had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve 
brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank ; that he had 
reached the head of Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal 
road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point ; 
that then, almost, if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading 
across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared 
in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security. The sound of 
musketry was there heard and McPherson's horse came back, bleeding, 
wounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff officer who brought this message 
to return at once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the 
Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him 
to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the 
Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank. I soon 
dispatched one of my own staff (McCoy, I think) to General Logan, with 
similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle 
(holding fast to Leggett's Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I 
would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would 
re-enforce him if he needed it." * * * * 

After explaining how Hood had first withdrawn from his 
outer line on the night of the 21st, occupied the fortified line 
next to Atlanta, and then sallied out with part of his force, 
passed entirely around the left of the Army of the Tennessee, 



ATLANTA. 123 

an<l struck it in flank and rear while a portion of it was in 
motion, General Sherman continues: 

" The enemy was, therefore, enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach 
quil near before he was discovered; indeed, his skirmish line had worked 
through the timber and got into the field to the rear of Giles A. Smith's 
division of the Seventeenth Corps unseen, had captured Murray's battery of 
regular artillery, moving through these woods entirely unguarded, and had 
got possession of several of the hospital camps. 

" The right of this rebel line struck Dodge's troops in motion ; but, fortun- 
ately, this corps (Sixteenth) had only to halt, face to the left, and was in line 
of battle; and this corps not only held in check the enemy, but drove him 
back through the woods. About the same time this same force had struck 
I ' Giles A. Smith's left flank, doubled it back, captured four guns in 

position and the party engaged in building the very battery, which was the 
special object of McPherson's visit to me, and almost enveloped the entire left 
flank. The men, however, were skillful and brave, and fought for a time 
with their backs to Atlanta. They gradually fell back, compressing their 
own line, and gaining strength by making junction with Leggett's division 
of the Seventeenth Corps, well and strongly posted on the hill. One or two 
3 of the Fifteenth Corps, ordered by McPherson, came rapidly across 
th n field to the rear, from the direction of the railroad, filled up the gap 

from Blair's new left to the head of Dodge's column — now facing to the general 
left — thus forming a strong left flank at right angles to the original line of 
battle. The enemy attacked, boldly and repeatedly, the whole of this flank, 
but met an equally fierce resistance, and on that ground a bloody battle raged 
from little after noon till into the night. * * * * 

" I rode over the whole of it " (the field) " the next day, and it bore the marks 
of a bloody conflict. The enemy had retired during the night inside of 
Atlanta, and we remained master of the situation outside. I purposely 
allowed the Army of the Tennessee" [then in the hands of three political 
generals] "to fight this battle almost unaided, save by demonstrations on the 
part of Generals Schofield and Thomas against the fortified lines to their im- 
mediate fronts, and by detaching, as described, one of Schofield's brigades to 

I i . because I knew that the attacking force could only be a part of 

I I army, and that, if any assistance were rendered by either of the other 
. the Army of the Tennessee would be jealous. Nobly did they do 

their work that day, and terrible was the slaughter done to our enemy, though 
at sad cost to ourselves." 

In reporting upon the battle to General Halleck, General 
Sherman telegraphed: 

"McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to the command, as it 
were, in the midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left; but it 



124 ATLANTA. 

soon recovered, and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practiced one 
of his favorite games of attacking our left when in motion, and before it had 
time to cover its weak flank." 

Following this, among some general observations upon the 
battle, and the question of a successor, the extracts given at 
the opening of this chapter are found. 

From the above fair outlines of General Sherman's account, 
the reader would conclude that some of the warnings received 
in regard to Hood's methods were disregarded, and that the 
new Confederate commander had sallied against, and passed 
entirely around our left, finding it unprepared and partly in 
motion by the flank, and that some confusion resulted, and a 
bloody battle, which was not particularly unexpected by 
General Sherman, and did not, in a great degree, disturb 
him. 

The real reason for this confusion on the left does not 
appear in the Memoirs. The key to unlock the bloody mys- 
teries of the 22d of July, where the Union loss was thirty- 
five hundred men, with General McPherson, and ten pieces of 
artillery, lies deeply covered under the sentence : " For some 
moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate." 

Some omitted leaves from the official record will show how 
long these " moments " were. 

In a report made by General Sherman to General Halleck, 
dated August 15, 1864, this paragraph occurs, though it is 
not mentioned in his book : 

" On the morning of the 22d, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was 
found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give us 
Atlanta without further contest. But General Johnston had been relieved 
of the command, and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed 
resolved upon, of which a bold attack upon our right was an index, * * 
-s- « About 10 A. M. I was in person with General Schofield examining 
the appearance of the enemy's line opposite the distillery, where we attracted 
enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy 
was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight." 

The last order recorded in General McPherson's field letter 



ATLANTA. 125 

book, in the morning of the clay he was killed, furnishes a 
further commentary upon those "moments," during which 
General Sherman thought the enemy "intended to evacuate:" 

Three and a Half Miles East of Atlanta, Georgia, ) 

July 22, 1864. J 

Major-General John A. Logan, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps: 

The enemy having evacuated their works in front of our lines, the suppo- 
sition of Major-General Sherman is that they have given up Atlanta, and are 
retreating in the direction of East Point. 

You will immediately put your command in pursuit to the south and east 
of Atlanta, without entering the town. You will keep a route to the left of 
that taken by the enemy, and try to cut off a portion of them while they are 
pressed in the rear and on our right by Generals Schofield and Thomas. 
Major-General Sherman desires and expects a vigorous pursuit. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

James B. McPherson, Major-General. 

The following telegram also furnishes testimony to the same 

end : 

Camp on Railroad, Four Miles from Atlanta, ) 
9 P. M., July 22, 1864. j 
Major Thomas T. Eckert, Washington. 

At daylight to-day it was found that the rebels had gone from our entire 
front, and General Sherman announced the occupation of Atlanta by Schofield, 
and ordered pursuit by Thomas and McPherson. Vigorous pursuit was made, 
and the enemy found in the fortifications of Atlanta, and not Schofield. We 
hold the railroad to within two and a half miles of the center of the place ; 
that is about the average distance of the whole line, though Schofield and 
Dodge are nearer. The fighting has been severe, and we lose McPherson, 
killed by a shot through the lungs while on a reconnoissance. It is thought 
that the enemy will be gone in the morning, as they have attacked and been 
repulsed since dark. Hood fights his graybacks desperately. 

J. C. Van Duzen, Cipher Operator, U. S. M. T. 

One of the political generals however had informed himself 
very early in the morning that the rebels had not evacuated 
Atlanta, as General Sherman supposed : but instead, held the 
inner Ijnes, near the city, in force. This appears from Gen- 
eral Dodge's report of the operations of the Sixteenth Corps 
on the Atlanta campaign, in which he says : 

" At 4 o'clock a. m. of the 22d of July, General Sweeney, commanding the 



126 ATLANTA. 

Second Division, reported to me that the enemy had disappeared from his 
front, and I immediately ordered him to push forward a heavy skirmish line, 
which he did promptly, and reported the enemy in force in the works sur- 
rounding Atlanta." 

Upon this corps, a few hours later, fell the chief brunt of 
the battle, as it was hastening to defend the left, and the char- 
acter of its fighting is sufficiently shown by the facts that it 
first held its ground, then repulsed the enemy, and that every 
field officer engaged appears to have been on the list of the 
killed or wounded. 

The character of the surprise upon the left is shown by 
the following extract from General Blair's report of the 
battle : 

" In the morning of the 22d the enemy came in on my rear and left in very 
heavy force, with the intention of overpowering and destroying this corps. 
Although we had no warning of his approach, and although attacked imme- 
diately in rear, the men and officers behaved with unparalleled gallantry, 
repulsing every assault, changing front repeatedly with a coolness and courage 
which can not be too highly praised." 

The account given in the above narrative, of the early note 
to McPherson not to extend so far to the left, certainly needs 
further explanation in the light of the order, also an early 
one, to pursue the rebels well to the left, past Atlanta even, 
and on toward East Point. 

The question also arises, if Hood, in his sally, was prac- 
tising one of his "favorite games," why he was allowed to 
succeed so well in his play. 

But the one point that will stand out in bolder relief than 
any other, is the flippancy with which the terms "volunteers" 
and "political generals" are used against those who, in the 
midst of grave surprise, brought on by the order of the com- 
manding general, rallied their three corps in the face of an 
army that had outflanked them, and burst upon them in 
reverse as well, and fought for hours with the rebel line — 
sometimes from one face of abandoned Confederate works, 
sometimes from the other, through that long Summer after- 



ATLANTA. 127 

noon and far into the night, and against every disadvantage 
finally achieved victory, and retrieved the one great mistake 
with which the commanding general began the day; namelv, 
announcing the evacuation of Atlanta and starting two of his 
armies by the flank in pursuit. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA DID GRANT OR SHERMAN PLAN IT? 

Did General Sherman originate the idea of the March to 
the Sea? This is a question which he makes very prominent 
in his Memoirs, and answers at length and most decidedly in 
the affirmative. But here, as in other instances which have 
been brought to the attention of the public, the distinguished 
author and historian ignores some important portions of the 
official records which others may find interesting. 

The following is the version of the origin of this move- 
ment given in Volume II of the Memoirs: 

" I have often been asked by well-meaning mends, when the thought of 
that march first entered my mind. I knew that an army which had pene- 
trated Georgia as far as Atlanta could not turn back. It must go ahead ; 
but when, how, and where, depended on many considerations. As soon as 
Hood had shifted across from Lovejoy's to Palmetto I saw the move in my 
" mind's eye ;" and, after Jeff. Davis' speech at Palmetto, of September 26, I 
was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as to the time and 
manner. When General Hood first struck our railroad above Marietta we 
were not ready, and I was forced to watch his movements further till he had 
"caromed off" to the west of Decatur. Then I was perfectly convinced, and 
had no longer a shadow of doubt. The only possible question was as to 
Thomas' strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field." — Page 166. 

Hood shifted to Palmetto September 21st; Davis' speech 
was on the 26th of September, and Hood moved to the west 
of Decatur October 26th; so that Sherman's account fixes the 
following points for himself: 

The move was in his "mind's eye," September 21, 1864. 
He was in doubt as to time and manner after September 26. 

(128) 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 129 

He had no doubt about the move October 26. 
The points of the narrative, in the chapter devoted to the 
question of planning the March to the Sea, are these : 

Hood having moved upon Sherman's railroad communica- 
tions, General Thomas returned to Chattanooga with a con- 
siderable force, and on the 29th of September Sherman tele- 
graphed the condition of affairs to Halleck, saying, among 
other things, "I prefer for the future to make the movement 
on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah." 

On that day (October 1) he telegraphed Grant : 

* * * " Why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces 

which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me 
to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, 
breaking railroads and doing irreparable damage? We can not remain on 
the defensive." 

On the 9th (October) he telegraphed General Thomas at 

Nashville : 

"I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and 
to make for the sea-coast. We can not defend this long line of road." 

On that same day he telegraphed to General Grant at City 
Point: 

"It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, 
Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without 
home or habitation. * * * I propose that we break up the rail- 

road from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for 
Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. * * * * I can make this 
march, and make Georgia howl!" 

October 10th he telegraphed Thomas as follows : 

" He (Hood) is now crossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west. 
Let me know if you can hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and 
the expected reinforcements, as, in that event, you know what I propose 
to do." 

And on the same day to General Grant: 

"Hood is now crossing the Coosa twelve miles below Rome, bound west. 
9 



130 THE MAECH TO THE SEA. 

If he passes over to the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, had I better not execute the 
plan of my letter sent you by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas 
with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an 
ample force when the reenforcements ordered reach Nashville. * * * * 

"From General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's army had disap- 
peared, but in what direction he was still in doubt ; and I was so strongly 
convinced of the wisdom of my proposition to change the whole tactics of the 
campaign, to leave Hood to General Thomas, and to march across Georgia 
to Savannah or Charleston, that I again telegraphed to General Grant: 

" 'Kingston, Ga., October 11, 11 A. M. 
" 'Lieutenant- General Gkant. 

"' We can not now remain on the defensive. With twenty-five thousand 
infantry, and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my road. 
I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from 
Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded 
and unserviceable men, and with my effective army move through Georgia, 
smashing things to the sea. * ::: " I can make Savannah, 

Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochie (Appalachicola). Answer 
quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.' 

" I received no answer to this at the time. * * * * 
" It was at Ship's Gap that a courier brought me the cipher message from 
General Halleck which intimated that the authorities in Washington were 
willing I should undertake the march across Georgia to the sea. The trans- 
lated dispatch named ' Horse-i-bar Sound' as the point where the fleet would 
await my arrival. After much time I construed it to mean 'Ossabaw Sound,' 
below Savannah, which was correct. [General Sherman gives none of the 
dispatches which passed in regard to the matter.] 

" On the 16th I telegraphed General Thomas at Nashville : 

"' Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions. Reestablish the road, 
and I will follow Hood wherever he may go.' * * * * 

"General Thomas' reply was (October 17) : 

* * * * '"Mower and Wilson have arrived and are on their way 
to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose, 
rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through 
Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant can not cooperate with you as 
at first arranged.' 

"So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General Thomas 
heartily tivored my proposed plan ol campaign. 

"On the 26th of October I learned that Hood's whole army had made its 
appearance about Decatur, Alabama, and at once caused a strong reconnois- 
sance to be made down the Coosa to near Gadsden, which revealed the truth 
that the enemy was gone, except a small force of cavalry, commanded by 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 131 

General Wheeler, which had been left to watch us. I then finally resolved 
on my future course, which was to leave Hood to be encountered by General 
Thomas, while I should carry into full effect the long-contemplated project of 
marching' for the sea-coast, and thence to operate toward Richmond. But it 
was all-important to me and to our cause that General Thomas should have 
an ample force, equal to any and every emergency. 

"He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops, and as 
many more civil employes of the quartermaster's department, which were 
not suited for the field, but would be most useful in manning the excellent 
forts that already covered Nashville. At Chattanooga he had General Steed- 
man's division, ahout five thousand men, besides garrisons lor Chattanooga, 
Bridgeport, and Stevenson ; at Murfreesboro he also had General Rousseau's 
division, which was full five thousand strong, independent of the necessary 
garrisons for the railroad. At Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama, was the 
infantry division of General R. S. Granger, estimated at four thousand, and 
near Florence, Alabama, watching the crossings of the Tennessee, were Gen- 
eral Edward Hatch's division of cavalry, four thousand ; General Croxton's 
brigade, twenty five hundred, and Colonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred. 
Besides winch General J. H. Wilson had collected in Nashville about ten 
thousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidly collecting the nec- 
essary horses for a remount. All these aggregated about forty-five thou- 
sand men. 

"General A. J. Smith at that time was in Missouri with the two divisions 
of the Sixteenth Corps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist 
General Rosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri. This 
object had been accomplished, and these troops, numbering from eight to ten 
thousand, had been ordered to Nashville. To these I proposed at first to add 
only the Fourth Corps (General Stanley), fifteen thousand, and that corps was 
ordered from Gaylesville to march to Chattanooga and thence to report for 
orders to General Thomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of October, at 
Rome, Georgia, learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised 
by General Grant were coming forward very slowly, I concluded to further 
reenforce him by General Schofield's corps (Twenty-third), twelve thousand, 
which corps accordingly marched for Resaca, and there took the cars for 
Chattanooga. I then knew that General Thomas would have an ample force 
with which to encounter General Hood any where in the open field, besides 
garrisons to secure the railroad to his rear, and as far forward as Chatta- 
nooga. * * * 

"On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to General Grant [Gen- 
eral Sherman does not give this dispatch], and on the 2d of November 
received (at Rome) this dispatch: 

"'City Point, November 1, 1S64, 6 P. M. 
ut Major- General Shermax. 

"'Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to 
entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's 



132 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

army destroyed you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and 
still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of 
you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is far away he 
might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while 
you are pushing in the other. If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's 
army, attend to that first and make your other move secondary. 

" ' U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General.' 
" My answer is dated : 

" ' Rome, Ga., November 2, 1864. 
" ' General Grant. 

" ' Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood I would 
turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the south- 
west, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his chief object. 
If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I may turn in that direction and 
endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat; but, thus far, he has not 
gone above the Tennessee River. General Thomas will have a force strong 
enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest, 
and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama. 
No single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results will 
follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis' cherished plan of making me leave 
Georgia by maneuvering. 

" 'Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced 
baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction ; but I regard the 
pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, 
I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction ; but, unless I 
let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.' 

"From that place, on the same day (November 2), [I] again telegraphed to 
General Grant : 

"'If I turn back the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my 
movements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and Thomas 
will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until the reinforce- 
ments from Missouri reach him. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga 
and Atlanta, and can stand a month's interruption to our communications. 
I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our railroad lines, except by 
cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I 
am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated 
movement through Georgia.' 

" That same day I received, in answer to the Rome dispatch, the following : 
'"City Point, Va., November 2, 1864,11:30 A. M. 
" ' To Major-General Sherman. 

" ' Your dispatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the 
same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, 
ought to be looked upon now as the object. With the force, however, you 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 133 

have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and 
destroy him. I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to 
follow Hood without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, 
go on as you propose. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General.' 

" This was the first time that General Grant assented to the March to the 
Sea, and, although many of his warm friends and admirers insist that he was 
the author and projector of that march, and that I simply executed his plans, 
General Grant has never, in my opinion, thought so or said so. The truth is 
full}- given in an original letter of President Lincoln, which I received at 
Savannah, Georgia, and have at tins instant before me, every word of which 
is in his own familiar handwriting. It is dated : 

" ' Washington, D. C, December 26, 1864. 
: '"" * * * "'When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic 
coast, I was anxious, if not fearful ; but, feeling that you were the better 
judge, and remembering ' nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not inter- 
fere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours ; for I 
believe none of us went further than to acquiesce; and, taking the work of 
General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great 
success. * a a- * A. Lincoln.'" 

Following this, in General Sherman's narrative, is the 
extract from page 167, given in the opening of this letter. A 
few brief extracts will close the account : 

"On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and telegraphed to General 
Grant [General Sherman does not give these papers] reviewing the whole 
situation, gave him my full plan of action, stated that I was ready to march 
as soon as the election was over, and appointed November 10th as the day 
for starting. On the 8th I received this dispatch : 

'"City Point, Va., November 1, 1S64, 10:30 P. M. 

'" Major- General Sherman. 

"'Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no present reason for 
changing your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do I will 
inform you. I think every thing here is favorable now. Great good fortune 
attend you! I believe you will be eminently successful, and at worst can 
only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for. 

"'U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- Genei-al.' 

" On the 10th of November the movement may be said to have fairly 
begun." 

The above is a full and fair summary of the account in the 
Memoirs of the discussion attending Sherman's starting for 



134 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

Savannah. It is in brief an extended argument to show that 
General Sherman planned the March to the Sea, and that 
General Grant and the authorities at Washington opposed his 
plan for several weeks, but finally gave a reluctant consent to 
its execution. This view has been impressed upon the country 
ever since the close of the war. 

It is doubtful whether a more skillful misuse of official 
records has ever before been made to uphold an erroneous 
history of a military movement, and this will now be made 
to appear. 

The question under discussion between the parties named 
was not whether General Sherman should make a campaign to 
the sea, but whether he should begin it by abandoning Atlanta 
and the line of the railroad, and especially before he destroyed 
Hood's army. A campaign to the sea to cut the Confederacy 
in two, was decided upon by General Grant during the previ- 
ous January, when he was in command at Nashville, and eight 
months before the time when General Sherman claims to have 
had such a move in his " mind's eye." General Thomas, General 
Halleck, and General Sherman were each notified at that time 
of this plan of General Grant. 

The first idea of the latter, as expressed in January, 1864, 
was to march through to Mobile, holding Atlanta and Mont- 
gomery as intermediate points, but the Union forces having 
occupied Mobile Bay on the 23d of August, just before the 
capture of Atlanta, General Grant, immediately after the fall 
of the latter place, telegraphed General Sherman that, as our 
forces had now secured the control of Mobile, he thought 
Sherman had better move on Augusta as soon as his men were 
rested, while Canby acted on Savannah. The following letters 
and telegrams are sufficiently explicit upon these points : 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
Nashville, Tenn., January 15, 1864. j 
[Confidential.] 
Major-General Halleck, Washington. 

* * * * I look upon the next line for me to secure, to be that 
from Chattanooga to Mobile, Montgomery and Atlanta being the important 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 135 

intermediate points. To do this, large supplies must be secured on the 
Tennessee Eiver, so as to he independent of the railroad from here to the 
Tennessee for a considerable length of time. Mobile would be a second base. 
The destruction which Sherman will do the roads around Meridian will be of 
material importance to us in preventing the enemy from drawing sui:>plies 
and in clearing that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. I do not 
look upon any points except Mobile in the south and the Tennessee River in 
the north as presenting practical starting points from which to operate against 
Atlanta and Montgomery. They are objectionable as starting points to be 
all under one command, from the fact that the time it will take to com- 
municate from one to the other will be so great But, Sherman or McPherson, 
one of whom would be entrusted with the distant command, are officers of 
such experience and reliability, that all objections on that score, except that 
of enabling the two armies to act as an unit, would be removed. ffi 

The same objection will exist probably not to so great an extent, however, 
if the movement is made in more than one column. This will have to be 
with an army of the size we will be obliged to use. 

Heretofore I have refrained from suggesting what might be done in other 
commands than my own, in cooperation with it, or even to think much over 
the matter. But, as you have kindly asked me in your letter of the 8th of 
January, only just received, for an interchange of views on our present situa- 
tion, I will write you again in a day or two, going outside of my own opera- 
tions. U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

Afterward, when General Grant was made Lieutenant- 
General and ordered East, turning over his command at Nash- 
ville to General Sherman, he sent the latter a copy of the 
above letter for his guidance. 

Four days after thus unfolding his plan for the Atanta and 
Gulf campaign to General Halleck, and while General Sher- 
man was on the Mississippi preparing his Meridian campaign, 
General Thomas, who was then in command at Chattanooga, 
was made acquainted with General Grant's design by the 
following letter : 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 1 
Nashville, January 19, 18(34. J 

Major-Gmeral George H. Thomas, Chattanooga. 

Owing to the presence of Longstreet in East Tennessee it will be impossible 
to attempt any movement from your present position while he remains. 

The great number of veterans now absent and yet to be furloughed will be 
another difficulty in the way of any movement this Winter. Sherman, how- 



136 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

ever, will be able to collect about twenty thousand men from that part of his 
command now along the Mississippi River available for a movement eastward 
from Vicksburg. He expects to have these ready to start about the 24th inst. 
He will proceed eastward as far as Meridan, at least, and will thoroughly destroy 
the roads east and south from there, and, if possible, will throw troops as far 
east as Selnia; or if he finds Mobile so far unguarded as to make his force 
sufficient for the enterprise, will go there. To cooperate with this movement, 
you want to keep up appearances of preparation of an advance from Chat- 
tanooga. It may be necessary even to move a column as far as Lafayette. 

The time for the advance, however, would not be before the 30th inst., or 
when you might learn the enemy were contemplating an attack. Logan will 
also be instructed to move, at the same time, what force he can from Belle- 
fontaine toward Rome. We will want to be ready at the earliest possible 
moment in the Spring for the advance. I look upon the line for this army to 
secure in the next campaign to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Atlanta 
and Montgomery being the important intermediate points. 

I look upon the Tennessee River and Mobile as being the most practicable 
points from which to start, and to hold as bases of supplies if the line is 
secured. I have so written to the General-in-Chief, only giving my views 
more fully, and shall write him to-day, giving my views of the cooperation 
we should have from the Eastern armies. 

I shall recommend that no attempt be made toward Richmond by any of 
the routes heretofore operated upon, but that a moving force of sixty 
thousand men be thrown into Newbern or Suffolk, favoring the latter place; 
and move out, destroying the road as far toward Richmond as possible. Then 
move toward Raleigh as rapidly as possible, hold that point, and open com- 
munication with Newbern, even Wilmington. From Raleigh the enemy's 
most important line would be so threatened as to force them to keep on it a 
guard that would reduce their armies in the field much below our own. 
Before any part of this programme can be carried out, Longstreet must be 
driven from East Tennessee. 

To do this it may be necessary to send more force from your command. 

I write this to give you an idea of what I propose, and at the same time to 
hear such suggestions as you may have to propose. 

U. S. Grant, Major- General. 

By the last of February, General Sherman having been 
meantime in the depths of his raid to Meridian, the prepa- 
rations for the campaign thus marked out by General 
Grant had progressed so far that General Thomas was send- 
ing in estimates of the number of troops needed to guard 
the roads and bridges from Nashville south, both by way of 
Decatur and of Stevenson, on to Chattanooga, and south to 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 137 

Atlanta. This appears clearly enough from the following 
telegram : 

[By telegraph from Chattanooga, February 28, 1864.] 
Major- General Grant, Xashville. 

General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line between 
lure and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men will lie 
sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. 

From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur, two 
thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to protect that 
line. One thousand infantry will he sufficient to protect the line from 
Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication can be guarded 
by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a great portion of which 
should be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized 
especially for the preservation of order in the State. 

1 believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth 
Corps in front, witli Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the 
line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta. 
I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As soon as Captain 
Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad lines, I can give 
you a definite estimate of the number of troops required to guard the bridges 
along the road. Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General U. S. Volunteers. 

General Grant having been made Lieutenant General, and 
ordered to Washington, summoned General Sherman, who 
had returned from Meridian, to Nashville, which latter point 
he reached on the 17th of March, 1864. On that day he was 
assigned to the command of the Military Division of the 
Mississippi, and immediately afterward left with General 
Grant, accompanying the latter, then on his way to Washington, 
as far as the Burnet House, in Cincinnati, where about the 
20th of March, a further consultation was held in regard to 
the forthcoming campaign. 

Immediately upon arriving at his headquarters in the East, 
General Grant notified Halleck of the orders he had given 
Banks for a move on Mobile, to cooperate with Sherman, as 
is indicated in the follo'wing extract: 

Headquarters in the Field, \ 
Culpepper, Va., 4 P. M., March 25, 1864. J 

Major- General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Stuff. 

I sent a letter to General Banks before leaving Nashville, directing him to 



]38 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

finish his present expedition and assemble all his available force at New 
Orleans as soon as possible, and prepare to receive orders for the taking of 
Mobile. 

If Shreveport is carried, about eight thousand (8,000) troops can be spared 
from Steele and Bosecrans to join Banks, and, if necessary, to insure success 
against Mobile, they can be taken from Sherman. * * * s 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

The letter to General Banks thus referred to, coupled with 
further instructions to the same end, was published at length 
in General Grant's final report dated July 22, 1865: 

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up the Bed River 
against Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my 
appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the 
importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible 
day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to 
fifteen days more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be 
absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified 
by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of 
the Bed Biver expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of 
the Mississippi ; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold 
Shreveport and the Bed Biver with such force as he might deem necessary, 
and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, 
commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to 
make that then held by him more easily held ; that it might be a part of the 
Spring campaign to move against Mobile ; that it certainly would be, if 
troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other 
movements ; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an 
expedition ; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move 
from Arkansas as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstra- 
tion, as Steele thought advisable. On the 31st of March, in addition to the 
foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows : 

1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over 
the defense of the Bed Biver to General Steele and the navy. 

2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon 
the Bio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn 
their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half 
of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. 

3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi Biver, the force to guard it 
from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if 
not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the 
territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west 
of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of 
over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To 
this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you 
think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 139 

necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five 
thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With 
these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in 
making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or 
mi ire iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives 
him a strung naval fleet with which to cooperate. 

You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his coopera- 
tion, and select your own line of approach. 

My own idea of the matter is, that Pascagaula should be your base; but, 
from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about 
the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be cooperative with 
movements elsewhere, and you can not now start too soon. All I would now 
add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve 
a profound secresy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible 
moment. U. S. Grant, Lieutenat- General. 

Major- General N. P. Banks. 

In addition to sending General Sherman a copy of the 
letter to Halleck, dated Nashville, January 15th, General 
Grant, a few days after sending the above letter to General 
Banks, again wrote the outlines of his plans to General Sher- 
man, as will be seen by the letters which follow: 

Headquarters Armies of the United States,) 
Washington, D. C, April 4, 1864. J 

Maj 'or -General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mis- 
sissippi. 

General: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take 
the initiative in the Spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, 
and somewhat towards a common center. For your information I now write 
you my programme as at present determined upon. 

I have sent orders to Banks by private messenger to finish up his present 
expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of 
the Bed Biver to General Steele and the navy, and return your troops to you 
and his own to New Orleans ; to abandon all of Texas except the Bio Grande, 
and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men ; to reduce the num- 
ber of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and 
to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. 
To this I will add five thousand (5,000) from Missouri. With this force he 
is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be 
impossible for him to commence too early. 

Gilmore joins Butler with ten thousand (10,000) men, and the two operate 
against Richmond from the south side of James Biver. This will give Butler 
thirty three thousand (33,000) men to operate, with; General W. F. Smith 
commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gilmore the left wing. I will 
stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less 



140 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

than twenty -live thousand (25,000) effective men, and operate directly against 
Lee's army wherever it may be found. 

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns — one, under Ord and 
Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia; and the other, under Crooke, to 
start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia 
& Tennessee Railroad. Crooke will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to 
get in about Saltville and move east from there to join Ord. His force will 
be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all 
arms. 

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get 
into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the 
damage you can against their war resources. 

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay 
down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute in 
your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of 
operations. 

As stated Banks is ordered to commence oj^erations as soon as he can. Gil- 
more is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon 
thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from 
their places of rendezvous until I direct except Banks. I want to be ready to 
move by the 25th inst. if possible ; but all I can now direct is that you get 
ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter 
getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe 
you will accomplish it. 

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not cal- 
culate on very great results, but it is the only way I can take troops from 
there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect he can spare no 
troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through 
to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of 
his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin 
himself, he can hold a leg whilst some one else skins. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

General Grant had assumed command of all the armies on 
the 17th of March, and before the month closed matured his 
general plans for the Spring campaign and sent to all army 
commanders a map, which he thus describes in his final report 
of operations: 

"The accompanying map, a copy of which -was sent to General Sherman 
and other comanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occu- 
pied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of the 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 141 

campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to 
occupy." 

General Sherman thus acknowledges its receipt: 

Headquarters Military Division - op the Mississippi, ) 
Nashville, Texx., April 5, 1864. j 

Colonel C. B. Comstock, General Grant's Staff, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Colonel : Your letter of March 26th came to me on the 2d inst., 
and the mail brought me the map yesterday. The parcel had evidently been 
opened and the postmaster bad marked some additional postage on it. I will 
cause inquiries to be made lest the map has been seen by some eye intelligent 
enough to read the meaning of the blue and red lines. We can not be too 
careful in these matters. 

That map to me contains more information and ideas than a volume of 
printed matter. Keep your retained copies with infinite care, and if you have 
occasion to send out to other commanders any more I would advise a special 
courier. From that map I see all, and glad am I that there are minds now 
at "Washington able to devise ; and for my part, if we can keep our counsels, 
I believe I have the men and ability to march square up to the position 
assigned me, and to hold it. Of course, it will cost us many a hard day, but 
I believe in fighting in a double sense — first, to gain physical results, and 
next, to inspire respect on which to build up our nation's power. 

Of course, General Grant will not have time to give me the details of move- 
ments Ea>t, and the limes. Concurrent action is the thing. It would be wise 
if the General, through you or some educated officer, should give me timely 
notice of all contemplated movements, with all details that can be foreseen. 
I now know the results aimed at, I know my base and have a jjretty good 
idea of my lines of operation. No time shall be lost in putting my forces in 
mobile condition, so that all I ask is notice of time, that all over the grand 
theater of war there shall be simultaneous action. We saAV the beauty of 
time in the battle of Chattanooga, and there is no reason why the same har- 
mony of action should not pervade a continent. 

I am well pleased with Captain Poe, and would not object to half a dozen 
thoroughly educated young engineer officers. 

I am, with respect, your friend, 

W. T. Sherman, Major- General commanding. 

In reply to further letters from General Grant, setting forth 
his plans, Sherman wrote : 

Headquarters Military Division' of the Mississippi, 1 
Nashville, Texx., April 10, 1864. ) 

Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. 

Dear General: Your two letters of April 4 are now before me, and 



142 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act on a common 
plan, converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war. 

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have 
thorough and hearty cooperation. I will not let side issues draw me off from 
your main plans in which I am to knock Joe Johnston, and do as much 
damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written 
to General Rawlins and Colonel Comstock, of your staff, somewhat of the 
method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and 
division commanders, and signified only to the former, viz.: Schofield, Thomas, 
and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our 
conversations here and at Cincinnati. * * * * 

Should Johnston fall behind Chattahoochee, I would feign to the right, but 
pass to the left and act on Atlanta or its eastern communications according 
to developed facts. 

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I would ever bear 
in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he can not in 
any event send any part of his command against you or Banks. 

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama 
River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem — 
provisions. But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabi- 
tants. If they can live we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt my 
communications I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own 
resources, but will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and whenever I 
can find. 

I will inspire my command if successful, with my feelings that beef and 
salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and parched corn fed General 
Jackson's army once on that very ground. 

As ever, your friend and servant, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 

Under date of Nashville, April 16th, 1864, General Sher- 
man wrote General McPherson as follows: 

"I take it for granted that, unless Banks gets out of Red River and 
attacks Mobile (which is a material part of General Grant's plan), we will 
have to fight Polk's army as well as Johnston's." 

Mobile Bay having been captured a few weeks before the 
fall of Atlanta, General Grant, a few days after General Sher- 
man had occupied the latter place, suggested the following 

modification of his plan: 

City Point, Va., September 10, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

As soon as your men are properly rested, and preparations can be made, it 
is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. 



THE MABCH TO THE SEA. 143 

We want to keep the enemy continually pressed to the end of the war. If 
we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end can not be far distant. 
Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it 
will he the best move for Major-General Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, 
while you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, on 
this matter. TJ. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

To the above suggestion Sherman replied that it would risk 
his whole army to move as suggested by Grant, unless the 
latter could capture the Savannah River up to Augusta, or the 
Chattahoochee up to Columbus. The following is this reply, 
dated September 10, 8 p. M.: 

General Grant. 

I have your dispatch of to-day. My command need some rest and pay. 
Our roads are also broken back near Nashville, and Wheeler is not yet dis- 
posed of. Still I am perfectly alive to the importance of pushing our advan- 
tage to the utmost. I do not think we can afford to operate further, depend- 
ent on the railroad. It takes so many men to guard it, and even then it is 
nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms about us. Macon is 
distant one hundred and three miles and Augusta one hundred and seventy-five 
miles. If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta 
or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville and compel Hood to 
give up Augusta or Macon, and could then turn on the other. The country 
will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough in any one place to 
admit of a delay. In scattering for forage we have a great many men picked 
up by the enemy's cavalry. 

If you can manage to take the Savannah Biver as high as Augusta, or the 
Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia, 
otherwise I would risk our whole army by going too far from Atlanta. 

W. T. Sherman, Major- General. 

In reply to this telegram holding that there would be great 
risk in moving far beyond Atlanta, Grant wrote at length. 
under date of September 12th, stating his own plans for move- 
ments East, and telling Sherman that he plainly saw the diffi- 
culties in supplying his army, except when it should be 
constantly moving beyond. The following extract is sufficient 
to show its bearing upon the question now under discussion: 

"What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not exactly 
see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when they are constantly 



144 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

moving beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's 
movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. 
From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been 
taken. With these forces, my idea would have been to divide them, sending 
one-half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move 
as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. 
Whichever one should be abandoned by the enemy you could take and open 
up a new base of supplies." * * * * 

General Sherman's letter, in reply to the above, was dated 
September 20th, and contains these extracts : 

" Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls for 
no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city can be followed 
by the occupation of the Alabama River and the railroad to Columbus, 
Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my further 
progress into Georgia. * * * * 

" If successful, I suppose that Fort Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at 
once sent to the Savannah River. Then the reduction of that city is the next 
question. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I would not 
hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, hauling some 
stores and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of 
people find subsistence, my army won't starve. * * * 

"I will, therefore, give it as my opinion that your army and Canby's should 
be reenforced to the maximum; that, after you get Wilmington, you should 
strike for Savannah and its river; that General Canby should hold the 
Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way 
of the Alabama or Appalachicola River ; that I should keep Hood employed, 
and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and 
Charleston, and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the 
city of Savannah is in our possession. * * * 

"If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your 
center, and let General Canby have .command over the Mississippi River and 
the country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama and Appalachicola, 
provided you give me one hundred thousand of the drafted men to fill up my 
old regiments; and if you will fix a day to be in Savannah I will insure our 
possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta." * * * 

This last is sufficiently explicit as to the conditions upon 
which General Sherman was willing to undertake a march to 
the sea. 

On the 4th of October, while the subject of Sherman's 
further movement from Atlanta was under consideration, and 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 145 

three weeks before the time he now claims in his Memoirs 
that he had fully made up his mind in regard to the march to 
Savannah, General Grant wrote the following letter to General 
Halleck, both in regard to the nature of the original plan and 
the modifications suggested by the success in Mobile Bay: 

Headquarters Armies of the United States,) 
City Point, Va., October 4, 1864. J 

Major- General Haleeck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. 

General: Your letter of the 2d inst., in relation to the movements of the 
Western armies and the preparations ordered by the staff officers of General 
Canby, is received. When this campaign was commenced nothing else was 
in contemplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect 
with Canby at Mobile. Drawing the Nineteenth Corps, however, from Canby, 
and the movements of Kirby Smith demanding the presence of all of Canby's 
surplus forces in another direction, has made it impossible to carry out the plan 
as early as was contemplated. Any considerable force to cooperate with 
Sherman on the sea-coast must now be sent from here. The question is 
whether, under such circumstances, Augusta and Savannah would not be a 
better line than Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile- I think Savannah might 
be taken by surprise with one corps from here and such troops as Foster 
could spare from the Department of the South. This is my view, but before 
giving positive orders I want to make a visit to Washington and consult a 
little on the subject. All Canby can do with his present force is to make 
demonstrations on Mobile and up the Appalachicola toward Columbus. He 
can not positively have the force to require the transportation your letters 
would indicate he has called for, or to consume the supplies. Either line 
indicated would cut off the supplies from the rich districts of Georgia, Ala- 
bama and Mississippi equally well. Whichever way Sherman moves he will 
undoubtedly encounter Hood's army, and in crossing to the sea-coast will 
sever the connection between Lee's army and this district of country. I wrote 
to Sherman on this subject, sending my letter by a staff officer. He is ready 
to attempt (and feels confident of his ability to succeed) to make his way to 
either the Savannah River or any of the navigable streams emptying into 
the Atlantic or Gulf, if he is only certain of finding a base open for him when 
he arrives. The supplies Canby was ordering, I presume, were intended for the 
use of Sherman's army. I do not deem it necessary to accumulate them in 
any great quantity until the base to which he is to make his way is secured. 
Very respectfully your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

That General Sherman had heard nothing of the plan for 
the Spring campaign up to the time of his arrival in Nash- 
10 



146 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

ville, about the 1.7th of March, 1864, is quite evident from 
the following extracts from one of his own letters: 

Headquarters Department op the Tennessee,] 
Memphis, March \-ith, 1S64. J 

Major-General McPherson, commanding, etc., Vieksburg. 

Dear General: * * ® * I am summoned by General Grant 
to be in Nashville on the 17th, and it will keep me moving night and day to 
get there by that date. * * * * 

I don't know, as yet, the grand strategy of the next campaign, but on 
arrival at Nashville I will soon catch the main points, and will advise you of 
them. * * * * I am truly your friend, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General commanding. 

These various extracts from the records show conclusively 
that a campaign from Chattanooga through to the Gulf, 
originated with General Grant, and that he subsequently 
modified it on account of the control of Mobile having been 
secured before Atlanta was captured. It will now be made 
to appear that the discussion which took place between Gen- 
eral Sherman and General Grant was not over the question 
whether a march to the sea should be made, but whether it 
should be undertaken before Hood's army was overthrown, 
this army having passed to General Sherman's rear. As soon 
as the last move of the enemy had developed itself, and 
Thomas had been sent back to shoulder the responsibility 
of taking care of him, General Sherman became strongly 
possessed with the idea of marching through to the sea 
without first destroying Hood. He saw no risk in leaving 
Atlanta, and no longer seemed to think it necessary for Grant 
to first take Savannah, and Canby to take Columbus. Any 
route through Georgia, in the absence of Hood, was, as 
General Sherman expressed it in a telegram to Grant (not 
given in the Memoirs), "all open, with no serious enemy to 
oppose at present." 

Then the discussion between Sherman and Grant already 
alluded to began. 

Finally, by underestimating Hood's forces, and largely 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 147 

overestimating those proposed to be left with Thomas, Sher- 
man obtained the desired permission, and when Grant had 
thus been made to believe that Thomas would have ample 
force to meet Hood in the field and destroy him, and not till 
then, did he allow Sherman to go. 

The overestimates of Thomas' forces, and underestimates 
of Hood's were as follows: 

November 1st Sherman telegraphed Grant (the dispatch 
not being given in the Memoirs), that Hood's force was 
thirty thousand infantry, and from seven to ten thousand 
cavalry, and that General Thomas would have (according to 
a summary of General Sherman's figures, as given in detail 
in this dispatch), from fifty-three to sixty thousand, beside 
a large force of cavalry — now stated in the Memoirs to have 
been about ten thousand — thus representing to General Grant 
that Hood's whole force was only from thirty-seven to forty 
thousand, while Thomas had from sixty-three to seventy 
thousand. In the same dispatch he informed Grant that he 
had retained only fifty thousand men for his March to the Sea, 
when, as the official returns now printed in his Memoirs 
(Vol. II, page 172), show, he retained over sixty-two thousand. 

No wonder General Grant was finally persuaded to give up 
that part of his plan which, for its first step, involved the 
destruction of Hood. 

General Sherman, in his book (Vol. II, page 162), as already 
quoted, now that he deems it necessary for history to vindicate 
his march away from the very enemy that for five months 
had so stoutly resisted his combined forces, thus allowing Hood 
to turn upon the fragments left for General Thomas to gather- 
up, states the forces available to General Thomas for a fight 
at Nashville at from sixty-five to seventy-one thousand, beside 
seventeen thousand seven hundred cavalry, or a total force 
of from eighty-two thousand seven hundred to eighty-eight 
thousand seven hundred. This appears from a summary of 
his figures and not in direct terms. 

The official returns of the forces actually available for the 



148 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

battle of Nashville, which returns were at General Sherman's 
service when he prepared the above figures, are as follows: 
Infantry, forty-one thousand eight hundred and fifteen ; cav- 
alry, ten thousand five hundred and ninety-six ; artillery, 
three thousand and sixty-one; total, fifty-five thousand four 
hundred and seventy-two, or twenty-seven thousand two 
hundred and twenty-eight less than Sherman's lowest estimate. 
A few extracts from General Thomas' report of his cam- 
paign will test all the above statements of Sherman : 

"At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General 
J. E. Johnston, had so skillfully resisted the advance of the whole active 
army of the Military Division of the Mississippi, from Dalton to the Chatta- 
hoochee, reenforced by a well equipped and entbusiastic cavalry command 
of over twelve thousand (12,000), led by one of the boldest and most successful 
commanders in the rebel army. My information from all sources confirmed 
the reported strength of Hood's army to be from forty to forty-five thousand 
infantry, and from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry. My effective force, at 
this time, consisted of the Fourth Corps, about twelve thousand (12,000), 
under Major-General D. S. Stanley; the Twenty-third Corps, about ten 
thousand (10,000), under Major-General J. M. Schofield; Hatch's division 
of cavalry, about four thousand (4,000) ; Croxton's brigade, twenty -five hun- 
dred (2,500), and Capron's brigade, of about twelve hundred (1,200). The 
balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Mur- 
freesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to 
keep open our communications, and hold the posts above named, if attacked, 
until they could be reenforced, as up to this time it was impossible to 
determine which course Hood would take — advance on Nashville, or turn 
toward Huntsville. Under the circumstances, it was manifestly best to act 
on the defensive until sufficiently reenforced to justify taking the offen- 
sive. * * * * 

" It was therefore with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at 
Florence to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General 
Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my 
command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the 
defensive in Tennessee, or to take the offensive in Alabama. * * * * 
The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman was now at an 
end, and I quickly took measures to act on the defensive. Two divisions of 
infantry, under Major-General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to 
join me from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments tben arriving 
in the Department, and detachments collected from points of minor import- 
ance, would swell my command when concentrated to an army nearly as 
large as that of the enemy. * * * * 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 149 

"My only resource then was to retire slowly toward my reinforcements, 
delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible to gain time fo/ reinforce- 
ments to arrive and concentrate. * Since the departure of 
General Sherman about seven thousand (7,000) men belonging to his column 
had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning to their 
commands and men returning from furlough. 

"These men had been organized into brigades to be made available at such 
points as they might be needed. My command had also been reenforced by 
twenty (20) new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed 
in replacing old regiments whose term of service had expired." 

The very dispatch which General Sherman quotes as Grant's 
assent to the march, shows that he gave it upon the ground 
that Thomas, with the force Sherman said he had left him, 
could destroy Hood. This telegram was in reply to one of 
November 1st, given just above, mis-stating Thomas' avail- 
able force. After saying he had telegraphed Sherman on the 
same day that Hood's army should be looked upon as the 
"object," the dispatch continued: 

"With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he 
must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. * * * * I say, 
then, go on as you propose." 

General Sherman interprets the last clause of this order as 
if it read: "Go on and execute the March to the Sea, which 
you have originated," when, in fact, he should have interpreted 
it: "You propose to march without first destroying Hood. 
As Thomas can now take care of him, I say go." 

There is an expression in the congratulatory order issued 
by General Sherman to his army, after reaching Savannah, 
which can not well be explained in accordance with his theory 
that he planned the March to the Sea. Speaking of Hood's 
movement to his rear as an attempt to decoy him out of 
Georgia, General Sherman in that order wrote: 

" But we were not thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and 
control events ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the 
departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy Gen- 
eral Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete the original 
journey." * * * * 



150 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

When General Sherman wrote of our "original journey," 
he may have had in mind a letter he sent General Banks, then 
in Louisiana, dated Nashville, April 3, 1864. It contained 
the following paragraph : 

" All is well in this quarter, and I hope by the time you turn against 
Mobile our forces will again act toward the same end, though from distant 
points. General Grant, now having lawful control, will doubtless see that 
all minor objects are disregarded, and that all the armies act on a common 
plan." 

Two weeks before this he had returned from the Cincinnati 
conference with General Grant, where the latter communicated 
to him the plan of the Atlanta campaign and the movement 
beyond to Mobile, as he had in the previous January made 
them known to Generals Halleck and Thomas. As will be 
seen these letters were written about a month before the open- 
ing of the Atlanta campaign, and over five months before the 
date claimed by General Sherman as the earliest time when he 
had the March to the Sea in his " mind's eye." 

There are some singular and important omissions in Gen- 
eral Sherman's story. On page 166, after quoting Grant's 
dispatch of November 2d, given above, he says: "This [No- 
vember 2d] was the first time that General Grant assented to 
the March to the Sea." 

And yet, on November 1st, as appears in a dispatch to 
General Grant, given in one of General Sherman's published 
reports, he said: 

"Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson 
back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about four thousand five ' 
hundred. This is the best I can do, and shall therefore, when I get to Atlanta 
the necessary stores, move south as soon as possible." 

Was he going without the permission which he here says he 
did not receive until November 2d ? 

The fact is, however, that, notwithstanding the statement 
that Grant's dispatch of November 2d was his first assent to 
the March, he had really given such assent three weeks 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 151 

before, in the following answer to Sherman's telegram of 
October 11th, heretofore quoted: 

City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M. 
Major-General Sherman. 

Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea- 

coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may 

make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you 

think best. XL S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

In this permission also, the condition of holding Tennessee 
firmly against Hood is prominent. 

The next day General Grant again telegraphed as follows: 

City Point, October 12, 1864, 1 P. M. 
General Sherman, Kingston. 

On reflection I think better of your proposition. It will be much better to 
go south than to be forced to come north. You will, no doubt, clear the 
country where you go of railroad tracks and supplies. * * * * 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

General Sherman, on page 154, says he received no answer 
to his Kingston dispatch "at the time." The reason is obvi- 
ous. It was dated 11:30 r. M. of the 11th, and the next day 
Sherman left for Rome. His telegraphic communications 
with Kingston and with Washington, however, remained 
perfect, and it is not likely that a dispatch from the Lieuten- 
ant-General, directing the march of an army through to the 
sea-coast, would be long delayed. If he had never received 
it in the field, however, he need not now have made the above 
mistake of three weeks in so important a date, since General 
Grant's reply of October 11th was printed in full in his final 
report of the operations of the armies. 

On page 157 Sherman says: "So it is clear that at that 
date [October 17] neither General Grant nor General Thomas 
heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign." And yet 
the day before this he had telegraphed Halleck: 

"I got the dispatch in cipher about providing me a place to come out on 
salt water, but the cipher is imperfect, and I can not make out whether 



152 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

Savannah or Mobile be preferred; but I also want to know if you are willing 
that I should destroy Atlanta and the railroad." 

And on this very date (October 17) he had received the 
following from General Grant: 

"The moment I know you have started south, stores will be shipped to 
Hilton Head, where there are transports ready to take them to meet you at 
Savannah. In case you go south I would not propose holding any thing 
south of Chattanooga, certainly not south of Dalton. Destroy in such case 
all of military value in Atlanta." 

As early as October 13th, two weeks before General Sher- 
man claims that he finally decided on this march, General 
Grant had ordered cooperating forces to proceed to the coast 
below Savannah and move inland against the Gulf Railroad. 
This appears in the following from Halleck to Grant, dated 
Washington, October 22d : 

"I had prepared instructions to General Canby to move all available 
forces in Mobile Bay and elsewhere to Brunswick and up the Savannah and 
Gulf Railroad, as directed by you on the 13th, but on learning that Sher- 
man's operations were uncertain I withheld the order." 

October 19th Sherman telegraphed Thomas: 

* * * * "I propose with the Armies of Ohio, Tennessee, and 
two corps of this, to sally forth and make a hole in Georgia and Alabama 
that will be bard to mend. I will, probably, about November 1st, break up 
the railroads and bridges, destroy Atlanta, and make a break for Mobile, Sa- 
vannah, or Charleston." * * * * 

Under date of October 19, 1864, General Sherman wrote 
General Halleck as follows: 

"I must have alternatives; else, being confined to one route, the enemy 
might so oppose, that delay and want would trouble me ; but, having alterna- 
tives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess my objective. 
Therefore, when you hear I am off, have lookouts at Morris Island, S. G, 
Ossabaw Sound, Ga., Pensacola and Mobile Bays. I will turn up somewhere, 
and, believe me, I can take Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, 
Ga., and wind up with closing the neckband of Charleston so that they will 
ctarve out. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 153 

"This movement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate 
the vulnerability of the South." 

Colonel Bowman, in his "Sherman and his Campaigns," a 
work written in the interest of Sherman, commenting upon 
the above letter, says: 

"General Grant promptly authorized the proposed movement, indicating 
however, his preference for Savannah as the objective, and fixing Dal ton as 
the northern limit for the destruction of the railway." 

To this alternative letter Halleck replied, under date of 
October 31 : 

"The alternatives mentioned in your letter of October 19th will be pre- 
pared for by boats at Hilton Head and Pensacola, with means of transporta- 
tion to any point where required." 

Certain correspondence, which passed between General 
Sherman before Atlanta and General Canby before Mobile, 
has a forcible bearing upon the questions under consideration. 
It will be noticed that this correspondence began some weeks 
before the capture of Atlanta, and related to a move beyond 
upon Montgomery: 

Near Atlanta, August 17, 1864. 
Major- General Canby, Mobile. 

Dispatch of the 6th received. * * * * If possible the Alabama 
River should be possessed by us in connection with my movement. I could 
easily open communication to Montgomery, but I doubt if you will have 
troops enough until the September draft. I can press on Atlanta good, but 
I do not want Kirby Smith here. * * * * 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 

New Orleans, August 27th. By way of Cairo, September 9th, j 
Received at Headquarters, September 29, 1864. J 

Major-General Sherman. 

* » * * I have a reserve of twelve thousand men up the river to 
watch Kirby Smith. I do not think he can cross in any force without being 
discovered in time to prevent it, but I can not use this force against Mobile 
and prevent a passage. 

The route you suggested has been considered, and with twenty thousand 
men we could control the Alabama River from Mobile to Montgomery. * 



154 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

• * * I will keep the enemy about Mobile uneasy, and will act against 
the city and river the moment I can gather a sufficient force. 

Ed. R. Canby, Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi. In the Field, j 
Atlanta, Georgia, September 10, 1804. } 

General Canby, New Orleans. 

Dispatch of the 27th received. I got to Atlanta by a couple of good 
moves. You succeeded at Fort Morgan sooner than I expected. We must 
have the Alabama River now, and also the Appalachicola at the old arsenal, 
and up to Columbus. My line is so long now that it is impossible to protect 
it against cavalry raids; but if we can get Montgomery and Columbus, 
Georgia, as bases in connection with Atlanta, we have Georgia and Alabama 
at our feet. You ought to have more men, and it is a burning shame that at 
this epoch we should need men, for the North is full of them. 

They can raise a political convention any time of fifty to one hundred 
thousand men, and yet they pretend they can not give us what we want. But 
keep at it, and I only want to express my idea that I Mould not bother with 
the city of Mobile, which will simply absorb a garrison for you, but would 
use the Tensas channel and notify General Gardner, of the rebel army, to 
maintain good order, etc., in the now useless streets of Mobile. 

I will be ready to sally forth again in October, but ought to have some 
assurance that, in case of necessity, I can swing into Appalachicola or Mont- 
gomery, and find friends. 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General commanding. 

By telegraph from New Orleans, 1 
i 7th September, via Cairo, 24th. J 
3fajor-General Sherman. 

Your dispatch of the 10th has just been received. The plans you suggested 
have been under consideration, and preparations are now in progress. 

I think I can give you the assurance that you will find friends in Mobile, 
if the trouble in Arkansas River should be soon ended, how far east of that 
will depend upon the reinforcements that can be spared for this command? 

Ed. R. Canby, Major-General. 

Kingston, Georgia, November 7, 1864. 
General Canby, New Orleans. 

Beauregard has left Georgia altogether and shifted across to the neighbor- 
hood of Florence, Alabama, threatening to invade Tennessee. We are all 
ready for him there, and I have still an army with which to go on. If you 
hear I have destroyed Atlanta and marched south, be prepared with boats to . 
send me supplies from Ponehartrain, and have the navy look out for my fires 
and rocket signals along the east side of Mobile Bay, as high up as Old 
Blakely. W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 155 

The last letter written by General Sherman to General 
Grant before cutting loose from Atlanta, was dated November 
6th. It is referred to in the Memoirs, bnt not quoted. It 
contains the following significant passages : 

" The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him 
[Hood] far over into Mississippi, * * * * but then I thought that 
by so doing I would play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too far 
away from our original line of advance." 

And again, he argues for a movement on Pensacola and 
Mobile as follows : 

"Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement [to the sea] 
per se be right; still there may be reasons why one route would be better than 
another. There are three from Atlanta — south-east, south, and south-west — 
all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. 

"The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining 
to the Confederacy, which would be destroyed, and thereby the communica- 
tions between the armies of Lee and Beauregard severed. Incidentally I 
might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea- 
shore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could reen- 
force our armies in Virginia. 

" The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially 
the valley of Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching 
up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same 
railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying 
about tour hundred thousand (400,000) bales of cotton near Albany and Fort 
Gaines. 

"This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future move- 
ments. 

" The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to 
Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. 

"This latter route would enable me at once to cooperate with Gen- 
eral Can by in the reduction of Mobile, and occupation of the line of the 
Alabama. 

" In my judgment the first would have a material effect upon, your cam- 
paign in Virginia; the second would be the safest of execution ; but the third 
would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command, and have a 
direct bearing upon my own enemy, 'Beauregard.' If, therefore, I should 
start before I hear further from you, or before further developments turn my 
course, you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnes- 
ville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good; and then, 
if I feign on Columbus, will move via Macon and Milieu to Savannah; or, 



156 THE MAECH TO THE SEA. 

if I feign on Macon, you may take it for granted that I have shot off toward 
Opelika, Montgomery and Mobile Bay or Pensaeola." 

The following extracts from the final report of General 
Grant, dated Washington, July 22, 1865, bear pointedly 
upon the questions under consideration. In describing the 
combined movements ordered for the Spring of 1864, he 
says : 

" General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, break 
it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, 
inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy 
in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent 
of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it 
was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific 
instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him 
the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and 
would execute them to the fullest extent possible." 

And again : 

"It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the 
coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west 
through Georgia, to effectually sever the East from the West. 

"In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been 
cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General Sher- 
man's plan virtually effected this object." 

That part of Sherman's plan here referred to, is his propo- 
sition to march through Georgia without holding Atlanta. 

The above citations from the official records, and chiefly 
from those in General Sherman's possession, are quite sufficient 
to show that the correct history of the March to the Sea is 
not given in the Memoirs. 

There was this important difference between Grant's plan 
and Sherman's: Grant's contemplated a prior destruction of 
Hood's army. Sherman's was a march away from an enemy. 
This branch of the subject will be treated at length in a subse- 
quent chapter. 

The records thus far produced are sufficient to show that 
General Grant, while still in command at Nashville, and two 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 157 

months before his promotion as Lieutenant-General, had 
planned a movement from Chattanooga through to Mobile, 
and that he then had in mind a cooperation on the part of the 
Eastern armies. There are records to show, further, that in the 
preceding November he was contemplating a concert of action 
between these armies, and his idea was to secure a commander 
for the Army of the Potomac who Avould act in full accord 
with him. He settled upon W. F. Smith as that officer, and 
thus urged his promotion: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 12, 1863. J 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

I would respectfully recommend that Brigadier-General W. F. Smith be 
placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of Major-General. He is 
possessed of one of the clearest heads in the army, is very practical and 
industrious. No man in the service is better qualified than he for our largest 
commands. I have the honor, etc., 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, J 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, November 30, 1863. j 

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President of the United States. 

In a previous letter addressed to the Secretary of War, I recommended 
Brigadier-General W. F. Smith for promotion. Recent events have entirely 
satisfied me of his great capacity and merits, and I hasten to renew the 
recommendation and to urge it. The interests of the public service would 
be better subserved by this promotion than the interests of General Smith 
himself. My reason for writing this letter now is to ask that W. F. Smith's 
name be placed first on the list for promotion of all those previously recom- 
mended by me. I have the honor, etc., 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

His object in making these recommendations appears from 
further correspondence. 

Early in December he wrote General Halleck expressing 
the opinion that East Tennessee and his immediate front were 
safe; that the roads were such that extensive movements in 
that latitude were impossible for either army, and so a small 
force could hold his lines while he should move on Mobile, 
and thus greatly advance the Spring operations. In this letter 



158 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

his intention of including Mobile in his plan of a movement 
in the Spring from Chattanooga, also appears. Omitting the 
description of the general situation, it is as follows: 

Chattanooga, December 7, 1863. 
Major- General Halleck:, Washington. 

* * * * I feel unwilling, or rather desirous to avoid keeping so 
large a force idle for many months. I take the liberty of suggesting a plan 
of campaign that I think will go far toward breaking down the rebellion 
before Spring. It will at least keep the enemy harassed, and prevent that 
reorganization which could be effected by Spring if left unimpeded. 

I propose, with the concurrence of higher authority, to move by way of 
New Orleans and Pascagoula on Mobile. 1 would hope to secure that place, 
or its investment by the last of January. Should the enemy make an 
obstinate resistance at Mobile, I would fortify outside and leave a garrison 
sufficient to hold the garrison of the town, and with the balance of the army 
make a campaign into the interior of Alabama and possibly Georgia. The 
campaign of course would be suggested by the movements of the enemy. It 
seems to me this move would secure the entire States of Alabama and Missis- 
sippi, and a part of Georgia, or force Lee to abandon Virginia and North 
Carolina. Without his force the enemy have not got army enough to resist 
the army I can take. 

I am General, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major-General. 

The Assistant Secretary of War having visited General 
Grant, and talked over the question of this campaign, re- 
turned to Washington and reported fully to the authorities. 

General Halleck then telegraphed General Grant as follows: 

Washington, December 21, 1863, 4:30 P. M. 
Major-General U. S. Grant. 

As I understand from your dispatch of the 7th, and from conversation with 
Mr. Dana, you propose : 

1. To expel the enemy from East Tennessee, and to provide against his 
return into that valley. 

2. To either force the rebels further back into Georgia or to provide against 
their return by that line into Tennessee. 

3. To clean out West Tennessee. 

4. To move a force down the Mississippi and operate against Mobile. 
The importance of these objects is considered to be in the order above 

stated. It is thought that the fourth should not be definitely determined 
upon till the other three are accomplished, or their accomplishment made 



THE MARC PI TO THE SEA. 159 

reasonably certain. Moreover, circumstances may be such by the time that 
your Bpare forces reach Port Hudson or New Orleans as to require their 
services west of the Mississippi. If so, the latter part of the plan would be 
sour what varied, or its execution delayed. 

H. W. IIat.lix'k, (leneral-in-Chief. 

The communication of the Assistant Secretary which pre- 
sented the matter at greater length, shows that the question 
of putting General W. F. Smith in command of the Army 
of the Potomac had been thoroughly discussed, and Grant, 
the President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck 
agreed that it would be better to select Smith than General 
Sherman : 

Washington, December 21, 18G*5, 6 P. M. 
Major- General U. S. Grant, Chattanooga. 

I have had detailed conversations with the President, the Secretary of War, 
and General Halleck, with respect to your project of a campaign in Alabama. 
It meets the full approval of them all in every respect, not only because it 
keeps your army active during the otherwise useless weather of the Winter, 
but because it appears to them well conceived and as certain of producing 
the desired effect as any plan can be. "If it succeed" said the Secretary of 
War, "Bragg's army become prisoners of war without our having the trouble 
of providing for them." You would be authorized to proceed immediately 
with its execution but for the anxiety which seems to exist respecting East 
Tennessee. If Longstreet were expelled from that country, you could start 
for Mobile at once; I suppose General Halleck will communicate with you 
fully on this subject. I judge from my conversation with him that he does 
not understand clearly how an army, large enough to make Longstreet's 
dislodgment certain, can be supplied while operating against Rogersville and 
Bristol, and accordingly I presume that, first, as soon as it is settled that he 
must be left in that region, you will be allowed to proceed south with the 
main body of your forces, leaving, of course, a sufficient number of troops to 
observe Longstreet, and prevent his getting hold of Knoxville, Cumberland 
(rap, or any other controlling point now in our hands. 

To my suggestion that the surest means of getting the rebels altogether out 
of East Tenncseee is to be found in the Army of the Potomac; the reply is, 
that that is true, but from that army nothing is to be hoped under its present 
commander. This naturally led to your second proposition, namely, that 
either Sherman or W. F. Smith should be put in command of that army. 
To this the answer is such as to leave but little doubt in my mind that the 
second of these officers will be appointed to that post. Both the Secretary of 
War and General Halleck said to me that, as long as a fortnight before my 
arrival, they had come to the conclusion that when a change should be made, 



160 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

General W. F. Smith would be the best person to try. Some doubts which 
they seemed to have respecting his disposition and personal character I think 
I was able to clear up. The Secretary of War has also directed me to inform 
him that he is to be promoted on the first vacancy. The President, the 
Secretary of War, and General Halleok, agree with you in thinking that it 
would be, on the whole, much better to select him than Sherman. As yet, 
however, nothing has been decided upon, and you will understand that I have 
somewhat exceeded my instructions from the Secretary of War in this com- 
munication, especially in the second branch of it, but it seems to me necessary 
that you should know all these particulars. q_ j^ Dan A 

While all the records show that General Grant planned that 
Atlanta campaign which was finally executed, and that from 
its inception, it was in his mind a march to the sea, designed to 
divide the Confederacy; it is also true that this question of cut- 
ting through the territory of the rebels from the West, had been 
discussed at one or two prominent headquarters in the East, 
sometime before General Grant, in a different way from any 
suggested at these discussions, entered practically upon the 
work. Notes are in existence of a conversation at General 
McDowell's headquarters, on the day following the battle 
of Cedar Mountain in August, 1862, upon the policy of sever- 
ing the Confederacy by an army operating from the West 
through Atlanta, a movement on Savannah and Charleston 
from the rear, and a march up the coast. These were Gen- 
eral McDowell's ideas, though no definite combinations of 
troops were suggested for carrying them out. 

Early in the following year, General Pope wrote Secretary 
Stanton presenting a very elaborate plan for an advance from 
Murfrecsboro to Mobile, through Atlanta. It involved the 
immediate abandonment of Grant's move against Vicksburg, 
and the transfer of his army to Rosecrans' front, an advance 
by Burnside through Cumberland Gap, the occupation of 
Chattanooga with a permanent garrison of sixty thousand 
men, and a movement thence on Atlanta with a force at least 
one hundred and fifty thousand strong. At the same time he 
proposed that forty thousand men from the Eastern army 
should be thrown into Pensacola, and marched north on 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 161 

Montgomery to meet an equal number to be sent from the 
one hundred and fifty thousand at Atlanta. The line thus 
taken was to be permanently held by sixty thousand at 
Chattanooga, one hundred thousand at Atlanta, sixty thousand 
at Montgomery, and ten thousand at Mobile and Pensacola. 
Such a division of the Confederacy, General Pope argued at 
length, would soon lead to its overthrow. This plan involved 
the abandonment of the attempt to open the Mississippi. It 
remained for General Grant, however, to achieve this most 
important river division of the Confederacy, and then turning 
eastward to divide it again by the move from Chattanooga. 
And this division, Sherman, under the direction of Grant, 
accomplished with his force of one hundred thousand, which 
furnished both his garrisons and his moving column. 

So the records not only show that General Grant planned 
the March to the Sea which was finally executed, but also, that 
general plan of operations for the closing year of the war 
was his conception. 

11 



CHAPTER XII. 

hardee's escape from savannah. 

General Sherman, having seen the enemy he had been 
fighting throughout the Spring and Summer well on his way 
toward the North, marched down to the sea at Savannah, and 
moved against a new enemy there. 

Of the preparations, and the departure from Atlanta to 
the sea, General Sherman writes: 

"It was surely a strange event — two hostile armies marching in opposite 
directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive 
result in a great war." * * * * 

And again: 

"Of course General Thomas saw that on him would likely fall the real 
blow, and was naturally anxious." 

And the day of leaving Atlanta he thus records what he 
thought the general verdict would be : 

"There was a "devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men that 
made me feel the full load of responsibility, for success would be accepted as 
a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this 'march' would be adjudged ( 
the wild adventure of a crazy fool." 

It w 7 ill be well in the outset to look at the situation. 

Sherman had marched off to the sea with over sixty-two 
thousand men. He had taken two of the strongest corps, the 
Fourteenth and the Twentieth, numbering over twenty-eight 
thousand men, from General Thomas' own army; had taken 
his efficient pontoon train, and dismounted General Wilson's 
(162) 



HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 163 

cavalry to give Kilpatrick fresh horses. In short, every thing 
wanted in the shape of organized men, equipment, horses, and 
batteries, was taken from Thomas to fit out Sherman. Two 
small but organized and well-disciplined corps, numbering 
together twenty-two thousand men, were given Thomas. For 
the rest he had orders for two divisions of veteran troops to 
come from Missouri; he had bridge-guards distributed over 
four railroads, and small garrisons in a dozen towns. In 
Nashville he had quartermasters' employe's to man the forts; 
and to meet Hood's twelve thousand well-equipped and enthu- 
siastic cavalry he had seven thousand and General J. H. Wil- 
son's dismounted men. To further strengthen him, some 
twenty new one-year regiments were arriving to replace 
veteran troops, whose terms had expired. 

Hood's army, fully concentrated, confronted Thomas. The 
concentration of Thomas' army had only begun. A. J. 
Smith's veterans were still in Missouri. To meet Hood he 
had less than half Hood's foree. To fall back slowly while 
he gathered his army from the immense territory over which 
the fragments which were finally to compose it were scattered, 
was, of course, his only chance of success. How well this 
object was accomplished, all the world knows. How Schofield 
gathered the troops in hand, reached Franklin and defeated 
Hood, will not be forgotten. The very day he fought there, 
Smith's veterans began to arrive at Nashville, and the next 
night Schofield and Smith had made the concentration com- 
plete at the latter place. Then came storms and sleet when 
Thomas would not risk his army, the threats to remove him, 
the order removing him, the clearing up of the storm, the 
melting of the ice which had prevented man or horse from 
moving, the great battle and his decisive victory. And 
Sherman, with the bulk of the organized army which Hood 
had so often checked upon the Atlanta campaign, had marched 
down to the sea, the roads before him, wherever he might 
choose, being, as he expressed it in a dispatch to Grant, "all 
open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present." 



164 HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 

On the 10th of December Sherman, with sixty thousand 
men, had announced the investment of Savannah garrisoned 
by Hardee with a force supposed to be fifteen thousand. On 
the 17th he had demanded- its surrender, and been refused 
on the ground that he had not invested the city, and that his 
guns could not even reach it. 

On the 14th Thomas had successfully attacked Hood, and 
on the 15th had utterly defeated and routed him, and the 
War Department had telegraphed Thomas: 

War Department, December 15, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville. 

I rejoice in tendering to you and the gallant officers and soldiers of your 
command the thanks of this department for the hrilliant achievements of this 
day, and hope that it as the harbinger of a decisive victory that will crown 
you and your army with honor, and do much toward closing the war. We 
shall give you a hundred guns to-morrow. 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

On the 24th Mr. Stanton had notified Thomas of his 
nomination as a Major-General in the regular army for the 
"recent brilliant military operations" under his command, 
and expressed the opinion that "no one has more justly 
earned promotion by devoted, disinterested, and valuable 
services to his country." 

On the 18th of December, in a letter to Sherman of warm 
congratulation over the success of the march to Savannah, 
General Grant added : 

" My Dear General : * * * * If you capture the garrison of 
Savannah it certainly will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us 
nearly the whole South. * * * * Congratulating you and the 
army again upon the splendid results of your campaign, the like of which is 
not read of in past history, I subscribe myself more than ever, if possible, your 
friend." 

Eight days after, when the news arrived of the capture of 
Savannah and the escape of Hardee, it was guardedly acknowl- 
edged by Grant as follows, under date of December 26th : 

" General : Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by Major 
Gray, of General Foster's staff, is just at hand. As the Major starts back at 



HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 165 

once, I can do no more at present than simply acknowledge its receipt. The 
capture of Savannah with all its immense stores must tell upon the people of 
the South. All well here." 

Under the same date Secretary Stanton telegraphed Grant 
at City Point : 

"I wish you a merry Christmas, if it is not too late, and thank you for the 
Savannah news. 

" It is a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get off his fifteen 
thousand from Sherman's sixty thousand. It looks like protracting the war 
while their armies continue to escape. 

" I hope you will give immediate instructions to seize and hold the cotton. 
Thomas has been nominated for Major-General." 

Of the approach to the coast, General Sherman writes : 

" The weather was fine, the roads good, and every thing seemed to favor us 
Never do I recall a more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by 
night, lit up by the fires of fragrant pine knots. * No 

enemy opposed us, and we could only occasionally hear the faint rever- 
beration of a gun to our left rear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick 
was skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him. 
But the infantry columns had met with no opposition whatever. * 

* That night (December 8) we reached Pooler's Station, eight miles from 
Savannah, and during the next two days, December 9 and 10, the several 
corps reached the defenses of Savannah, * * * thus completely 
investing the city." 

This question of investing the city involves the one of 
responsibility for the escape of Hardee, and will bear a little 
attention. 

On the 13th December General Sherman wrote Mr. Stanton, 
as quoted at page 201, Volume II : 

"Before opening communication we had completely destroyed all railroads 
leading into Savannah and invested the city." 

And on the 16th to General Grant, quoted on page 207 : 

" I had previously made you a hasty scrawl * * * advising 

you that the army had reached the sea-coast * * * * investing 
closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the fleet. 

* * * * General Slocum occupies Argyle Island and the upper end 
of Hutchinson's Island and has a brigade on the South Carolina shore 



166 HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 

opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of his corps over to that shore. 
* * « -:;•- jj e [Hood] can draw nothing from South Carolina, save 
from a small corner down in the south-east, and that by a disused wagon 
road. I could easily get possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk 
of making a detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the 
main army." * * * * 

In demanding the surrender of the city, on the 17th, he 
wrote Hardee : 

"Also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which 
the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am, therefore, 
justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah and its de- 
pendent forts; and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer before 
opening with heavy ordnance." 

The same day Hardee, in refusing to surrender, thus gave 
him notice that he had not invested the city : 

"Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled every 
avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is incorrect. I am 
in free and constant communication with my department." 

The effect of this last communication General Sherman 
thus relates (page 216) : 

"On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank road, 
eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter declining 
to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. The ground was difficult, 
and as all former assaults had proved so bloody, I concluded to make one 
more effort to completely surround Savannah on all sides, so as further to 
excite Hardee's fears, and, in case of success, to capture the whole of his 
army. We had already completely invested the place on the north, west, and 
south; but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the old dike 
or plank road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that Hardee would 
have a pontoon bridge across the river." 

On the same day, December 18, he wrote General Grant in 
reference to this incredulousness of Hardee, as follows: 

"In relation to Savannah, you will remark that General Hardee refers to 
his still being in communication with his department. This language he 
thought would deceive me, but I am confirmed in the belief that the route to 
which he refers (the Union plank road on the South Carolina shore) is 



HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 167 

inadequate to feed his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster 
assures me that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad 
River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah." 

And yet, with this letter spread at length on the pages of 
his book, General Sherman goes on to say, following the last 
quotation preceding this letter to Grant : 

"On examining my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, 
belonging to General Foster's command, might be moved from its then 
position at Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could 
reach this plank road, fortify, and hold it — at some risk, of course, because 
Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fall on this detachment 
with his whole army." 

That is to say, while writing to General Grant, after 
receiving Hardee's letter and before any further word from 
Foster, that the latter held this plank road, he thought, by 
looking at his maps, that one of Foster's divisions might be 
moved down to a point from which it eould reach this road; 
but there would be risk, since Hardee with fifteeen thousand 
men could leave Savannah in the face of Sherman's sixty 
thousand men, cross the river on pontoons, march ten miles 
inland over this one road leading through swamps or over- 
flowed rice lands, and "fall on this detachment with his whole 
army." 

General Sherman then continues (page 216, Vol. II) : 

•:■:- -:;:- " S 0) taking one or two of my personal staff, I rode back 
to King's Bridge, leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make 
all possible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or three days' 
absence; and there I took a boat for Warsaw Sound, whence Admiral Dahl- 
gren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) to Hilton Head, 
where I represented the matter to General Foster, and he promptly agreed 
to give his personal attention to it. During the night of the 20th we started 
back, the wind blowing strong. Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the 
Harvest Moon to run into Tybee, and to work his way through to "Warsaw 
Sound and the Ogeechee River by the Romney marshes. We wereeanglit by 
a low tide and stuck in the mud. After laboring some time, the Admiral 
ordered out his barge In it we pulled through this intricate and shallow 
channel, and toward evening of December 21 we discovered coming toward 
us a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to the quartermaster's department, 



168 HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 

with a staff officer on board bearing letters from Colonel Dayton to myself 
and the Admiral, reporting that the city of Savannah had been found 
evacuated on the morning of December 21, and was then in our possession. 
General Hardee had crossed the Savannah River by a pontoon bridge, carry- 
ing off his men and light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy yard, 
but leaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway cars, steamboats, 
and an immense amount of public and private property." * * * * 

Some light is thrown upon the question of the responsibility 
for Hardee's escape by the official records. 

The aggregate strength of Sherman's army before Savannah 
on December 20, the day before its evacuation, was sixty 
thousand five hundred and ninety-eight men. 

Hardee's field returns for the same day showed an aggregate 
for his garrison, of all arms and all sorts, of nine thousand 
and eighty-nine men. 

On the 16th of December General Sherman, in a let- 
ter to General Grant, gave this opinion of the Confederate 
strength : 

"I think Hardee, in Savannah, has good artillerists; some five or six 
thousand good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten 
thousand militia." 

General Sherman had "surrounded" the city, as he so fully 
explained — that is, he had not surrounded it. Hardee held 
the entire Savannah River front of the city. Hutchinson 
Island, opposite, reached from a point below the place to a 
point opposite the left of the Union line. Between Hutchin- 
son Island and the South Carolina shore was Pennyworth 
Island. The only possible way of escape for Hardee, unless 
he cut through Sherman's sixty thousand, was by building 
pontoon bridges connecting these islands and the two shores. 
General Slocum, who occupied the Union left with the Twen- 
tieth Corps, had captured two small steamers, and collected 
a number of flats and small boats immediately after reaching 
the Savannah River, and was extremely anxious to cross a 
corps to the South Carolina side, which would have effectually 
invested the city. With an army of four corps, and either 



HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 169 

corps stronger than Hardee's entire army, his desire would 
appear to have been most judicious. 

General Sherman thus explains why he did not accede 
to General Slocum's proposition to pass a sufficient force 
to the South Carolina shore, to close Hardee's only line of 
escape : 

"General Slocum had already captured a couple of steamboats trying to 
pass down the Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some of 
his men on Argyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted to 
transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as the enemy had 
iron-clad gun-boats in the river, I did not deem it prudent, because the same 
result would be better accomplished from General Foster's position at Broad 
River. 

The following extracts from General Slocum's report of 
operations in the rear of Savannah will illustrate the vacil- 
lating course his orders obliged him to pursue: 

"From the 13th to the 20th [December] several changes were made in the 
position of the troops. * * " s * Two regiments from Geary occu- 
pied the upper end of Hutchinson's Island. Carman's brigade, First Division, 
was sent to Argyle Island, and subsequently across to the South Carolina 
shore, with one section of Battery I, First New York Artillery. * * 
During the 20th the report from Carman's brigade indicated that 
large columns were crossing to the Carolina shore, either to cover their own 
line of communication or preparatory to the final evacuation of the city. 

"In the night General Geary reported to me that the movements across the 
river were still going on. The different commanders were instructed to keep 
on the alert and press their pickets close to the rebel works, but the enemy, 
intending to abandon his heavy guns, kept \ip a fire until the moment of quit- 
ting the works." 

The following orders from General Slocum's headquarters 
to various officers, under his command show the details of 
this movement threatening the rebel line of communication : 

"December 11. — To General Geary: The General commanding directs that, 
if you can find any boats in the river, you send fifty or sixty men to Hutch- 
inson's Island to ascertain what they can. 

" December 13. — To General Geary: The General commanding directs that 
the forty-seven men of your command, under Major Hoyt, now on Hutchin- 
son's Island, remain there until further orders. 



170 HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 

" December 16. — To Colonel Hawley: The General commanding the corps 
directs that you have all the boats in your charge, or in that of Colonel 
Bloodgood, on your side of the river by 8 A. M. to-morrow, and in readiness 
to cross troops. The whole of Colonel Carman's brigade will cross. 

"December 16. — To General Jackson: In accordance with directions from 
the General commanding the corps, the order for Colonel Carman to cross 
his brigade to the South Carolina side of the Savannah River to-morrow 
morning is hereby countermanded. 

" The General commanding directs that you have him send over a force of 
ninety or one hundred men in small boats to effect a lodgment, if possible, 
and feel the enemy's position. He wishes him to take only such force as can 
be readily brought back in case the enemy be too strong for him. 

" December 18. — To Colonel Carman: The Brigadier-General commanding 
the corps directs that you cross your command to the South Carolina side of 
the Savannah River to-morrow morning. You will commence the movement 
before daylight. 

"December 21. — General Jackson: The General commanding directs that 
General Carman's brigade be moved to this side of the river, leaving one 
regiment on the island for the present. He wishes the brigade encamped on 
this side so that they will protect the two rice mills." 

Colonel Charles C. Jones, Chief of Artillery on the staff of 
General Hardee during the siege of Savannah, in a work 
which he has published, thus describes the evacuation : 

"December 14. — The evacuation of Savannah having been resolved upon, 
and it being impracticable by means of the few steamboats and river craft at 
command to cross the garrison, artillery, and requisite stores with con- 
venience and safety to Screven's Ferry, orders were issued for the immediate 
construction of suitable pontoon bridges. The line of retreat selected by the 
engineers, and adopted upon the evacuation of the city, involved the location 
of a pontoon bridge extending from the foot of West Broad street to Hutch- 
inson's Island, a distance cf about a thousand feet, a roadway across that 
island in the direction of Pennyworth Island, a second pontoon bridge across 
the middle river, another roadway across Pennyworth Island, and a third 
pontoon bridge across Back River, the further end of which rested upon the 
rice field on the Carolina shore. The route then followed the most sub- 
stantial and direct rice dam running north, a canal being on one side and an 
impracticable rice field on the other. This dam was just wide enough to 
permit the careful movement of field artillery and army wagons. The plan- 
tation bridges along the line of march were strengthened to bear the passage 
of these heavy conveyances. * * * * 

"All available rice-field flats were collected. These being between seventy- 
five and eighty feet in length, and possessing sufficient width for the purpose, 
were swung into position with the tide, lashed end to end by means of ropes 



HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 171 

and stringers running from boat to boat continuously tbe entire length of the 
bridge, and were kept in their places by ear wheels, the only anchors which 
could be procured. Above the stringers was a flooring of plank obtained 
from the city wharves. 

"At eight o'clock on the evening of the 17th, the first pontoon bridge span- 
ning the Savannah Eiver from the foot of West Broad street to Hutchinson 
Island was completed, and by half-past eight o'clock p. m. on Monday, the 
19th, the remaining bridges were finished, and the route in readiness for the 
retreat of the Confederate garrison. * * Two regiments of 

General Geary's division occupied the upper end of Hutchinson's Island, and 
Carman's brigade was pushed forward to Argyle Island. * * * * 

"Heavy skirmishing occurred between General P. M. B.Young's command 
and the Federals on Argyle Island. 

"In the effort to advance in the direction of the Confederate line of 
communication with the Carolina shore, the enemy was repulsed with con- 
siderable loss. The fighting along the rice dams was obstinate and bloody. 
As the retention of this route was essential to the safety of the troops engaged 
in the defense of Savannah, all General Wheeler's available forces, assisted 
by Young's troops, and such of the South Carolina light batteries as could be 
spared from points along the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, were con- 
centrated for its protection. By these troops all attempts of the enemy to 
move upon our line were stubbornly and successfully resisted. * * * * 
The troops from the western lines were quietly withdrawn, in the order and 
at the hours indicated in the circulars issued by the Lieutenant-General for 
the evacuation of the city. No confusion prevailed, and the movement was 
executed silently and in good order. 

"Guns were spiked, and ammunition destroyed as far as this could con- 
veniently be done without attracting the notice of the enemy in our immediate 
front. 

"To conceal the movement, occasional firing was kept up until the latest 
moment. Forty-nine pieces of artillery, with limbers, caissons, forges, battery 
wagons, and baggage wagons, were safely transported over the pontoon 
bridges. A single battery wagon was lost. Through some negligence of 
the driver, it got off the bridge. The horses attached to it were saved. No 
interruption was encountered at the hand of the enemy, and the Confederate 
army rendezvoused the next day at Hardeeville, South Carolina." 

So much for what the records and this last account have 
to say in regard to Hardee's escape from General Sherman. 
The latter now contents himself with the following reflections 
(Vol. II, page 218) : 

"I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but on the 
whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits of victory." 



172 HARDEE'S ESCAPE FROM SAVANNAH. 

And at the time, in a .letter to General Halleck, dated 
December 24th (not given in the Memoirs), he wrote : 

"I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me, but really am 
not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up the "Union cause- 
way," but intervening obstacles were such that before I could get my troops 
on the road Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were 
in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia troops 
under G. W. Smith declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and 
they have gone north en route for Augusta; and I have reason to believe the 
North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington; in other words, they are 
scattered." 

But these reflections will scarcely break the force of Mr. 
Stanton's words, heretofore quoted, from a dispatch to General 
Grant : 

"It is a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get off his fifteen 
thousand from Sherman's sixty thousand. It looks like protracting the war 
while their armies continue to escape." 

It might be supposed that in treating of the Savannah 
campaign after the lapse of so many years, General Sherman 
would not introduce matter reflecting upon Thomas, whose 
victory at Nashville furnished the only justification for the 
March to the Sea. How far he does violence to so charitable 
a supposition will appear in another chapter. 



CHAPTEE XIII. 

AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE CRITICISED FROM SAVANNAH. 

No sooner had our army reached Savannah than a sickening 
anxiety set in about headquarters to hear from Nashville. 
An army of sixty thousand men had marched away from its 
enemy, leaving him moving toward the North, to be taken 
care of with what General Sherman calls the "somewhat 
broken forces" at the disposal of Thomas. Exultation over 
the "great march" was fast dying away at headquarters. 
The all-important question there was: Will Hood evade or 
defeat Thomas, and invade Kentucky and the North? 
Writing the day after he entered Savannah to General 
Webster, at Nashville, Sherman said in a letter, referred 
to in the Memoirs, but not given : 

"I have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas' 
dispatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was 
successful, but not complete. I await further accounts with anxiety, as 
Thomas' complete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this cam- 
paign, and I have no doubt that my calculation that Thomas had in hand 
(including A. J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in a fair 
fight was correct." 

There was no peace at headquarters till this doubt was 
fully resolved, and the painful suspense removed by the news 
of final and complete victory at Nashville. This victory was 
full deliverance for General Sherman from the verdict he had 
recorded as the march began, when he wrote: "Should we 
fail, this march would be adjudged the wild adventure of 
a crazy fool." Had Hood defeated Thomas, or reached the 

(173) 



174 AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 

Ohio River, this verdict would assuredly have passed into 
history. 

And so, considering the bearings which the battle of Nash- 
ville had upon Sherman's campaign to the sea, his best friends 
may well be surprised to find his book stained by unjust 
reflections upon Thomas. 

The following extracts from the Memoirs indicate the 
treatment which this branch of the subject receives: 

"As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened communica- 
tion with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had transpired in Tennessee 
since our departure. * * * 

"As before described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry — 
S. D. Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's — at Florence, Alabama, with 
Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about forty-five 
thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee, quietly 
^engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken forces at his 
disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps — the Fourth and 
Twenty-third — under the general command of Major-General J. M. Schofield, 
at Pulaski, directly in front of Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry 
(Hatch, Croxton, and Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watch- 
ing closely for Hood's initiative. 

"This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore inferior to 
the enemy ; and General Schofield was instructed, in case the enemy made a 
general advance, to fall back slowly toward Nashville, fighting till he should 
be reenforced by General Thomas in person. * * * * 

" Meantime General Thomas had organized the employe's of the quarter- 
master's department into a corps, commanded by the Chief-Quartermaster, 
General J. L. Donaldson, and placed them in the fortifications of Nashville, 
under the general direction of Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United 
States Engineers. He had also received the two veteran divisions of the 
Sixteenth Corps, under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected, 
and he had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama), the divisions 
of Steedman and of R. S. Granger. 

"These, with General Schofield's army, and about ten thousand good 
cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson, constituted a strong army, capable, 
not only of defending Nashville, but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet 
Thomas remained inside of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood 
had closed upon him and had intrenched his position. * * * * At 
that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was covered with ice 
and snow, and both parties for a time rested on the defensive. Thus matters 
stood at Nashville, while we were closing down on Savannah, in the early 
part of December, 1864; and the country, as well as General Grant, was 



AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 175 

alarmed at the seeming passive conduct of General Thomas; and General 
Grant at one time considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of 
going to Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be 
at City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas. Luckily for the 
latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and thus escaped so 
terrible a fate." 

It seems never to have occurred to General Sherman that 
much of this trouble came to General Thomas through the 
misrepresentations he himself had made to General Grant of 
Thomas' force, in the dispatch of November 1st, and others 
of a similar purport. 

After narrating the demand on Hardee to surrender Savan- 
nah, his refusal and subsequent escape, and the occupation 
of the city, General Sherman again recurs to Thomas before 
Nashville, and in more generous terms: 

"Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in front of 
Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly fulfilled his 
promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given in his own official 
reports, long since published. Rumors of these great victories reached us at 
Savannah by piecemeal, but his official report came on the 24th of December, 
with a letter from General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to 
the 18th, and I wrote at once through my Chief-of-Staff', General Webster, to 
General Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms. His brilliant 
victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to make a complete 
whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by Mr. Lincoln, who 
recognized it fully in his personal letter of December 26th, hereinbefore 
quoted at length, and which I also claimed at the time, in my Special Field 
Order No. 6, of January, 8, 1865, here given." * * * * 

In comparing the above statements with the records, it 
is necessary to go back to the estimate General Sherman 
placed upon the forces of Hood, and those under the control 
of Thomas, when the object was to procure General Grant's 
permission to march for the sea without first destroying Hood. 

From Resaca on November 1st, he telegraphed Grant as 
follows: 

" As you foresaw, and as Jeff". Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the 
full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and 
defeat this army. His infantry, about thirty thousand (30,000), with Wheeler 



176 AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 

and Roddy's cavalry, from seven to ten thousand (7,000 to 10,000), are now 
in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and the water being low, 
are able to cross at will. * * * * 

"General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski, Stanley's corps, about 
fifteen thousand strong, and Schofield's corps, ten thousand, en route by rail, 
and has at least twenty to twenty-five thousand men, with new regiments and 
conscripts arriving all the time, also. General Rosecrans promises the two 
divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they can 
reach Tennessee in less than ten days. * * * * I have retained 
about fifty thousand good troops and have sent back full twenty-five thousand, 
and have instructed General Thomas to hold defensively Nashville, Chatta- 
nooga, and Decatur, all strongly fortified and provisioned for a long 
siege." * * * * 

The points to be noted in connection with this telegram 
are, that Hood s forces were then estimated by Sherman at 
from thirty-seven to forty thousand, while Thomas' troops 
were stated to be from forty-five to fifty thousand besides new 
regiments, conscripts arriving all the time, and the two 
divisions of A. J. Smith. 

Instead of Smith's troops reaching Thomas in ten days, 
they did not reach him for thirty days. 

General Sherman instead of retaining fifty thousand troops 
retained over sixty-two thousand. 

Thomas was instructed to hold Nashville defensively. 

To write at this late day of General Thomas being in 
Nashville "seemingly passive," and " quietly engaged in 
reorganizing his army," is, in view of the almost superhuman 
efforts which he with the "somewhat broken forces at his dis- 
posal " was making to prepare for the defeat of Hood, to 
perpetrate an injustice to the dead which the General of the 
army could easily have avoided. 

And, as if to make this "passiveness and quiet" apparent to 
all and the more inexcusable, and the great risk which he saw 
in leaving Thomas to grapple Hood at every disadvantage 
less apparent, the Memoirs present the estimate given below 
of Thomas' strength, which agrees neither with the dispatch 
of November 1st, already quoted, nor with the fact as recorded 
in the official records. A summing up of the statement will 



AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 177 

show that it places Thomas' strength of all kinds at from 
eighty-two thousand seven hundred to eighty-eight thousand 
seven hundred, besides several garrisons, when in fact the 
official returns show that the effective force present at the 
battle of Nashville was fifty-five thousand four hundred and 
seventy-two, while the dispatch of November 1st fixed it at 
from sixty-three to seventy thousand. 

Says General Sherman, Vol. II, page 162: 

" He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops, and as 
many more civil employes of the quartermaster's department, which were 
not suited for the field, but would be most useful in maiming the excellent 
forts that already covered Nashville. At Chattanooga he had General Steed- 
man's division, about five thousand men, besides garrisons for Chattanooga, 
Bridgeport, and Stevenson ; at Murfreesboro he also had General Rousseau's 
division, which was full five thousand strong, independent of the necessary 
garrisons for the railroad. At Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama, was the 
infantry division of General R. S. Granger, estimated at four thousand, and 
near Florence, Alabama, watching the crossings of the Tennessee, were Gen- 
eral Edward Hatch's division of cavalry, four thousand ; General Croxton's 
brigade, twenty five hundred, and Colonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred. 
Besides which General J. H. Wilson had collected in Nashville about ten 
thousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidly collecting the nec- 
essary horses for a remount. All these aggregated about forty-five thou- 
sand men. 

"General A. J. Smith at that time was in Missouri with the two divisions 
of the Sixteenth Corps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist 
General Rosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri. This 
object had been accomplished, and these troops, numbering from eight to ten 
thousand, had been ordered to Nashville. To these I proposed at first to add 
only the Fourth Corps (General Stanley), fifteen thousand, and that corps was 
ordered from Gaylesville to march to Chattanooga and thence to report for 
orders to General Thomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of October, at 
Rome, Georgia, learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised 
by General Grant were coming forward very slowly, I concluded to further 
reenforce him by General Schofield's corps (Twenty-third), twelve thousand, 
which corps accordingly marched for Resaca, and there took the cars for 
Chattanooga. I then knew that General Thomas would have an ample force 
with which to encounter General Hood any where in the open field, besides 
garrisons to secure the railroad to his rear, and as far forward as Chatta- 
nooga." 

In the earlier quotations of this chapter will be found some 
12 



178 AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 

generous words spoken of Thomas' success at Nashville, 
coupled with the statement that, upon learning the result, 
he wrote through General Webster, "complimenting him 
[Thomas] in the highest terms." Though not produced that 
letter exists in the records, and the part of it in any degree 
complimentary in its character is as follows: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In the Field, Savannah, G-a., December 23, 1864. \ 

General J. D. Webster, Nashville, Tenn. 

Dear General: Major Dixon arrived last night, bringing your letter oi 
the 10th December, for which I am very much obliged, as it gives me a clear 
and distinct view of the situation of affairs at Nashville up to that date. I 
have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas' dispatch, 
giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was successful, 
but not complete. I await further accounts with anxiety, as Thomas' com- 
plete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this campaign, and I have 
no doubt that my calculation that Thomas had in hand (including A. J. 
Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in a fair fight was correct. 
I approve of Thomas' allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable 
him to concentrate his own men, though I would have preferred that Hood 
should have been checked about Columbia. Still, if Thomas followed up his 
success of the 15th, and gave Hood a good whaling, and is at this moment 
following him closely, the whole campaign in my division will be even more 
perfect than the Atlanta campaign, for at this end of the line I have realized 
all I had reason to hope for, except in the release of our prisoners, which was 
simply an impossibility. 

December 24. — I have just received a letter from General Grant, giving a 
detail of General Thomas' operations up to the 18th, and I am gratified 
beyond measure at the result. 

Show this letter to General Thomas, and tell him to consider it addressed 
to him, as I have not time to write more now. * * * * 

I am, very truly, yours, W. T. Sherman, Major- General. 

Perhaps the most glaring instance of injustice to General 
Thomas found in the book appears on page 209. It is con- 
tained in a general letter to Grant upon the situation before 
Savannah, and plans for a coming campaign, dated in front 
of the latter place December 16th. It has the following par- 
agraph in regard to Thomas: 

" I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in Tennessee. I 



AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 179 

purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas assured rne that he was 
all ready, and my last dispatch from him of the 12th of November was full of 
confidence, in which he promised me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to 
advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead and give myself no concern 
about Hood's army in Tennessee. 

" Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and discomfiting 
him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not approve of his evacuat- 
ing' Decatur, but think he should have assumed the offensive against Hood 
from Pulaski in the direction of Waynesburg. I know full well that General 
Thomas is slow in mind and in action, but he is judicious and brave, and the 
troops feel great confidence in him. I still hope he will outmaneuver and 
destroy Hood." 

This letter, with the exception of the above extract, was 
printed in full by General Sherman in the report he placed 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in May, 
1865. The country was still ringing with the praise of 
Thomas. It would have been a serious thing to print it 
then; but now, when Thomas is dead, and Sherman is vin- 
dicating himself for history, this unjust paragraph is hunted 
up and given to the world, with the remark (page 207) 
that the letter now produced " is a little more full than the 
one printed in the report of the Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War, because in that copy I omitted the matter 
concerning General Thomas which now need no longer be 
withheld." 

Even if General Sherman believed the paragraph was just 
when he wrote it, he well knew it to be cruelly unjust when 
he printed it. 

On the 23d of December, only a few days after the date 
of this letter, he had written General Webster in the one 
already quoted: 

"I approve of Thomas' allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable 
him to concentrate his own men, though I would have preferred that Hood 
should have been checked about Columbia." 

And in the text of his Memoirs, only a few pages in advance 
of where he reproduces this paragraph, after enumerating all 



180 AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 

the force available about Pulaski, he writes, as already 
quoted : 

"This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore inferior 
to the enemy ; and General Schofield was instructed, in case the enemy made 
a general advance, to fall back slowly toward Nashville, fighting till he 
should be reenforced by General Thomas in person." 

General Sherman also knew well that only a portion of the 
veteran reinforcements ordered to General Thomas had suc- 
ceeded in reaching Nashville the day of the battle of Franklin, 
and that the rest did not arrive till the day succeeding that 
battle. 

Among the last dispatches he sent to General Thomas at 
Nashville, before starting on the March to the Sea, was this 
order, dated October 31st: 

"You must unite all your men into one army and abandon all minor points 
if you expect to defeat Hood." 

And the very last dispatch, before starting south, was one 
notifying Thomas of his belief that all information seemed to 
indicate that Beauregard (Hood) would attempt to work 
against Nashville : 

"I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against 
Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information 
seems to point that way." 

Why General Thomas did not turn on Hood at Franklin 
appears from the following field dispatches from General 
Schofield, who was fighting a splendid battle at that place: 

Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 1864, 12 M. 
Maj or- General Thomas, Nashville. 

Your dispatch of 10:25 A. m. is received. I am satisfied that I have hereto- 
fore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check while so far inferior 
to him in both infantry and cavalry. The slightest mistake on my part, or 
failure of a subordinate, during the last three days, might have proved dis- 
astrous. I don't want to get into so tight a place again. 

I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views if you think it 
expedient to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your 



AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 181 

troops together, and in fighting condition, we can whip Hood easily, and I 
believe make the campaign a decisive one. Before that the most we can do 
is to husband our strength and increase it as much as possible. * * * * 

J. M. Schofield, Major- General. 

Franklin, Tenn., November 30, 3 P. M. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville. 

I have just received your dispatch, asking whether I can hold Hood here 
three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but 
will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large force, probably 
two corps, in my front, and seems preparing to cross the river above and 
below. I think he can effect a crossing to-morrow in spite of all my efforts 
to prevent, or to-night if he attempts it. A worse place than this for an 
inferior force could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General 
Wilson this evening, yet fear he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest 
will be in my rear to-morrow doing some greater mischief. 

It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at once. If 
A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro garrison join me there, I ought 
to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have just learned that 
the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles below. I will have 
lively times with my trains again. J. M. Schofield, Major-General. 

And, if all thus far related is not enough to show that there 
was nothing in the situation at Nashville surpassing Sherman's 
understanding, the terms of the congratulatory order he prints 
in full a few pages beyond where he records the shock to his 
powers of comprehension, are conclusive, and a brief extract 
will suffice: 

"Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments to our rear, 
returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their 
meshes, while we came on to complete the original journey. 

" Almost at the moment of our victorious entry into Savannah came the 
welcome and expected news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled 
nobly and well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then 
turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his artillery, 
great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the fragments down 
in Alabama." 

There were several other paragraphs reflecting upon General 
Thomas, omitted from the letters furnished the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, which are now reproduced by Gen- 
eral Sherman, but the citation of one is sufficient. 



182 AFFAIRS AT NASHVILLE. 

There is a brief letter in the records, not quoted in the 
Memoirs, which contains a sentence fitted for the close of a 
chapter on the operations at Nashville and Savannah. Mr. 
Lincoln had written General Sherman, in a letter before 
quoted: 

"Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I 
believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of 
General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great 
success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military ad- 
vantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, 
putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving 
enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole (Hood's army), it 
brings those who sat in darkness to see great light." 

To which General Sherman replied: 

"I am gratified at the receipt of your letter of December 26th, at the hands 
of General Logan, especially to observe that you appreciate the division I 
made of my army, and that each part was duly proportioned to its work." 

Two pictures will rise here" before the mind. In one ap- 
pears General Thomas, struggling in the face of a veteran and 
concentrated enemy, then far outnumbering him at every 
point, to collect enough fragments to give battle, finally 
accomplishing the task, and achieving victory. 

In the other picture, Sherman, with sixty-two thousand 
selected men, thoroughly armed and equipped, marches down 
to the sea unopposed, summons Hardee's ten thousand to 
surrender, who first refuse, and three days thereafter escape. 
And yet General Sherman was especially gratified with the 
conceit that each part of his army was duly proportioned to 
its work. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE — THE HISTORY OP HIS 
CONTEMPLATED REMOVAL. 

The causes which produced the dissatisfaction at City Point 
and Washington, over the apparent slowness of General 
Thomas at Nashville, can now be clearly traced. They sprung 
directly from the telegrams of General Sherman, overesti- 
mating the forces he had left to take care of Hood. General 
Grant and the authorities at the Capital looked upon Hood's 
northward advance with alarm. Sherman had been repeat- 
edly notified that he must leave an ample force with Thomas 
to enable this officer to hold the line of the Tennessee. He 
as often replied that he had fully complied with these direc- 
tions. General Grant naturally became solicitous lest Hood, 
if not attacked, should pass around Thomas, invade Kentucky, 
and possibly reach the North. As a result of this anxiety 
and unjust dissatisfaction, an order was given for the removal 
of Thomas, which order, however, was not executed in conse- 
quence of his battle and victory. 

As has been seen, Sherman thus refers to this matter: 

"Yet Thomas remained inside of Nashville, seemingly passive, until Gen- 
eral Hood had closed upon him and had intrenched his position. * * * 

"At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was covered 
with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on the defensive. Thus 
matters stood at Nashville while we were closing down on Savannah in the 
early part of December, 1864; and the country, as well as General Grant, 
was alarmed at the seeming passive conduct of General Thomas; and General 
Grant at one time considered the situation so dangerous that he thought ol 
going to Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be 
at City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for the 

(183) 



184 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and thus escaped so 
terrible a fate." 

The full correspondence relating to this subject is not only 
interesting, but it throws much new light upon General 
Sherman's account of the movements connected with the 
March to the Sea. 

General Thomas was in Nashville directing the concentra- 
tion of his army. General Schofield was in command at the 
front. The great object was to hold Hood back until all 
available forces could be united to meet him, and the remount 
of the cavalry accomplished. Under these circumstances, and a 
week before the advance of A. J. Smith's troops arrived at 
Nashville, the enemy had reached Columbia, and his large 
force of cavalry under Forrest was becoming very active. At 
this time the correspondence between General Thomas and the 
authorities at the East began, and continued until the battle 
was fought. 

Its opening dispatch was as follows : 

City Point, Va., November 21, 18*64, 4 P. M. 
Major- General George H. Thomas, Nashville, Term. 

* * * * Do not let Forrest get oft' without punishment. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

The answer gave strong reasons for not implicitly obeying 
this order, and, together with the telegrams which succeeded 
it, shows the real condition in which General Sherman left 
Thomas : 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, ) 
Nashville, Tknn., November 25, 1864, 11 A. M. J 

Lieutenant General Grant, City Point, Va. 

Your dispatch of 4 P. M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is 
in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbers mine at this time that I am 
compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's troops have 
arrived yet, although they embarked at St Louis on Tuesday last. The 
transportation of Generals Hatch's and Grierson's cavalry was ordered by 
General Washburne I am told, to be turned in at Memphis, which has crippled 
the only cavalry I had at this time. All of my cavalry was dismounted to fur- 
nish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went with General Sherman. My 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 185 

dismounted cavalry is now detained at Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. 
Horses are arriving slowly, and arms have been detained somewhere en route 
for more than a month. General Grierson lias been delayed by conflicting 
orders in Kansas, and from Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he 
will reach here. Since being placed in charge of affairs in Tennessee, 1 have 
lost nearly fifteen thousand men discharged by expiration of service and per- 
mitted to go home to vote. My gain is probably twelve thousand perfectly 
raw troops. Therefore, as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me, both in 
infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. 
The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood, and if Forrest 
can be reached he shall be punished. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General Volunteers commanding. 

Nashville, December 1, 18G4, 9:30 P. M. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

After General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced that the 
enemy very far outnumbered him both in infantry and cavalry, I determined 
to retire to the fortifications around Nashville until General Wilson can get 
his cavalry equipped. He has now but about one-fourth the number of the 
enemy, and consequently, is no match for him. I have two iron-clads here, 
with several gun-boats, and Commodore Fitch assures me that Hood can 
neither cross the Cumberland, nor blockade it. I, therefore, think it best to 
wait here until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here 
he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday. If he remains 
until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, and will move against him at 
once. I have Murfreesboro strongly held, and therefore feel easy in regard 
to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk River bridges 
have strong garrisons. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Volunteers commanding. 

War Department, ) 
Washington, December 2, 10:30 A. M. J 
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point. 

The President feels solicitous about the disposition of Thomas to lay in 
fortifications for an indefinite period, "until Wilson gets equipments." This 
looks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing, and let the 
enemy raid the country. The President wishes you to consider the matter. 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

City Point, Va., December 2, 1864, 11 A. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, we will lose all 
the roads back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the 
Tennessee River. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you 
should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your 
quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc. tj. s. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 



186 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

Citt Point, Va., December 2, 1864, 1:30 P. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

With your citizen employes armed you can move out of Nashville with all 
your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own 
choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin it looks to me that instead 
of falling back to Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the 
enemy, but at this distance may err as to the method of dealing with the 
enemy. You will suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is 
not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to 
attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no peace. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, ) 
Nashville, Tenn., December 2, 1S64, 10 P. M. j 

General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. 

Your two telegrams of 11 A. M. and 1:30 P. M. to-day are received. At the 
time Hood was whipped at Franklin I had at this place but about five thou- 
sand (5,000) men of General Smith's command, which, added to the force 
under General Schofield, would not have given me more than twenty-five 
thousand (25,000) men. Besides, General Schofield felt convinced that he 
could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the five thousand could reach 
him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered only about one- 
fourth that of Forrest, I thought it best to draw the troops back to Nashville 
and await the arrival of the remainder of General Smith's force, and also a 
force of about five thousand (5,000), commanded by General Steedman, 
which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith 
arrived yesterday morning, and General Steedman's troops arrived last 
night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive if I had 
more cavalry, and will take the field anyhow as soon as the remainder of 
General McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will in 
two or three days. 

We can neither get reinforcements nor equipments at this great distance 
from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command 
was made up of the two weakest corps of General Sherman's army, and all 
the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and the task of reorganizing and 
equipping has met with many delays which have enabled Hood to take 
advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however in a few 
more days I shall be able to give him a fight. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General TJ. S. Volunteers commanding. 

City Point, Va., December 5, 1864, 6:30 P. M. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. 

Is there not danger of Forrest's moving down the Tennessee River where 
he can cross it? It seems to me, while you should be getting up your cavalry 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 187 

as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where 
he is. 

Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Nashville, December 6, 1864. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point. 

Your telegram of 6:30 p. M., December 5, is just received. As soon as I 
get up a respectable force of cavalry I will march against Hood. General 
Wilson has parties out now pressing horses, and I hope to have some six or 
eight thousand cavalry mounted in three days from tins time. General 
Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the cavalry 
remount as rapidly as possible. I do not think it prudent to attack Hood 
with less than six thousand (6,000) cavalry to cover my flanks, because he 
lias under Forrest at least twelve thousand (12,000). I have no doubt 
Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the gun-boats will 
be able to prevent him. The enemy has made no new developments to-day. 
Breckinridge is reported at Lebanon with six thousand (6,000) men, but 
1 can not believe it possible. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Volunteers commanding. 

This statement did not give satisfaction, and the following 
order for an attack was telegraphed: 

City Point, Va., December 6, 1864, 4 P. M. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount for your cavalry. 
There is great danger in delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

This was acted upon, but General Thomas protested against 
the wisdom of the order: 

Nashville, December 6, 1864, 9 P.M. 
J.i< a/' nant-General U. S. Grant, City Point. 

Your dispatch of 4 p. M. this day received. I will make the necessary 
disposition and attack Hood at once, agreeably to your orders, though I 
believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my service. 
Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General U. S. Volunteers commanding. 

AVar Department, ) 
Washington, December 7, 1864, 10:20 A. M. J 
Lieutenant- General Grant. 

You remember that when Steele was relieved by Canby he was ordered to 
Cairo to report to this department. What shall be done with him? The 
order superseding Bosecrans by Dodge has been issued. Thomas seems 



188 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was any but hazard- 
ous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last 
horn. Edwin M. Stanton. 

City Point, Va., December 8, 1864. 
Major- General Halleck, Washington. 

Please direct General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare to General 
Thomas. With such an order he can be relied on to send all that can 
properly go. They had probably better be sent to Louisville, for I fear 
either Hood or Breckinridge will go to the Ohio River. I will submit 
whether it is not advisable to call on Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois for sixty 
thousand men for thirty days. If Thomas has not struck yet he ought to be 
ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better man to 
repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take the 
initiative. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

War Department, 1 
Washington, D. C, December 8, 1864. J 

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point. 

If you wish General Thomas relieved give the order. No one here will, I 

think, interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, 

60 far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed. 

H. W. Halleck, Major- General, Chief of Staff. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 7, 1864, 9 P. M. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

The enemy has not increased his force on our front. Have sent gun-boats 
up the river above Cartilage. One returned to-day and reported no signs of 
the enemy on the river bank from forty miles above Carthage to this place. 
Captain Fitch, United States Navy, started down the river yesterday with a 
convoy of transport steamers, but was unable to get them down, the enemy 
having planted three batteries on a bend of the river between this and 
Clarksville. Captain Fitch was unable to silence all three of the batteries 
yesterday, and will return again to-morrow morning, and with the assistance 
of the Cincinnati, now at Clarksville, I am in hopes will now be able to 
clear them out. So far the enemy has not materially injured the Nashville 
and Chattanooga Railroad. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Volunteers commanding. 

City Point, Va., December 8, 7:30 P. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the enemy are 
trying to cross the Cumberland, and are scattered. Why not attack at once? 
By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, 
can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the Governors of States 
to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. 
You clearly never should cross, except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 189 

the fairest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies 
of the enemy. If destroyed he can never replace it Use the means at your 
command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing from one end of the 
land to the other. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

City Point, Va., December 8, 1864, 10 P. M. 
Major- General Halleck, Washington. 

Your dispatch of 9 p. M. just received. I want General Thomas reminded 
of the importance of immediate action. I sent him a dispatch this evening, 
which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him until I hear 
further from him. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 8, 1864, 11:30 P. M. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. 

Your dispatch of 7:30 P. M. is just received. I can only say, in further 
extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my 
troops, and get their transportation in order, in shorter time than it has been 
done, and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete 
the task. Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General commanding. 

Washington, December 9, 1S64, 10:30 A. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. 

Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in 
attacking the enemy. If you wait till General Wilson mounts all his cavalry 
you will wait till doomsday, for the waste equals the supply. Moreover, you 
will be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year — with so many 
animals that you can not feed them. Reports already come in of a scarcity 
of forage. H. W. Halleck, Major-Genei-al and Chief of Staff. 

Nashville, December 9, 1864, 2 P. M. 
Mojor- General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

Your dispatcli of 10:30 A. M., this date, is received. I regret that General 
Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel 
conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and that the 
troops could not have been gotten ready before this. And if he should order 
me to be relieved I will submit without a murmur. 

A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight, which will 
render an attack impossible till it breaks. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Voh. commanding. 

The next step was a dispatch from General Grant, ordering 
that General Thomas should be relieved : 

City Point, Va., December 9, 1864, 11 A. M. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

Dispatch of 8 p. M. last evening, from Nashville, shows the enemy scattered 



190 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

for more than seventy miles down the. river, and no attack yet made by 
Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him at once, and placing Scliofield 
in command. Thomas should be ordered to turn over all orders and dis- 
patches, received since the battle of Franklin, to Scliofield. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

In obedience to this dispatch, according to Halleck, the 
following order was drawn up in the War Department, but 
never issued, and no trace of it can now be found there : 

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 1 
Washington, December 9, 1864. J 

[General Orders No. — .] 

The following dispatch having been received from Lieuten ant-General 

Grant, viz. : " Please telegraph orders relieving him (General Thomas) at 

once, and placing (General) Schofield in command," the President orders: 

1. That Major-General J. M. Schofield relieve, at once, Major-General G. 
H. Thomas, in command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland. 

2. General Thomas will turn over to General Schofield all orders and 
instructions received by him since the battle of Franklin. 

E. D. Townsend, A. A. G. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 9, 1S64, 1 P. M. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point. 

Your dispatch of 8:30 P. M. of the 8th is just received. I have nearly 
completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but a 
terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it im- 
possible for our men to fight to any advantage. I am, therefore, compelled 
to wait for the storm to break and make the attack immediately after. 
Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe 
will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt but 
Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river, with the view of 
attempting a crossing, but it has been impossible for me to organize and 
equip the troops for an attack at an earlier time. Major-General Halleck 
informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking. 
I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you should 
deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur. 

Geo. H.Thomas, Major-General U.S. Vols. commanding. 

War Department, 1 
Washington, December 9, 1864, 4 P. M. J 

Lieutenant- General Grant, City Point. 

Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out when his telegram 

of this p. M. was received. If you still wish these orders telegraphed to 

Nashville they will be forwarded. H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff. 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 191 

City Point, Va., December 9, 1864, 5:30 P. M. 
Major- General Haleeck, Washington. 

General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the enemy ; 
even to giving the positive order. He did say he thought he should be able 
to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not 
doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done so 
much good service as General Thomas has, however, and will, therefore, 
suspend the order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do anything. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

City Point, Va., December 9, 1864, 7:30 P. M. 
Major- General Thomas, Nashville. 

Your dispatch of 1 p. M. to-day is received. I have as much confidence in 
your conducting the battle rightly as I have in any other officer, but it has 
seemed to me you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs 
to convince me otherwise. Receiving your dispatch to Major- General Hal- 
leck of 2 p. m. before I did the first to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order 
relieving you until we should hear further. I hope most sincerely that there 
will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that 
you have been right all the time. TJ. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

City Point, Va., December 1 1, 1864, 4 P. M. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed 
of a rebel army moving for the Ohio, and you will be forced to act, accepting 
such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood can not 
stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he 
retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and most of his army. I 
am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you 
have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reenforeements. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1864, 10:30 P. M 
Lieutenant- General TJ. S. Grant, City Point, Va. 

Your dispatch of 4 p. M. this day is just received. I will obey the order as 
promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have 
to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with 
a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able 
to move about on level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as 
soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday had it not been 
for the storm. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Vols, commanding. 

The following telegram shows that an attempt was made by 



192 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

General Thomas to obey implicitly the order for attack, and 
the reason why the movement was not made : 

Nashville, Tenn., December 12, 1864, 10:30 P. M. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the 
sleet, which now covers the ground, has melted sufficiently to enable the men 
to march. The whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and 
slippery it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move 
over level ground in any thing like order. It has taken the entire day to 
place my cavalry in position, and it has only been finally effected with im- 
minent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the numbers of horses 
falling with their riders on the road. Under these circumstances, I believe 
that an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Vols, commanding. 

On the 13th of December General Logan, then at City 
Point, was ordered to proceed to Nashville, and informed by 
General Grant that he was to take command of the Army of 
the Cumberland, relieving General Thomas, provided no 
movement had taken place upon his arrival at Nashville; and, 
further, that he (Grant) would leave in a few days to assume 
command of the forces around Nashville and fight a battle. 

The order to General Logan was as follows: 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, ) 
City Point, Va., December 13, 1864. j 

[Special Orders No. 149.] 
I. Major-General John A. Logan, United States Volunteers, will proceed 
immediately to Nashville, Tennessee, reporting by telegraph to the Lieutenant- 
General his arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at Nash- 
ville, Tennessee. * * * * 

By command of Lieutenant- General Grant. 

T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant- General. 

Washington, December 14, 1864, 12:30 M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashmlle. 

It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood, with a part of his 
forces, held you in check near Nashville, he would have time to cooperate 
against other 'important points, left only partially protected. Hence, Lieu- 
tenant-General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel forces in 
your front, and expresses great dissatisfaction that his order has not been car- 
ried out. Moreover, so long as Hood occupies a threatening position in Tennes- 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 193 

see, General Canby is obliged to keep large forces on the Mississippi River to 
protect its navigation, and to hold Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., although General 
Grant had directed a part of these forces to cooperate with Sherman. 

Every day's delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with General 
Grant's plans. H. W. Halleck, Major-General and Chief of Staff. 

On the 14th General Grant himself left City Point for 
Nashville to assume command, but was met at Washington by 
the news of Thomas' victory. 

Nashville, December 14, 1864, 8 P. M. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

Your telegram of 12:30 M. to-day is received. The ice having melted away 
to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning. Much as I regret 
the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done 
before with any reasonable prospect of success. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General U. S. Vols, commanding. 

Nashville, Tenn., 9 P. M., December 15, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff. 

Attacked enemy's left this morning, drove it from the river, below city, 
very nearly to Franklin pike, distance about eight miles. * * * * 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General. 

The body of the above dispatch contains a lengthy account 
of the movements. 

Washington, December 15, 1864, 11:30 P. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville, 

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van 
Duzen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push 
the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your 
army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army, and 
make it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but 
take them from the country, as the enemy has done. Much is now expected. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Washington, December 15, 1864, 12 Midnight. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville. 

Your dispatch of this evening just received. I congratulate you and the 
army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a conviction that 
to-morrow will add more fruits to your victory. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

13 



194 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumrerland, Eight Miles from Nashville, ) 

6 P. M., December 16, 1864. j 

To the President of the United States, Hon. E. M. Stanton and General U. S. 
Grant. 
This army thanks you for your approbation of its conduct yesterday, and 
begs to assure you that it is not misplaced. 

I have the honor to report, etc. [Here follows a second report in detail.] 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General. 

On reaching Louisville, General Logan learned that Thomas 
had made a successful move, and in reporting to General 
Grant, requested that he might be ordered back to his com- 
mand : 

Louisville, Ky., 10 A. M., December 17, 1864. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, Burlington, N. J. 

Have just arrived. Weather bad ; raining since yesterday morning. Peo- 
ple here jubilant over Thomas' success. Confidence seems to be restored. I 
will remain here to hear from you. All things going right. It would seem 
best that I return to join my command with Sherman. 

John A. Logan, 3Iajor- General. 

In reply to this, General Grant telegraphed an order direct- 
ing Logan to report to General Sherman. 

Immediately after the congratulatory dispatches, and while 
every effort was being made to press Hood's retreat, General 
Thomas was appealed to by Halleck to "capture or destroy 
Hood's army in order that General Sherman can entirely crush 
out the rebel military power in all the Southern States." 

Washington, December 21, 1864, 12 M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas. 

Permit me, General, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of Hood's 
army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few day? 
will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the great result. 
If you can capture or destroy Hood's army General Sherman can entirely 
crush out the rebel military force in all the Southern States. He begins a 
new campaign about the first of January, which will have the most important 
results if Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on 
your part is, therefore, of vital importance to General Sherman's plans. No 
sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result. 

H. W. Halleck, Major- General and Chief of Staff. 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 195 

To this General Thomas replied at length and with spirit: 

In the Field, December 21, 1864. 
Major- General Hai/leck, Washington, D. C. 

Your dispatch of 12 M., this day, is received. Genera] Hood's army is 
being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to 
pursue another. We can not control the elements, and you must remember 
that, to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to reorganize and almost 
thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought the battle of 
the 15th and 16th instants with the troops but partially equipped ; and, 
notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, 
have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River, crossing two 
streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, 
without the aid of pontoons, and witli but little transportation to bring up 
supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing all in my power to 
crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy it. Rut pursuing an 
enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with 
heavy rains, is no child's play, and can not be accomplished as quickly as 
thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department 
remembers that General Sherman took with him the complete organization 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect, as 
regards ammunition, supplies, and trasportation, leaving me only two corps, 
partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken 
with him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had 
resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi 
on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which 
is now, in addition, aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may 
appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, 
and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too 
much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially 
when they have the task of destroying a force, in a Winter's campaign, which 
was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in Spring and 
Summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit 
to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may 
contribute to the destruction of the rebellion. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major- General. 

Washington, December 22, 1864, 9 P. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas. 

I have seen to-day General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday, and your 
reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most 
unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to 
the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the 
enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration 



196 THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 

and thankfulness for the great deeds which you have already performed, or 
more confiding faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than 
will be done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers of 
your command. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

On the same day General Grant telegraphed : 

City Point, December 22, 1864. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas. 

You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which you 
are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon bridge 
at Tuscumbia before he gets there. Should you do so, it looks to me that 
Hood is cut off. If you succeed in destroying Hood's army, there will be but 
one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capable of doing us harm. I will 
take care of that, and try to draw the sting from it, so that in the Spring we 
shall have easy sailing. You have now a big opportunity, which I know you 
are availing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can before the enemy 
can derive benefit, either from the raising of negro troops on the plantations 
or white troops now in the field. u. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 

Two dispatches properly close this correspondence : 

War Department, December 24, 1864. 
Major- General Thomas, Nashville. 

With great pleasure I inform you that for your skill, courage, and conduct 
in the recent brilliant military operations under your command, the President 
has directed your nomination to be sent to the Senate as a Major-General in 
the United States Army, to fill the only vacancy existing in that grade. 
No official duty has been performed by me with more satisfaction, and no 
commander has more justly earned promotion by devoted, disinterested, and 
valuable services to his country. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

To which General Thomas, then in the field directing the 
pursuit of Hood, replied : 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
McKanes' Church, 



MBERLAND, ) 

i, Tenn. j 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

I am profoundly sensible of the kind expressions of your telegram of 
December 24th, informing me that the President had directed my name to 
be sent to the Senate for confirmation as Major-General United States Army, 
and beg to assure the President and yourself, that your approval of my 
services is of more value to me than the commission itself. 

Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General commanding. 



THOMAS' TROUBLES AT NASHVILLE. 197 

In the succeeding July, General Grant in that portion of 
his final report which related to the campaign about Nash- 
ville, made the following manly acknowledgment that the 
result had vindicated General Thomas' judgment : 

"Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared 
to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning 
that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into 
Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great 
trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of im- 
mediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there 
in person. Beaching Washington City, I received General Thomas' dispatch 
announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle 
had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dis- 
pelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon 
the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify 
should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of 
waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of 
the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his 
final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication 
of that distinguished officer's judgment." 

General Sherman himself, after introducing into his book 
several passages that he has for years suppressed, and which 
severely reflected upon General Thomas' action before Nash- 
ville, closes his consideration of the subject with these more 
generous words: 

"Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought in front of 
Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly fulfilled his 
promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given in his own official 
reports, long since published." 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH CHARACTER OF 

THE ATTACK ON SECRETARY STANTON THE JEFF. 

DAVIS GOLD. 

Attacks upon dead men may fairly be called one of the 
features of General Sherman's Memoirs. Thomas, McPher- 
son, and Stanton, with others less prominent, are in turn 
rudely and unjustly assailed in their graves. In writing 
history it would have been not only allowable for an 
honorable author to set down exact truth in regard to these 
noted actors in the war, even though it were unpalatable to 
their friends, but his bounden duty to do so. But when an 
author of General Sherman's position writes of his famous 
associates, having close at hand and conveniently arranged for 
reference all means of ascertaining the exact facts about every 
question which could arise, he stands without excuse before 
his countrymen if he wrongfully writes disgrace over graves 
where he should strew laurel. 

On page 243, Vol. II, of his Memoirs, General Sherman 
relates that he was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer the 
cotton captured in Savannah to an agent of the Treasury. 
This General Sherman did by an order dated January 12, 
1865. He then continues as follows, charging that Mr. 
Stanton's action in this matter caused great loss to the Gov- 
ernment : 

"Up to this time all the cotton had heen carefully guarded, with orders to 
General Easton to ship it by the return vessels to New York for the adjudi- 
cation of the nearest prize court, accompanied with invoices and all evidence 
Q98) 



THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 199 

of title to ownership. Marks, numbers, and other figures were carefully 
preserved on the bales, so that the court might know the history of each bale. 
But Mr. Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, and 
ordered the obliteration of all the marks, so that no man, friend or foe, could 
trace his identical cotton. I thought it strange at the time, and think it 
more so now, for I am assured that claims real and fictitious have been 
proved up against this identical cotton of three times the quantity actually 
captured, and that reclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more 
than the actual quantity captured, viz., thirty-one thousand bales." 

Here General Sherman, once a practicing attorney, forgot 
both his law and the facts, for cotton thus captured would not 
fall within the jurisdiction of a prize court, and the records 
show that what he charges upon Mr. Stanton never occurred. 

As there were nearly forty thousand bales of this cotton, in 
view of the high price then prevailing and the necessities of the 
Treasury, the proper care and handling of this most valuable 
capture were matters of the greatest importance to the Gov- 
ernment. That Mr. Stanton was fully aware of all this, that 
he caused the business to be promptly and properly attended 
to, and that every reflection made upon him by General Sher- 
man in the above extract is utterly unfounded, will now be 
made to appear. 

Secretary Stanton's first dispatch, upon learning of the 
capture of Savannah, related to the care of this cotton, and a 
copy of it was immediately sent to General Sherman and its 
receipt acknowledged by him. It was as follows: 

War Department, ) 
Washington, December 26, 1864. J 
Lieutenant- General Grant, City Point. 

I wish you a merry Christmas if not too late, and thank you for the 
Savannah news. It is a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get oft' 
his fifteen thousand from Sherman's sixty thousand. It looks like protracting 
the war while their armies continue to escape. I hope you will give imme- 
diate instructions to seize and hold the cotton. All sorts of schemes will be 
got np to hold it under sham titles of British and other private claimants. 
They should all be disregarded; and it ought not to be turned over to any 
Treasury agent, but held by the military authorities until a special order 
of tlie department is given for the transfer. Thomas lias been nominated for 
Major -General. Edwin M. Stanton. Secretary of War. 



r 



200 THE CAPTUKED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 

The part relating to cotton was sent by General Grant to 
General Sherman, and was thus answered by the latter: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In the Field, Savannah, Ga., January 2, 1865. j 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

I have just received from Lieuten ant-General Grant a copy of that part of 
your telegram to him of December 26th relating to cotton, a copy of which 
has been immediately furnished to General Eastern, Chief Quartermaster, who 
will be strictly governed by it. 

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of 
Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer was that all the 
cotton in Savannah was prize of war, belonged to the United States, and 
nobody should recover a bale of it with my consent; that, as cotton had been 
one of the chief causes of this war, it should have to pay its expenses; that 
all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility 
was committed against the United States some time in December, 1S60, and 
that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title. 

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department, United 
States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney a mere certificate 
of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales, marks, etc., the cotton 
then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Dej>artment to be shipped 
to New York for sale. But since the receipt of your dispatch I have ordered 
General Eastern to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New 
York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury 
Department ought to bother itself with the prizes as captures of war. 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 

Soon after Mr. Stanton reached Savannah, and his first order 
there in regard to the cotton was this : 

War Department, ) 
Savannah, Ga., January 12, 1865. j 

Brevet Major-General Meigs, Quartermaster- General U. S. A., Savannah, Ga. 

Sir : The Secretary of War directs that you assume the charge of the cap- 
tured cotton in this city, and provide for its proper care and preservation 
until further orders. 

You will consider yourself charged with the duty of having sufficient 
guards and precautions for its security, and will apply to the commanding 
general for any force required. 

You will also detail a competent quartermaster for the special duty of 
seeing to its being turned over and receipted for by the agents of the Treasury 
Department. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant- General. 



THE CAPTUKED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 201 

In pursuance of this order General Meigs, then in Savan- 
nah, issued the following: 

[Special Orders, No. 1.] 

Savannah, Ga., January 12, 1865. 

The Secretary of War having directed the Quartermaster-General to 
assume the charge of the captured cotton in this city and provide for its 
proper care and preservation, and to detail a competent quartermaster for 
the special duty of seeing to its being turned over and receipted for by the 
agents of the Treasury Department, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hansom is 
hereby detailed for this duty. 

Brevet Brigadier-General L. C. Easton will place Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ransom in charge of all the cotton in his possession. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom will immediately make a careful inspection of 
the stores containing the captured cotton, and will make requisition for 
guards sufficient to prevent all danger of unauthorized persons entering the 
storehouses or meddling with the cotton. 

No person not in the employment of the United States will be permitted 
to enter into or to loiter about the neighborhood of the buildings. 

He will afford every facility for the operations of the Treasury agent, 
Simeon Draper, collector of the port of New York, who is charged by the 
Treasury Department with the care and disposition of this captured property. 

He will employ competent clerks to attend to the weighing of each bale, 
who will keep an accurate register of the number and weight of each bale, 
and will take duplicate receipts in detail from the special agent of the Treas- 
ury Department before allowing any of it to leave the harbor. He will 
forward one copy of these receipts to the Quartermaster-General's office in 
^\':lshington by the first mail after their execution. 

The other copy and the books and all papers containing the records of this 
business he will himself carry in person to Washington, and will deliver 
them to the Quartermaster-General. 

For the cotton already stored on board vessels, he will take receipts in 
detail from the special agent, based upon the accounts and invoices of this 
property prepared by Captain George B. Cadwallader, heretofore in charge of 
this duty. 

In default of such receipts he will order the vessels to proceed to New 
York, invoicing the cotton to Brevet Brigadier-General Van Vliet, Chief 
Quartermaster, forwarding with the bills of lading an official copy of this order. 

General Van Vliet will transfer the cotton in this case to the special agent 
of the Treasury in New York, upon receiving such receipts as are herein 
prescribed. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom will collect and register all the information 
offered to him of claims to the former ownership of this cotton. He will 
take this information with him to Washington, but will give copies or ex- 
tracts from it to no one in Savannah but the Quartermaster-General. 



202 THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 

The utmost vigilance will be exercised by Colonel Ransom in the execu- 
tion of this important trust committed to him. He will himself visit the 
guards, and the presses and storehouses continually. He will see that no 
fires are lighted near the storehouses, or in the open streets or squares sur- 
rounding them. He will report to the officer commanding the guards all 
neglect or inattention on the part of the guards, and if this does not imme- 
diately produce a reform he will report the facts to the commanding officer 
of the post of Savannah. * * * * 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom will confer freely with the special agent of the 
Treasury Department, and will call for such military assistance as may be 
necessary to discover and place him in possession of all the cotton in the 
city of Savannah, or within the lines occupied by its garrison. It is all prize 
of war. * * * * 

M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster- General, Brevet Major- General. 

Next, in order that there might be no mistake in regard to 
the responsibility of the various parties charged with these 
duties, the following memorandum was drawn up, signed, and 
put on record : 

Office of thk General Agency foe Captured and Abandoned Property, ) 

Savannah, Ga. J 

1. Cotton captured in Savannah, that is, all the cotton within the military 
post of Savannah and its defenses, has been taken possession of and is now 
held by the Quartermaster-General, under the order of the Secretary of War. 

2. The Quartermaster-General has also, under the order of the Secretary 
of War, detailed Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, of the Quartermaster Depart- 
ment, to take charge of the cotton personally, to cause it to be weighed and 
a careful and accurate account to be taken and recorded. 

To exclude all persons not employed by the United States and needed in 
this operation from the warehouses and docks and their vicinity. 

To transfer the cotton to the special agent of the Treasury Department, 
taking duplicate receipts therefor in detail, said receipts specifying the num- 
ber and weight of every bale thus transferred to the special agent of the 
Treasury Department. 

To allow none of the cotton to leave the harbor until said receipts are given 
to him by the agent aforesaid. * * * * 

4. The original instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury of 28th 
December, 1864, designated Simeon Draper, Esq., as the special agent to take 
charge of the captured cotton, and to give receipts therefor as provided by 
law. 

The instructions of the 7th January to Albert G. Browne, special agent, 
communicated also to Simeon Draper, Esq., direct that Mr. Browne shall 
receive from the military authorities who are in possession of the cotton, 



THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 203 

and give receipts therefor in the form prescribed by the Treasury regula- 
tions. * * * 

M. C. Meigs, Q. M. Gen., Brevet Major-Gm. U. S. A. 

Albert G. Browne, Supervising Special A<Jt Treas. Dep't. 

S. Draper, Treasury Agent. 

S. H. Kauffmax. 

In addition to the above, Mr. Draper carried special instruc- 
tions from Secretary Fessenden, and approved by the Presi- 
dent, for his "government in the examination of marks and 
numbers, former ownership, as near as it can be ascertained, 
and its shipment." 

Among many other details these instructions provided 
that: 

"The marks and numbers must be carefully recorded, not only such as are 
complete, but also such as have been in part obliterated, as nearly as can be 
ascertained. 

" These directions you will cause to be carefully observed, that the records 
may be complete in regard to any bales, or package, or number of packages, 
belonging to the same lot, so that any package or lot, or the proceeds thereof, 
may be clearly identified should any question in relation thereto hereafter be 
brought before the Court of Claims." 

These various extracts from the open records are quite 
sufficient to show that, so far from ordering any marks ob- 
literated, directions were given to have the greatest care 
exercised to obtain a full record of them. The single para- 
graph in the order given by Mr. Stanton, directing all receipts 
to be given in the form prescribed by the Treasury regula- 
tions, insured the preservation of every mark. 

As a matter of fact, the records in Washington which relate 
to this cotton are very complete. Every bale captured was 
fully and carefully registered, and the military officers in 
charge received and filed a receipt from the Treasury agents 
for every pound of it. These receipts are on file in the War 
Department and in the Treasury, and accessible to all who 
desire information, and they have been constantly consulted 
by counsel of the United States and of claimants in all cases 
yet tried or prepared for trial. In a few instances, in re- 



204 THE CAPTUKED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 

pressing and repairing torn covering, some of the marks were 
unavoidably defaced. 

The officers charged with preserving all means of identifica- 
tion, employed a force of citizen clerks, who had long been 
engaged in the cotton warehouses of Savannah, to superintend 
the re-pressing and shipping of the cotton, and they selected 
the books and blanks in common use for this purpose, and 
copied into and upon these all marks by which the merchants 
of Savannah and the shippers from that port had been accus- 
tomed to insure the perfect identification of cotton. 

Aside from the records thus made, and forwarded afterward 
to Washington, there existed in each of the great cotton ware- 
houses of Savannah a full record and description of each 
bale on hand when General Sherman's army took possession 
of the city, and these have been accessible to all interested. 

Of the existence and completeness of the records here, 
General Sherman could have satisfied himself in a very few 
moments on any occasion. He could have ascertained all the 
above facts any day, and in less time than it must have taken 
him to compile the page of errors concerning the matter 
which his book contains. 

If these records had been filed away among the musty docu- 
ments pertaining to the war, there would have been a slight 
show of excuse for General Sherman ; but what shall be said 
for him in view of the fact that he wrote thus recklessly about 
Secretary Stanton, with these records open to all men, in the 
War Department, with duplicates of them in the Treasury, in 
the Court of Claims, and in the printed files of Congress. 
They are records of the most public character. They have 
been consulted by the parties to every suit in which this 
cotton was involved. The War Department had furnished 
transcripts of the marks for seventy-seven cases to the Court 
of Claims, and the Government had printed them. Congress 
had called on the War Department for the entire record, em- 
bracing all the orders and directions which were given, and 
the receipts in full taken by Colonel Ransom, setting forth all 



THE CAPTUKED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 205 

the marks collected by the officers detailed for the duty by 
Mr. Stanton's order, and had printed the whole of it, and 
furnished copies to the War Department, and the completed 
history of the matter was at Sherman's elbow in the very 
building where he wrote. 

The statement of the Memoirs that the Treasury Depart- 
ment has allowed claims for more than the total amount of 
cotton captured, and that claims have been proved up amount- 
ing to three times the whole capture, is without the least 
foundation. 

The following is a statement prepared at the Treasury 
Department in regard to this Savannah cotton : 

" The Treasury Department lias not passed upon a single claim for cotton 
captured at Savannah, nor has it paid out a dollar on such claims, except 
upon judgments of the Court of Claims, under the act of March 12th, 1863. 

" The following is a statement of the proceeds of said cotton and the claims 
therefor : 



No. bales sold at New York 39,358 

No. bales allowed by Court of Claims... 31,657 

7,701 
No. bales claimed in cases pending in 
Court of Claims 4,901 

2,800 



Net proceeds paid into Treasury. ..$7,259,499 78 
Amount allowed by the Court of 
Claims 5,873,159 90 

SI, 3*6,339 S8 
Proceeds claimed in pending cases, 8f>5,678 26 

$520,651 62 



"If all pending claims are allowed there will remain two thousand eight 
hundred bales which are unclaimed, and a balance of $520,661 62 in the 
Treasury." 

And now it will be interesting, in view of the severe 
though unjust strictures in which General Sherman indulges 
upon Mr. Stanton, to see what kind of orders Sherman gave 
looking to the preservation of the marks upon this cotton, 
when it was passing from his possession into the hands of the 
Treasury Department. He had previously preserved the 
marks, but on transferring it, directed the receipt to be taken 
in gross. This is the order : 

[Special Field Orders No. 10.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,) 
In the Field, Savannah, Ga., January 12, 1865. j 

1. Brevet Brigadier-General Easton, Chief Quartermaster, will turn over 



206 THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 

to Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury Department, all 
cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war, taking his receipt for the 
same in gross, and returning for it to the Quartermaster- General. * * * 
By order of General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. Dayton, Aide-de-Camp. 

And so it appears that General Sherman's transfer called 
only for a receipt in gross, and that Mr. Stanton's orders alone 
secured the full record with which the Government has pro- 
tected itself against fictitious claims. 

There is another instance in which General Sherman 
attempts, with as little reason and success, to be severe upon 
Mr. Stanton, which may properly be presented in this con- 
nection. 

In the second bulletin which the Secretary of War published 
on April 27th, concerning General Sherman's arrangements 
with General Johnston, the following paragraphs appeared 
from a dispatch of General Halleck's, dated Richmond, April 
26th, 9:30 P. M.: 

"The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis' specie is 
moving south from Goldsboro, in wagons, as fast as possible. * * * * 

" The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteen million 
dollars." 

Commenting upon these paragraphs, General Sherman says: 

"The assertion that Jeff. Davis' specie train, of six to thirteen million 
dollars was reported to be moving south from Goldsboro in wagons as fast as 
possible, found plenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand 
men had been at Goldsboro from March 22d to the date of his dispatch, 
April 26th ; and such a train would have been composed of from fifteen to 
thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie, even if it all were in 
gold. I suppose the exact amount of treasure which Davis had with him is 
now known to a cent; some of it was paid to his escort when it disbanded at 
and near Washington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a small 
parcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars, which is 
now retained in the United States Treasury vault at Washington, and shown 
to the curious. 

" The thirteen millions of treasure with which Jeff. Davis was to corrupt our 
armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to the contents of a hand valise! 
To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of these published 
bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express the state of my 



THE CAPTURED COTTON AT SAVANNAH. 207 

feelings. I was outraged beyond measure, and was resolved to resent the. in- 
sult, cost what it might." 

This ridicule of Halleck is based upon a perfectly evident 
misprint of "Goldsboro" for "Greensboro" in transmitting 
Hal leek's dispatch of the 26th April, as it was through the 
latter place the rebel Cabinet passed. 

How little reason he had for this outburst upon the question 
of Jeff. Davis' gold, will appear from the fact that the day before 
this telegram of Halleck's was written, General Sherman had 
himself telegraphed substantially the same thing to Admiral 
Dahlgren, and also to General Gillmore. The following is 
Sherman's gold dispatch: 

Raleigh, N. C, April 25, 1865. 
Major-General G. A. Gillmore, Commanding Department of the South, 

and 
Real-Admiral John A. Dahlgren, Commanding S. A. B. Squadron. 

I expect Johnston will surrender his army. "We have had much negotia- 
tion, and things are settling down to the terms of Lee's army. Jeff. Davis 
and his Cabinet, with considerable specie, is making his way toward Cuba. He 
passed Charlotte, going south, on the 23d, and I think he will try to reach 
the Florida coast either at Cedar Keys or lower down. It would be well to 
catch him. Can't you watch the East coast, and send word round to the 
West coast? W. T. Sherman, Major-General. 

The facts presented from the records in this chapter, are 
quite sufficient to show the totally unreliable character of what 
the General of the army has written reflecting upon the great 
War Secretarv. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE THE CARELESS ADVANCE 

OF AN ARMY. 

The battle of Bentonville affords one of the most marked 
examples of carelessness in the management of a great army 
which can be found in the history of the war. 

Unlike the march from Atlanta to the sea, that from 
Savannah northward through the Carolinas originated with 
General Sherman. And in all respects it was a wonderful 
movement. 

The first instructions of General Grant contemplated an 
entrenched camp near Savannah, and the transportation of 
the bulk of Sherman's force by sea to City Point. General 
Sherman was very anxious, however, to capture Savannah, 
and then march northward by land. The reasons he gave 
Grant were such as to induce the latter to accept Sherman's 
plan as better than his own. 

The campaign from Savannah was in every way more 
difficult and hazardous than the march from Atlanta. In 
coming down to the sea there had been no veteran enemy in 
front, nor indeed, any force worthy of mention, nor had 
there been important garrisons on either flank to threaten or 
annoy. The roads were in the general direction of the larger! 
streams, and the country was well adapted to the march of 
an army. 

But from the moment of leaving Savannah grave difficulties 
were to be expected at every step. The country was low and 
exceedingly swampy, the rains had swollen the streams and 
(208) 



THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 209 

flooded the low lands, and the direction of the march was 
across them all. In front was Hardee with a force which 
might be formidable in contending the passage of the largei 
rivers. On the right were the garrisons of Charleston, 
Georgetown, and Wilmington. There was reason to expect 
that a portion of Hood's army would arrive on the left and 
strike from the direction of Augusta. Lastly, Wade Hamp- 
ton, then popular in South Carolina, had been sent down 
from Lee's army to rally an opposing force. And, as the 
result proved, before serious battle was delivered, an army esti- 
mated at thirty-seven thousand veteran Confederate troops con- 
centrated at Bentonville, under Sherman's old antagonist John- 
ston. The Union force at the time was fifty-seven thousand. 

In free conversation between General Schofield's officers 
and the prominent commanders in the Confederate forces, 
when they were paroled a few weeks later, all expressed great 
admiration for the campaign northward from Savannah and 
astonishment at its success. They had confidently expected, 
when the Union army began to push through the great 
swamps, that it would lose its artillery and its trains, and 
never emerge in an organized condition. But the roads, con- 
structed of logs and brush, which sunk to the axles of the 
artillery under the march of each successive division, were 
rebuilt by the division which followed, and the resistless 
columns moved steadily and surely against natural difficulties 
such as no other army breasted during the war. 

Sherman had left smoking South Carolina, with its ruined 
railroads, behind him ; his four corps had converged at Fayette- 
ville, and there crossed the Cape Fear River. Here the right 
and left wings again separated, but marched in the general 
direction of Goldsboro. All the Confederate garrison- of 
points below were piled up in his front, the provisions were 
running low in his trains, and there was need of unusual care 
and prudence. How great was the neglect instead, and how 
narrow the escape of Sherman from serious disaster, the 
history of the battle of Bentonville will show. 
14 



210 THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 

Little became known at the time, of the real character of 
this battle. The surrender of Lee, which occurred before the 
facts connected with Bentonville could be disclosed, and the 
appalling death of Mr. Lincoln, occupied the full attention 
of the country. By the time it so recovered as to turn its 
mind toward North Carolina, Johnston had offered to sur- 
render, and so Bentonville passed almost unnoticed. 

It is just to General Sherman to say, that in his Memoirs 
he brings the real facts connected with this action into 
bolder relief than any other of his mistakes of which he 
treats. But the official record supplies some important omis- 
sions. 

Concerning the start from Savannah northward, General 
Sherman writes : 

"I knew full well at the time that the hroken fragments of Hood's army 
(which had escaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across 
Georgia, by Augusta, to make junction in my front, estimating them at the 
maximum, twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, and Hamp- 
ton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand, which, it handled with 
spirit and energy, would constitute a formidable force, and might make the 
passage of such rivers as the Santee and Cape Fear a difficult undertaking." 

His whole army reached Fayetteville, North Carolina, and 
crossed the Cape Fear to move on Goldsboro, where he 
expected to make a junction with General Schofield, then 
advancing from Xewbern. From this point, in a letter to 
General Grant, dated March 12, 1865, he said: 

"Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield about 
Newborn, but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered 
armies at Kaleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get our men 
reclothed and our wagons reloaded." 

And in another letter of the same date to General Terry, 
he wrote: 

" I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not catch one of my corps in 
flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro in compact 
form." 



THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 211 

But, in spite of this good resolution, the right and left 
wings were marched on roads from ten to fifteen miles apart, 
and cadi wing was strung out at great length. 

Of the start from Fayetteville, General Sherman writes : 

"I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos. Johnston, was 
back, with part of his old army; that he would not be misled by feints and 
false reports, and would, somehow, compel me to exercise more caution than 
I had hitherto done. I then overestimated his force at thirty-seven thousand 
infantry, supposed to be made up of S. D. Lee's corps, four thousand; 
Cheatham's, five thousand; Hope's, eight thousand; Hardee's, ten thousand ; 
and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton's, Wheeler's, and But- 
ler's cavalry, about eight thousand. Of these, only Hardee and the cavalry 
were immediately in our front, while the bulk of Johnston's army was sup- 
posed to be collecting at or near Raleigh. * * 

"On the 15th of March the whole army was across Cape Fear River, and 
at once began its march for Goldsboro — the Seventeenth Corps still on the 
right, the Fifteenth next in order, then the Fourteenth and Twentieth on the 
extreme left, the cavalry acting in close concert with the left flank. With 
almost a certainty of being attacked on this flank, I had instructed General 
Slocum to send his corps trains, under strong escort, by an interior road, 
holding four divisions ready for immediate battle. General Howard was in 
like manner ordered to keep his trains well to his right, and to have four 
divisions, unencumbered, about six miles ahead of General Slocum, within 
easy support." * * * * 

On the 16th, about Averysboro, "the opposition continued 
stubborn," and General Slocum had quite a brisk fight, losing 
twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and four hundred 
and seventy-seven wounded. 

The succeeding events are thus described in the Memoirs : 

"From Averysboro the left wing turned east toward Goldsboro, the Four- 
teenth Corps leading. I remained with this wing until the night of the 18th, 
when we were within twenty-seven miles of Goldsboro, and five from Benton- 
ville; and, supposing that all danger was over, I crossed over to join How- 
ard's column, to the right, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, 
known to be approaching Goldsboro. I overtook General Howard at Falling 
Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reason of the had 
roads. I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum's head of column, 
and supposed it to indicate about the same measure of opposition by Hardee's 
troops and Hampton's cavalry, before experienced. But, during the day, a 
messenger overtook me, and notified me, that, near Bentonville, General 



212 THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 

Slocum had run up against Johnston's whole army. I sent back orders for him 
to fight defensively, to save time, and that I would come up, with reinforce- 
ments, from the direction of Cox's Bridge, by the road which we had reached 
near Falling Creek Church. The country was very obscure, and the maps 
extremely defective. 

"By this movement I hoped General Slocum would hold Johnston's army 
facing west, while I would come on his rear from the east. The Fifteenth 
Corps, less one division (Hazen's), still well to the rear, was turned at once 
toward Bentonville; Hazen's division was ordered to Slocum's flank; and 
orders were also sent for General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to come 
to the same destination. Meantime the sound of cannon came from the di- 
rection of Bentonville. 

"The night of the 19th caught us near Falling Creek Church; but early 
the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R. Wood's division leading, 
closed down on Bentonville, near which it was brought up by encountering 
a line of fresh parapet, crossing the road and extending north toward Mill 
Creek. 

"After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with due caution, 
using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction with General Slocum, on 
his left. These deployments occupied all day, during which two divisions of 
the Seventeenth Corps also got up. At that time General Johnston's army 
occupied the form of a V, the angle reaching the road leading from Averys- 
boro to Goldsboro, and the flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing 
the village of Bentonville. 

"General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines, and General Howard's 
the other ; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength, I did not 
feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had been out from Savannah 
since the latter part of January, and our wagon trains contained but little 
food. I had also received messages during the day from General Schofield, at 
Kinston, and General Terry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro ; both 
expected to reach it by March 21. During the 20th we simply held our 
ground, and started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which would 
be needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle at Benton- 
ville. The next day (21st) it began to rain again, and we remained quiet till 
about noon, when General Mower, ever rash, broke through the rebel line on 
his extreme left flank, and was pushing straight for Bentonville and the 
bridge across Mill Creek. I ordered him back to connect with his own corps, 
and, lest the enemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line 
to be engaged with a strong skirmish fire. 

"I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed Mowers' 
lead with the whole of the right wing, which would have brought on a gen- 
eral battle, and it could not have resulted otherwise than successfully to us, 
by reason of our vastly superior numbers ; but at the moment, for the rea- 
sons given, I preferred to make junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, 
before engaging Johnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown. 



THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 213 

The next day he was gone, and had retreated on Smitlifield ; and, the roada 
all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro. The heaviest fighting at Ben- 
tonville was on the first day, viz.: the 19th, when Johnston's army struck the 
head of Slocum's column, knocking hack Carlin's division. But as soon as 
General Slocum had brought up the rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, 
and afterward the Twentieth on his left, he received and repulsed all attacks, 
and held his ground, as ordered, to await the coming back of the right wing." 

General Sherman's formal report of this battle, dated Golds- 
boro, April 4, 1865, contains the following very contradictory 
statements concerning the attack : 

"All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no fur- 
ther opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank 
while in motion." 

A few paragraphs below, in the same report, he again refers 
to the matter, as follows : 

"Johnston had moved, by night, from Smithfield, with great rapidity, and 
without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it 
could be relieved by its cooperating columns. But he reckoned without his 
host. I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, 
and was prepared for it." 

From the above extracts it is quite evident that Johnston 
attempted to concentrate his forces, fall upon the left wing of 
Sherman's army, crush it before the others could arrive, and 
then, in turn, attack the right, and that he came much nearer 
success than it is pleasant to contemplate. The warnings of 
such a concentration, as will be seen, were abundant. That 
they were not heeded seems marvelous and the extreme of 
carelessness. Some of the telegrams accompanying a former 
printed report of General Sherman make the situation still 
clearer. 

The advance of the left wing began at seven o'clock on the 
19th of March, and was stubbornly contested from the first. 
About ten o'clock General Slocum became convinced that he 
had encountered the enemy in force. He therefore concluded 
to assume the offensive, and communicate with General Slier- 



214 THE BATTLE OF BENTON VILLE. 

man. The two wings were so far separated that it was six or 
seven hours before the commanding general, who was with 
the right wing, could be reached. 

At five p. M., of the 19th, he sent the following dispatch to 
General Schofield, then approaching Goldsboro : 

"Since making my dispatch to-day (2 p.m.) General Slocum reports the 
enemy in force between him and Cox's Bridge; thinks it is the main army 
of the enemy. I can hardly suppose the enemy will attempt to fight us this 
side of the Neuse, but will direct all my columns on Cox's Bridge to-morrow. 
You must secure Goldsboro, and fortify."' 

At the same hour he dispatched General Kilpatrick : 

"Your report of to-day is received. General Slocum thinks the whole 
rebel army is in his front. I can not think Johnston would fight us with the 
Neuse to his rear." 

On the morning of the 20th, at 4 A. m., General Sherman 
wrote as follows to General Terry: 

"Johnston, with his concentrated force, made an unsuccessful attack on my 
left wing yesterday, near Bentonville. I am just starting with my right 
wing to attack him." 

And again to General Terry at 6 A. M.: 

" Yesterday Johnston, with his force concentrated, struck my left wing, near 
Bentonville, and they had a severe battle, lasting until night. General 
Slocum beat them off, but was uneasy. I am now turning the right wing on 
Bentonville. * By to-night I will know if Jos. Johnston 

intends to fight me in force, when I will communicate further." 

To General Schofield, at 2 P. m., of the 20th, he wrote: 

" I am now within two miles of Slocum, but Johnston is between us. We 
are now skirmishing." 

As will be observed, this was twenty-eight hours after the 
attack in force began on Slocum. 

At 8 P. M., of the 20th, he wrote General Slocum : 

"We struck the enemy on his left rear about noon and have pressed him 
very hard, and have dislodged him from all his barricades except the line 



THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 215 

constructed as against you, which may he double or inclosed, for our men find 
parapets from the road well down to Mill Creek. Johnston hoped to over- 
come your wing before I could come to your relief; having failed in that I 
can not see why he remains, and still think he will avail himself of night to 
get hack to Smithfield. I would rather avoid a general battle if possible, but 
if he insists on it we must accommodate him. In that event, if lie be in posi- 
tion to-morrow, I want you to make a good road around his flank into this, 
and to-morrow night pass your trains and dispose your troops so that we 
have our back toward Faison's and Goldsboro. General Schofield was to 
leave Kinston for Goldsboro to-day, and General Terry has arrived with 
nine thousand infantry at Faison's, and I have ordered him to Cox's Bridge 
to be drawn up here if we need him. I can also draw on General Schofii Ld 
in a few days for ten thousand men, but I think we have enough." 

At 9 r. m. of the same day the following dispatch was sent 
General Terry : 

"We struck Johnston on his left rear to-day, and have been skirmishing 
pretty hard all day. We have opened communication with General Slocum, 
who had a hard fight yesterday. We are now ready for battle, if Johnston 
desires it, to-morrow; but as he has failed to overcome one wing he will 
hardly invite battle with both. I don't want to fight now or here, and 
therefore won't object to his drawing off to-night toward Smithfield, as he 
should." 

To General Schofield he wrote, March 21, from Bentonville : 

"Captain Twining is here, and I send by him an order that you will per- 
ceive looks to stayirg here some days. 

" I thought Johnston, having failed as he attempted to crush one of my 
wings, finding he had not succeeded, but that I was present with my whole 
force, would withdraw; but he has not, and I must fight him here. He is 
twenty (20) miles from Smithfield, and with a bad road to bis rear, but his 
position is in the swamps, difficult of approach, and I don't like to assail his 
parapets, which are of the old kind." 

In a letter to General Grant dated March 22, quoted in the 
Memoirs, reviewing the affair of Bentonville at length, the 
following passage occurs: 

" I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday, the 14th 
instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro, to which point I had also 
ordei sd General Schofield from Newbern and General Terry from Wilming- 
ton. I knew that General Jos. Johnston was in supreme command against 
me, and that he would have tried to concentrate a respectable army to oppose 



216 THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 

the last stage of this march * * * On Tuesday, the 15th [probably 

a misprint for Thursday the 16th], General Slocum found Hardee's army from 
Charleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position across the 
narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers where the road 
branches oft' to Goldsboro. There a pretty severe fight occurred, in which Gen- 
eral Slocum's troops carried handsomely the advanced line, held by a South 
Carolina brigade commanded by a Colonel Butler. * * * * 

"We resumed the march toward Goldsboro. I was with the left wing 
until I supposed all danger had passed, but when General Slocum's head of 
column was within four miles of Bentonville, after skirmishing as usual with 
cavalry, he became aware that there was infantry at his front. He deployed 
a couple of brigades, which, on advancing, sustained a partial repulse, but 
soon rallied, and he formed a line of the two leading divisions, Morgan's and 
Carlin's, of Jeft". C. Davis' corps. The enemy attacked these with violence, 
but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General 
Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the Twentieth Corps, hastily 
disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrick massed his cavalry on 
the left. 

"General Jos. Johnston had the night before marched his whole army 
(Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had drawn from 
every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crush one of our corps and 
then defeat us in detail He attacked General Slocum in position from 3 p.m. 
on the 19th till dark, but was every where repulsed and lost heavily. At the 
time I was with the Fifteenth Corps marching on a road more to the right, 
but on hearing of General Slocum's danger directed that corps toward Cox's 
Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps over, and on the 20th marched 
rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear. We struck him about noon and forced 
him to assume the defensive and to fortify. Yesterday we pushed him hard 
and came very near crashing him, the right division of the Seventeenth 
Corps, however, having broken in to within a hundred yards of where 
Johnston himself was, at the bridge across Mill Creek. Last night he retreated, 
leaving us in possession of the field, dead, and wounded." 

The report of General Hazen, commanding the First Di- 
vision of the right wing which started to the relief of the left, 
gives a clear idea of the distance of the left wing from the 
nearest support. Writing of his march to the relief of Gen- 
eral Slocnm, he says: 

" On the 15th the march was resumed in the direction of Goldsboro, which 
was continued at slow stages till midnight of the 19th, when I received orders 
to turn back to the assistance of General Slocum, and reported to him with 
the division near Bentonville at daylight, having marched since sunset 
twenty miles. 



THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 217 

"At 12 M. of the 20th the division was moved to the rear of the Four- 
teenth Corps, and two regiments were deployed and connected with the First 
Division 'of the Fifteenth Corps on the right and the Fourteenth Corps on the 
left, engaged the enemy on their lines." * * 

The extent to which the left wing was stretched out on the 
road is shown by a paragraph in General Slocum's report: 

" On the following morning (20th) Generals Baird and Geary, each with 
two brigades of their respective divisions, and General Ilazen, of the Fifteenth 
Corps, with his entire division, arrived on the field." 

The first-named generals belonged to the left wing and 
Hazen to the right. As to the arrival of the left wing in 
force General Slocum says : 

"On the morning of the 21st the right wing came up and connected with 
General Hazen." 

The battle began about ten o'clock on the 19th. One 
division of the right wing, by a long night march, came up 
the next morning, but the main body of that wing was not 
ready to strike the enemy until the morning of the 21st. 

The situation of affairs around Bentonville, then, was about 
this: With a full knowledge that Johnston was rapidly con- 
centrating all available forces in his front, the two wings of 
the Union army, each inferior to Johnston's supposed num- 
bers, were allowed to march in extremely open order, and so 
far apart that, when an attack in force began on the left wing 
at ten o'clock on the 19th, it w r as not until noon of the next 
day that part of the other wing came within striking distance, 
and even then it was not able to communicate directly with 
the left wing because the enemy was interposed in force. 

The total strength of the left wing was less than twenty-six 
thousand, and only a portion of this could be brought up for 
the first day's fight. General Johnston's force was then esti- 
mated at thirty-seven thousand, though he afterward stated 
that he had only fourteen thousand infantry engaged. 

The Union officers and men fought splendidly, and thus 



218 THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. 

neutralized the effect of General Sherman's carelessness and 
saved their wing of the army. Still, in spite of their gallant 
fighting against superior numbers, it was probably owing to a 
mistake on the Confederate side that the left wing was not 
wholly overpowered. 

A general assault had been contemplated by the Confederate 
o-enerals about an hour before sundown. But by some error 
in conveying commands, or in obeying them, night came on 
before their lines were ready for the movement, and so the 
opportunity for crushing Sherman's left wing passed. Thus 
narrowly did this magnificent army escape serious disaster in 
its last battle. 

General Sherman speaks repeatedly of Generals Sehofield 
and Terry as if they were independent commanders, and says : 
"Wilmington was captured by General Terry on the 22d of 
February." 

Accurately, General Terry's forces formed a portion of the 
command of General Sehofield, and advanced on Wilmington 
upon the left bank of the Cape Fear River, while the Twenty- 
Third Corps formed the other part of Schofield's army, and 
advanced on the right bank of the river. General J. D. Cox's 
troops of this latter corps, with one division of Terry's troops, 
assisted by the fleet, drove the enemy out of Fort Anderson, 
and then by secretly passing Casement's brigade in flats over 
Town Creek near its mouth, General Cox secured the main 
crossing over that strongly guarded stream, and opened the 
way to the rear of Wilmington, which, as a consequence, was 
immediately evacuated. As General Sehofield directed all the 
movements, a careful writer would have said Wilmington was 
captured by General Sehofield. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE TEEMS WITH JOHNSTON — THE FIRST DRAFT MADE BY 
A CONFEDERATE CABINET OFFICER. 

General Sherman sneers at political generals, and then 
devotes thirty pages of his Memoirs to an inaccurate history 
of his own political surrender to General Jos. E. Johnston 
near Raleigh. 

The country will never forget its joy over the news from 
Appomattox, or the chill which shortly after fell upon it when 
the true character of Sherman's terms became known. If the 
country at large ever does forget the circumstances attending 
the latter event, those who were at Raleigh at the time never 
will. 

The real character of these terms was carefully concealed 
there, even from very prominent officers, and was known 
first at the North. It was given out at Sherman's head- 
quarters that the terms granted Johnston were virtually the 
same as those extended by Grant to Lee, and special stress 
was laid upon the statement that in no sense had General 
Sherman recognized the political existence of the Confederacy. 

When General Grant arrived and announced the prompt 
rejection of these terms, their real nature first became known. 
There was much indignation in consequence at Sherman's 
course, and many comparisons of views among officers of rank 
as to his motives. The speedy and successful correction of 
his great error, and the immediate close of the war, over which 
the Nation Avas so busy with its rejoicing, alone saved him from 
damao-ino; criticism. If it had been made known then that 

(219) 



220 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

the first draft of Sherman's terms was written by the rebel 
Postmaster-General at a consultation had between this mem- 
ber of Davis' Cabinet, his Secretary of War, Generals John- 
ston, and Wade Hampton, it would have made General 
Sherman's position most uncomfortable before the people. 
But in view of the services he had rendered, this, and other 
unpleasant facts did not find their way to the public then. 
Now that he has so recklessly invited criticism, and published 
an inaccurate version of these very negotiations, he can not 
complain if the beliefs which w r ere entertained among promi- 
nent officers at Raleigh, find expression, and documents cap- 
tured soon after the surrender are made public. 

The theory of General Sherman's negotiation with General 
Johnston, as held by many prominent officers, whose oppor- 
tunities for obtaining knowledge were excellent, was about 
this : 

General Sherman was elated almost beyond measure at his 
March to the Sea, and northward through the Carolinas. He 
had rested and refurnished his army at Goldsboro, and had just 
issued an order for it to march for the purpose of joining the 
Army of the Potomac, when down came the news, first, of 
the evacuation of Richmond, and, following close, of the sur- 
render of Lee. General Grant had captured the great army 
of the Confederacy; all the rest must follow, as a matter of 
course; Sherman was not in at the death; the war was to 
close with General Grant its greatest military hero. Then came 
the proposal for a conference from Johnston. While first 
writing to Johnston that he would extend the same terms 
given by Grant to Lee, and immediately writing General 
Grant that he would "be careful not to complicate any points 
of civil policy ;" yet, doubtless influenced by his own reflec- 
tions upon the secondary position in which events were leav- 
ing him, and by the cunning manipulations of the rebel Cabinet, 
he conceived the idea, not only of receiving the surrender of 
the remaining military forces of the rebellion, and declaring 
"peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande," but of becom- 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 221 

ing the political reconstructor of the Nation, and thus the 
most prominent character emerging from the war. 

Before any pronounce this theory chimerical, let them read 
the narratives, extracts, and records which follow. 

The materia] points of General Sherman's account of his 
negotiations with General Johnston are these : 

On April 14, 1865, a note was received from Johnston, dated 
the day before, asking whether, since" the results of the recent 
campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military 
character of the belligerents," General Sherman was willing, 
in order "to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation 
of property," to ask from General Grant a suspension of hos- 
tilities for the purpose of permitting "the civil authorities to 
enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing 
war." 

General Sherman wrote Johnston the same day that he had 
authority to suspend hostilities, that he would meet Johnston 
to confer upon the subject, and added: "that a basis of action 
may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and con- 
ditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appo- 
mattox Court House on the 9th inst., relative to our two 
armies." 

The same evening he wrote General Grant as follows, 
chough this letter is not given in the Memoirs : 

" I send copies of a correspondence begun with General Johnston, which I 
think will be followed by terms of capitulation. I will grant the same 
terms as General Grant gave General Lee, and be careful not to complicate 
any points of civil policy." 

On the 17th the opposing commanders met alone in a firm- 
house near Durham Station, when, after some conversation 
over the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, Sherman says : 

"I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not oppose 
my army, and that since Lee had surrendered he could do the same with 
honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedly admitted this, and added 
that any further fighting would be ' murder,' but he thought that instead of 



222 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

surrendering piecemeal we might arrange terms that would embrace all the 
Confederate armies. I asked him if he could control other armies than his 
own. He said not then, but intimated that he could procure authority from 
Mr. Davis. I then told him that I had recently had an interview with Gen- 
eral Grant and President Lincoln, and that I was possessed of their views. 
* * -s- a That the terms that General Grant had given to General 
Lee's army were certainly most generous and liberal. All this he admitted, 
but always recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing his own 
army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, 
and others in Alabama and Georgia. * * * * 

" Our conversation was very general and extremely cordial, satisfying me 
that it could have but one result, and that which we all desired, viz.: to end 
the war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return to Raleigh 
before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could be divulged, on General 
Johnston's saying that he thought that, during the night, he could procure 
authority to act in the name of all the Confederate armies in existence, we 
agreed to meet again the next day at noon, at the same place, and parted, he 
for Hillsboro and I for Raleigh." 

On the 18th the two Generals met again near Durham. 
The Memoirs give the following account of the interview: 

* * * * "We again entered Bennett's house and I closed the door. 
General Johnston then assured me that he had authority over all the Con- 
federate armies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the same 
terms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply this desirable 
result, I ought to give his men and officers some assurance of their political 
rights after their surrender. I explained to him that Mr. Lincoln's proclama- 
tion of amnesty of December 8, 1863, still in force, enabled every Confederate 
soldier and officer below the rank of colonel to obtain an absolute pardon by 
simply laying down his arms and taking the common oath of allegiance, and 
that General Grant, in accepting the surrender of General Lee's army, had 
extended the same principle to all the officers, General Lee included. Such 
a pardon, I understood, would restore to them all their rights of citizenship. 
But lie insisted that the officers and men of the Confederate army were 
unnecessarily alarmed about this matter as a sort of bugbear. He then said 
that Mr. Breckinridge was near at hand, and he thought that it would be well 
for him to be present. I objected on the score that he was then in Davis' Cabi- 
net, and our negotiations should be confined strictly to belligerents. He then 
said Breckinridge was a Major-General in the Confederate army, and might 
sink his character of Secretary of War. I consented, and he sent one of his staff 
officers back, who soon returned with Breckinridge, and he entered the room. 
General Johnston and I then again went over the whole ground, and Breckin- 
ridge confirmed what he had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers 
and soldiers about their political rights in case of surrender. While we were 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 223 

in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers, which General 
Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General. He and Breckin- 
ridge looked over them, and, after some side conversation, he handed one of 
the papers to me. It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long 
preamble and terms, so general and verbose that I said they were inadmissible. 
Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln at City Point, I sat down at 
the table and wrote off the terms, which, I thought, concisely expressed his 
views and wishes, and explained that I was willing to submit these terms to 
the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armies should remain in 
statu quo until the truce therein declared should expire. I had full faith that 
General Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did; and that 
I would he the gainer, for, in the few days it would take to send the papers 
to Washington and receive an answer, I could finish the railroad up to 
Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a long chase. 

"Neither Mr. Breckinridge nor General Johnston wrote one word of that 
paper. I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best I could do, and they 
readily assented." 

General Johnston, in his Narrative, gives the following 
account of the consultation held at President Davis' quarters 
at Charlotte, after the news of Lee's surrender was received : 

"In a telegram dated Greensboro, 4:30 P.M., the President directed me to 
leave the troops under Lieutenant-General Hardee's command, and report to 
him there. 

"Taking the first train, about midnight, I reached Greensboro about eight 
o'clock in the morning on the 12th, and was General Beauregard's guest. 
His quarters were a burden car, near, and in sight of those of the President. 
The General and myself were summoned to the President's office in an hour 
or two, and found Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan with him. We had 
supposed that we were to be questioned concerning the military resources of 
our department, in connection with the question of continuing or terminating 
the war. 

"But the President's object seemed to be to give, not to obtain information; 
for, addressing the party, he said that in two or three weeks he would have a 
large army in the- field by bringing back into the ranks those who had 
abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by calling out the 
enrolled men whom the conscript bureau, with its forces, had been unable to 
bring into the army. It was remarked, by the military officers, that men 
who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who, 
under the same circumstances, could not be forced into it, would scarcely, in 
the present desperate condition of our affairs, enter the service upon mere 
invitation. Neither opinions nor information was asked, and the conference 
terminated. Before leaving the room, we learned that Major-General Breck- 
inridge's arrival was expected in the course of the afternoon, and it was not 



224 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

doubted that he would bring certain intelligence of the state of affairs in 
Virginia. 

" General Breckinridge came as expected, and confirmed the report of the 
surrender of the army in Virginia. General Beauregard and myself, con- 
versing together after the intelligence of the great disaster, reviewed the con- 
dition of our affairs, and carefully compared the resources of the belligerents, 
and agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown. 
In conversation with General Breckinridge afterward, I repeated this, and 
said that the only power of government left in the President's hands was 
that of terminating the war, and that this power should be exercised without 
more delay. I also expressed my readiness- to suggest to the President the 
absolute necessity of such action, should an opportunity to do so be given me. 
General Breckenridge promised to make me this opportunity. 

" Mr. Mallory came to converse with me on the subject, and showed great 
anxiety that negotiations to end the war should be commenced, and urged 
that I was the person who should suggest the measure to the President. 
I, on the contrary, thought that such a suggestion would come more prop- 
erly from one of his ' constitutional advisers,' but told Mr. Mallory of my 
conversation with General Breckinridge. 

"That gentleman fulfilled his engagement promptly; and General Beau- 
regard and myself were summoned to the President's office an hour or two 
after the meeting of his Cabinet there next morning. Being desired by 
the President to do it, we compared the military forces of the two parties 
to the war: ours, an army of about twenty thousand infantry and artillery, 
and five thousand mounted troops; those of the United States, three armies 
that could be combined against ours, which was insignificant compared with 
either — Grant's, of a hundred and eighty thousand men ; Sherman's, of a 
hundred and ten thousand at least; and Canby's, of sixty thousand — odds 
of seventeen or eighteen to one, which in a few weeks could be more than 
doubled. 

" I represented that, under such circumstances, it would be the greatest 
of human crimes for us to attempt to continue the war; for, having neither 
money nor credit, nor arms but those in the hands of our soldiers, nor 
ammunition but that in their cartridge boxes, nor shops for repairing arms 
or fixing ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would be not to 
harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation of our country and ruin of 
its people. I, therefore, urged that the President should exercise at once the 
only function of government still in his possession, and open negotiations for 
peace. 

"The members of the Cabinet present were then desired by the President 
to express their opinions on the important question. General Breckinridge, 
Mr. Mallory, and Mr. Reagan, thought that the war was decided against us; 
and that it was absolutely necessary to make peace. Mr. Benjamin expressed 
the contrary opinion. The latter made a speech for war, much like that of 
Sempronius in Addison's play. The President replied to our suggestion as 



THE TERMS WITH JOHXSTOX. 225 

if somewhat annoyed by it. He said that it was idle to suggest that he 
should attempt to negotiate, when it was certain, from the attempt previ- 
ously made, that his authority to treat would not be recognized, nor any 
terms that he might otter considered by the Government of the United 
States. I reminded him that it had not been unusual, in such cases, for 
military commanders to initiate negotiations upon which treaties of peace 
were founded; and proposed that he should allow me to address General 
Sherman on the subject. After a few words in opposition to that idea, Mr. 
Davis reverted to the first suggestion, that he should offer terms to the 
Government of the United States — which he had put aside; and sketched a 
letter appropriate to be sent by me to General Sherman, proposing a meeting 
to arrange the terms of an armistice to enable the civil authorities to agree 
upon terms of peace. That this course might be adopted at once, I proposed 
that he should dictate the letter then to Mr. Mallory, who was a good 
penman, and that I should sign and send it to the Federal commander im- 
mediately. The letter, prepared in that way, was sent by me with all dis- 
patch to Lieutenant-General Hampton, near Hillsboro, to be forwarded by 
him to General Sherman. It was delivered to the latter next day, the 14th, 
and was in these terms : 

" 'The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the rela- 
tive military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to 
address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further 
effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a 
temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieu- 
tenant General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the 
request that he will take like action in regard to other armies — the object 
being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements 
to terminate the existing war.' " 

After mentioning the means taken to secure a meeting, the 
Narrative continues with an account of the interview, which 
General Sherman thus indorses: 

"General Johnston's account of our interview, in his Narrative (page 
402, et seq.), is quite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming 
the capitulation of Loeben to which he refers." 

Johnston's statement, thus referred to and indorsed, is as 

follows : 

"When General Sherman understood what seemed to have escaped him in 
reading my letter, that my object was to make such an armistice as would 
give opportunity for negotiation between the 'civil authorities' of the two 
countries, he said that such negotiations were impossible, because the Govern 
ment of the United States did not acknowledge the existence of a Southern 
15 



226 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

Confederacy ; nor, consequently, its civil authorities as such. Therefore, he 
could not receive, for transmission, any proposition addressed to the Govern- 
ment of the United States hy those claiming to be the civil authorities of a 
Southern Confederacy. He added, in a manner that carried conviction of 
sincerity, expressions of a wish to divert from the South such devastation as 
the continuance of the war would make inevitable; and, as a means of 
accomplishing that object, so far as the armies we commanded were con- 
cerned, he offered me such terms as those given to General Lee. 

" I replied that our relative positions were too different from those of the 
ai-mies in Virginia to justify me in such a capitulation, but suggested that 
we might do more than he proposed ; that, instead of a partial suspension of 
hostilities, we might, as other generals had done, arrange the terms of a 
permanent peace, and among other precedents reminded him of the prelimi- 
naries of Loeben, and the terms in which Napoleon, then victorious, pro- 
posed negotiation to the Archduke Charles, and the sentiment he expressed, 
that the civic crown earned by preserving the life of one citizen, confers 
truer glory than the highest achievement merely military. General Sherman 
replied, with heightened color, that he appreciated such a sentiment, and 
that to put an end to further devastatfon and bloodshed, and restore the 
Union, and with it the prosperity of the country, were to him objects of 
ambition. 

"We then entered into a discussion of the terms that might be given 
to the Southern States, on their submission to the authority of the United 
States. General Sherman seemed to regard the resolutions of Congress 
and the declarations of the President of the United States as conclusive 
that the restoration of the Union was the object of the war, and to believe 
that the soldiers of the United States had been fighting for that object. 
A long official conversation with Mr. Lincoln, on Southern affairs, a very 
short time before, had convinced him that the President then adhered to 
that view. 

"In the course of the afternoon we agreed upon the terms expressed in the 
memorandum drawn up on the 18th, except that General Sherman did not 
consent to include Mr. Davis and the officers of his Cabinet in an otherwise 
general amnesty. This consideration was mine of course. General Sherman 
did not desire the arrest of these gentlemen. He was too acute not to foresee 
the embarrassment their capture would cause; therefore, he wished them to 
escape. Much of the afternoon was consumed in endeavors to dispose of this 
part of the question in a manner that would be satisfactory both to the 
Government of the United States and the Southern people, as well as to the 
Confederate President ; but at sunset no conclusion had been reached, and 
the conference was suspended, to be resumed at 10 o'clock next morning. 
Thinking it probable that the confidential relations of the Secretary of War 
with Mr. Davis might enable him to remove the only obstacle to an adjust- 
ment, I requested him by telegraph to join me as soon as possible. 

"General Breckinridge and Mr. Reagan came to General Hampton's 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 227 

quarters together an hour or two before daybreak. After they had received 
from me as full an account of the discussion of the day before as my memory 
enabled me to give, and had learned the terms agreed upon, and the difficulty 
in the way of full agreement, Mr. Reagan proposed to reduce them to writing 
to facilitate reconsideration. In doing so, he included the article for amnesty 
without exceptions, the only one not fully agreed to. This paper being 
unfinished when General Breckinridge and myself set out to the place of 
meeting, was to be sent to me there. 

When we met, I proposed to General Sherman that General Breckinridge 
should be admitted to our discussion, as his personal relations with the Presi- 
dent of the Confederacy might enable him to remove the obstacle to agree- 
ment that we had encountered the day before. He assented, and that 
gentleman joined us. 

" We had conversed on the subject discussed the day before, perhaps a half 
hour, when the memorandum written by Mr. Reagan was brought. I read 
this paper to General Sherman, as a basis for terms of peace, pointing out to 
him that it contained nothing which he had not already accepted, but the 
language that included the President and Cabinet in the terms of amnesty. 
After glistening to General Breckinridge, who addressed him six or eight 
minutes in advocacy of these conditions of peace, General Sherman wrote 
very rapidly the memorandum that follows, with the paper presented by me 
before him. He wrote so rapidly that I thought at the time that he must 
have come to the place prepared to agree to amnesty, with no exceptions. 
His paper differed from mine only in being fuller." 

General Sherman gives the following account of his consul- 
tations with his principal officers after his first interview with 
Johnston in regard to the character of terms that should be 
offered : 

"During the evening of the 17th and morning of the 18th, I saw nearly 
all the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slocum, Howard, Logan, 
Blair), and we talked over the matter of the conference at Bennett's house 
of the day before, and without exception, all advised me to agree to some 
terms, for they all dreaded the long and harassing march in pursuit of a 
dissolving and fleeing army; a march that might carry us back again over 
the thousand miles that we had just accomplished. We all knew that if we 
could bring Johnston's army to bay, we could destroy it in an hour, but that 
was simply impossible in the country in which we found ourselves. We dis- 
cussed all the probabilities, among which was, wliether, if Johnston made a 
point of it, I should assent to the escape from the country of Jeff. Davis and 
his fugitive Cabinet; and some one of my general officers, either Logan or 
Blair, insisted that if asked for, we should even provide a vessel to carry 
them to Nassau from Charleston." 



228 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

In Craven's Prison Life of Jeff. Davis, the author gives 
this version of the circumstances attending the surrender of 
Johnston, which contains also an allusion to the proposition 
for Davis' escape, mentioned in the Memoirs. Mr. Craven 

says : 

"At Lexington he (Davis) received a dispatch from Johnston requesting 
that the Secretary of War, (General Breckinridge) should repair to his head- 
quarters near Raleigh — General Sherman having submitted a proposition for 
laying down arms which was too comprehensive in its scope for any mere 
military commander to decide upon. Breckinridge and Postmaster-General 
Reagan immediately started for Johnston's camp, where Sherman submitted 
the terms of surrender on which an armistice was declared; the same terms 
subsequently disapproved by the authorities at Washington. 

"One of the features of the proposition submitted by General Sherman 
was a declaration of amnesty to all persons, both civil and military. Notice 
being called to the fact particularly, General Sherman said: 'I mean just 
that,' and gave as his reason that it was the only way to have perfect peace. 
He had previously offered to furnish a vessel to take away such persons as 
Mr. Davis might select, to be freighted with whatever personal property they 
might want to take with them, and to go wherever it pleased. 

" General Johnston told Sherman that it was more than useless to carry 
such a proposition as the last to him (Davis). Breckinridge also informed 
General Sherman that his proposition contemplated the adjustment of 
certain matters which even Mr. Davis was not empowered to control. 
The terms were accepted, however, with the understanding that they should 
be liberally construed on both sides, and fulfilled in good faith; General 
Breckinridge adding that certain parts of the terms would require to be 
submitted to the various State Governments of the Confederacy for rati- 
fication." 

These statements of General Sherman and Mr. Davis cor- 
respond with those made by General Johnston. 

By comparing the accounts of Generals Sherman and John- 
ston, it will appear that the former officer says he read the 
draft of terms drawn up by Mr. Reagan, the Confederate 
Postmaster-General, but found them so general and verbose 
as not to be admissible. Johnston's account (indorsed as 
accurate by Sherman) states that the latter wrote his memo- 
randum with Reagan's paper before him, and that it differed 
from Reagan's only in being fuller. 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 229 

A copy of this draft was afterward sent to the War Depart- 
ment by General Sherman, indorsed in his own hand as fol- 
lows: "Copy of a project sent by General Johnston, being 
the production of Mr. Reagan, P. M. General of the Con- 
federates." 

The original of this draft was soon after captured by a 
Union officer, and below is an exact copy of it and of the 
attached note transmitting it to General Johnston during the 
interview: 

"As the avowed motive of the Government of the United States for the 
prosecution of the existing war with the Confederate States is to secure a 
reunion of all the States under one common government, and as wisdom and 
sound policy alike require that a common government should rest on the 
consent and be supported by the affections of all the people who compose it, 
now, in order to ascertain whether it be practicable to put an end to the 
existing war and to the consequent destruction of life and property, having 
in view the correspondence and conversation which has recently taken place 
between Major-General W. T. Sherman and myself, I propose the following 
points as a basis of pacification : 

"1. The disbanding of the military forces of the Confederacy; and 

"2. The recognition of the Constitution and authority of the Government 
of the United States, on the following conditions: 

"3. The preservation and continuance of the existing State Governments. 

"4. The preservation to the people of all the political rights, and rights of 
person and property, secured to them by the Constitution of the United .States 
and of their several States. 

"5. Freedom from future persecutions or penalties for their participation 
in the present war. 

" 6. Agreement to a general suspension of hostilities pending these nego- 
tiations." 

The above draft of terms was accompanied by the follow- 
ing note: 

General Johnston will see that the accompanying memorandum omits all 
reference to details, and to the necessary action of the States, and the prelim- 
inary reference of the proposition to General Grant for his consent to tli" 
suspension of hostilities, and to the Government of the United States for its 
action. He will also see that I have modified the first article, according to 
his suggestion, by omitting the reference to the consent of the President oi 
the Confederate States, and to his employing his good offices to secure t lie 



230 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

acquiescence of the several States to this scheme of adjustment and pacifica- 
tion. This may be done at a proper subsequent time. 
April 17, 1865. John H. Reagan. 

By comparing the above draft with the one written by 
General Sherman with Reagan's before him, it will be seen that 
Johnston is correct in asserting that Sherman's paper differed 
from his only in being fuller, and that Sherman's principal 
additions were the provisions restoring the courts, and the 
submission of questions pertaining to divided States to the 
Supreme Court: 

Memorandum, or basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near 
Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph 
E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sher- 
man, Commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina, both present. 

I. (See 6", Reagan's draft.) The contending armies now in tbe field to 
maintain the status quo until notice is given by the Commanding General of 
any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed. 

II. (See 1, Reagan.) The Confederate armies now in existence to be dis- 
banded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their 
arms and public property in the State arsenal, and each officer and man to 
execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the 
action of the State and Federal authorities. The number of arms and muni- 
tions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, 
subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the 
meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of 
the States respectively, 

III. (See 3, Reagan.) The recognition by the Executive of the United 
States of the several State Governments on their officers and Legislatures 
taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and 
where conflicting State Governnents have resulted from the war, the legiti- 
macy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. 

IV. The reestablishment of all Federal courts in the several States, with 
powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress. 

V. (See 4, Reagan.) The people and inhabitants of all States to be guar- 
anteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well 
as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the 
United States and of the States respectively. 

VI. (See 5, Reagan.) The Executive authority of the Government of the 
United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so 
long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and 
obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence. 



FAC-SIMILE 



ORIGINAL DRAFT 



SHERMAN'S TERMS WITH JOHNSTON 



AS DRAWN BY THE 



REBEL POST-MASTER GENERAL 



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THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 231 

VII. In general terms the war to cease, a general amnesty, so far as the 
Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disband- 
ment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the 
resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing 
said armies. 

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these 
terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain 
the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme. 

W. T. Sherman, 
Major-General Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina. 

J. E. Johnston, 
General Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina. 

Both the Confederate and National Cabinets held a consul- 
tation over Sherman's terms on the same day, the former at 
Charlotte, North Carolina, and the latter at Washington. All 
the members of President Davis' Cabinet advised him to 
accept the terms ; all the Cabinet officers at Washington 
advised that they be rejected. 

General Johnston thus relates what occurred at his head- 
quarters upon the receipt of information that the terms had 
been rejected at Washington : 

"In the afternoon of the 24th, the President of the Confederacy, then in 
Charlotte, communicated to me, by telegraph, his approval of the terms of 
the Convention of the 17th and 18th, and, within an hour, a special messen- 
ger from General Hampton brought me two dispatches from General Sherman. 
In one of them he informed me that the Government of the United States 
rejected the terms of peace agreed upon by us; and in the other he gave 
notice of the termination of the armistice in forty-eight hours from noon 
that day. 

"The substance of these dispatches was immediately communicated to the 
Administration by telegraph (at 6 P. M.), instructions asked for, and the 
disbanding of the army suggested, to prevent further invasion and devasta- 
tion of the country by the armies of the United States. The reply, dated 
eleven o'clock p.m., was received early in the morning of the 25th; it sug- 
gested that the infantry might be disbanded, with instructions to meet at 
some appointed place, and directed me to bring off the cavalry, and all other 
soldiers who could be mounted by taking serviceable beasts from the trains, 
and a few light field pieces. I objected, immediately, that this order provided 
for the performance of but one of the three great duties then devolving upon 
us — that of securing the safety of the high civil officers of the Confederate 
Government; but neglected the other two — the safety of the people and that 



232 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

of the army. I also advised the immediate flight of the high civil function- 
aries under proper escort. 

"The belief that impelled me to urge the civil authorities of the Confederacy 
to make peace, that it would be a great crime to prolong the war, prompted 
me to disobey these instructions — the last that I received from the Confederate 
Government. 

"They would have given the President an escort too heavy for flight, and 
not strong enough to force a way for him ; and would have spread ruin over 
all the South, by leading the three great invading armies in pursuit. In that 
belief, I determined to do all in my power to bring about a termination of 
hostilities. I therefore proposed to General Sherman another armistice and 
conference for that purpose, suggesting as a basis, the clause of the recent 
convention relating to the army. This was reported to the Confederate 
Government at once. General Sherman's dispatch, expressing bis agreement 
to a conference, was received soon after sunrise on the 26th ; and I set out for 
the former place of meeting, as soon as practicable, after announcing to the 
Administration that I was about to do so. 

"We met at noon in Mr. Bennett's house as before. I found General 
Sherman, as he appeared in our previous conversation, anxious to prevent 
further bloodshed, so we agreed without difficulty upon terms putting an 
end to the war within the limits of our commands which happened to be 
co-extensive — terms Avhich we expected to produce a general pacification." 

As will be remembered, Mr. Stanton caused to be made 
public the following "among others," as the grounds upon 
which the original terms were rejected : 

"First — It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, 
and on its face shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman 
had no authority to enter into any such arrangement. 

"Second — It was an acknowledgment of the rebel Government. 

"Third — It is understood to reestablish rebel State Governments that had 
been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousands of loyal lives and immense 
treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of rebels at 
their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies of the 
United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal States. 

" Fourth — By the restoration of the rebel authority in their respective 
States, they would be enabled to reestablish slavery. 

"Fifth — It might furnish a ground of responsibility by the Federal Gov- 
ernment to pay the rebel debt, and certainly subjects loyal citizens of the 
rebel States to debts contracted by rebels in the name of the States. 

"Sixth — It put in dispute the existence of loyal State Governments, and 
the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every depart- 
ment of the United States Government. 

"Seventh — It practically abolished the confiscation laws, and relieved 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 233 

rebels of every degree who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and 
penalties for their crimes. 

"Eighth — It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and 
solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels 
had ever asked in their most prosperous condition. 

"Ninth — It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, hut relieved the 
rebels from the pressure of our victories, and left them in condition to renew 
their effort to overthrow the United States Goverment, and subdue the loyal 
States, whenever their strength was recruited, and any opportunity should 
offer." 

While waiting to hear from Washington in regard to the 
fate of his terms, General Sherman, in the course of a letter 
transmitting some orders to General J. H. Wilson, then 
operating with cavalry in Georgia, thus expressed his ideas 
concerning slavery to General Johnston : 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, April 21. j 

General J. E. Johnston, Commanding Confederate Army. 

General: * * * I shall look for Major Hitchcock back 

from Washington on Wednesday, and shall promptly notify you of the 
result. By the action of General Weitzel in relation to the Virginia Legis- 
lature, I feel certain we will have no trouble on the score of recognizing 
existing State Governments. It may be the lawyers will want us to define 
more minutely what is meant by the guarantee of rights of person and 
property. It may he construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to 
the rights of slaves, and "leases of plantations" on the Mississippi, of 
"vacant and abandoned" plantations. I wish you would talk to the best 
men you have on these points, and, if possible, let us in our final convention 
make these points so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy. 

I believe, if the South would simply and publicly declare what we all 
feel, that slavery is dead, that you would inaugurate an era of peace and 
prosperity that would soon efface the ravages of the past four years of war. 
Negroes would remain in the South, and afford you abundance of cheap 
labor, which otherwise will he driven away; and it will save the country the 
senseless discussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years. 

Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject of a military convention, 
yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declaration of a result will be 
accepted as good as law every where. Of course, I have not a single word 
from Washington on this or any other point of our agreement, but I know 
the effect of such a step by us will be universally accepted. 
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General V. S. A. 



234 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

Through the unheralded arrival of General Grant at Ilaleigh, 
General Sherman was made acquainted with the primary dis- 
approval of his terms by the former, and their subsequent 
rejection by the Cabinet. He was also instructed to give im- 
mediate notice of the termination of the truce at the close of 
the forty-eight hours required by its provision. Such notice 
was sent forward early on the 24th of April, and on the same 
day General Sherman notified General Johnston that he was 
instructed not to attempt civil negotiations, and further, that 
he demanded the surrender of the Confederate army simply 
upon the terms extended to Lee. 

To these notes General Johnston sent the following replies : 

Headquarters Army of the Tennessee,) 
In the Field, April 25, 18(55. j 

Major- General Sherman, United States Army. 

Your dispatch of yesterday is received. I propose a modification of the 
terms you offer, such terms for the army as you wrote on the 18th, they also 
modified according to changes of circumstances, and a further armistice to 
arrange details, and a meeting for that purpose. 

J. E. Johnston, General. 

In the Field, April 26,1865. 
Major- General W. T. Sherman, Commanding United States Forces. 

General : I have had the honor to receive your dispatch summoning this 
army to surrender on the terms accepted by General Lee at Appomattox 
Court House. I propose, instead of such a surrender, terms based on those 
drawn up by you on the 18th for the disbandment of this army, and a further 
armistice and conference to arrange these terms. 

The disbandment of General Lee's army has afflicted this country with 
bands having no means of subsistence but robbery, a knowledge of which 
would, I am sure, induce you to agree to other terms. 

Most respectfully your obedient servant, 

J. E. Johnston, General. 

At a subsequent meeting, and after a protracted discussion, 
final terms of surrender, drawn up by General Schofield, not 
by General Sherman, were agreed upon, approved by General 
Grant, and forwarded to Washington. 

Then arrived the Northern papers containing Mr. Stanton's 
bulletins in regard to the character of the first terms, the 
action thereon by the Cabinet, and the orders given by General 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 235 

Halleck, who had been placed in command of the Army of 
the James, to push on, cut off Johnston's retreat, and pay no 
attention to orders from Sherman. These awoke that storm of 
abuse which the latter poured out upon Mr. Stanton and 
General Halleck. 

For his criticisms upon the latter, General Grant so far 
reprimanded him, as to formally suggest the modification of 
the report in which he reflected upon that officer. The letter 
upon this subject was as follows : 

Headquarters Armies op the United States. ) 
Washington, D. C, May 25, 1865. j 

Major-General W. T. Sherman, Comd'g Military Division of the 3Jississippi. 

General : General Grant directs me to call your attention to the part of 
your report in which the necessity of maintaining your truce, even at the 
expense of many lives, is spoken of. The General thinks that, in making a 
truce, the commander of an army can control only his own army, and that 
the hostile general must make his own arrangements with other armies 
acting against him. 

"Whilst independent generals, acting against a common foe, would naturally 
act in concert, the General deems that each must be the judge of his own 
duty, and responsible for its execution. 

If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you deem 
best. Very respectfully your obedient servant, 

T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant- General. 

The part of the report thus alluded to was as follows: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In the Field, City Point, Va., May 9, 1865. j 

General: * * * * It now becomes my duty to paint, in justly 
severe characters, the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General 
Halleck's dispatch of April 26th, to the Secretary of War, embodied in his to 
General Dix of April 27th. 

General Halleck had been chief of staff of the army at Washington, in 
which capacity he must have received my official letter of April 18th, wherein 
I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensboro were " pushed " it 
would " disperse," an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems 
to have been sent from Washington to Eichmond to command the new Mili- 
tary Division of the James, in assuming charge of which, on the 22d, he 
defines the limits of his authority to be the " Department of Virginia, the 
Army of the Potomac, and sucli part of North Carolina as may not be occu- 
pied by the command of Major-General Sherman." (See his General Orders 
No. 1.) 



236 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

Four days later, April 26th, he reports to the Secretary that he has 
ordered Generals Mead, Sheridan, and Wright to invade that part of North 
Carolina which was occupied by my command, and pay "no regard to any 
truce or orders of " mine. They were ordered to " push forward, regardless 
of any orders save those of Lieu ten ant-General Grant, and cut ofl' Johnston's 
retreat." He knew at the time he penned that dispatch and made those 
orders that Johnston was not retreating, but was halted under a forty-eight 
hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrender his command and 
prevent its dispersion into guerrilla bands, and that I had on the spot a 
magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required 
by the occasion. 

The plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burksville and Dan- 
ville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. When he 
contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made In- 
competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone 
himself, and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I was bound in honor 
to defend and maintain my own truce and pledge of faith, even at the cost of 
many lives. 

When an officer pledges the faith of his Government, he is bound to defend 
it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly. 

As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as chief of staff 
or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the 
facts contained in his dispatch to the Secretary? No he did not. If the 
Secretary of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by 
publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and 
escape? No orders or instructions to catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever 
came to me ; but, on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of 
War rather preferred he should effect an escape from the country, if made 
"unknown" to him. But even on this point, I inclose a copy of my letter to 
Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmington 
on the 25th of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted 
to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis' movements, designed, 
doubtless, to stimulate his troops to march their legs ofl' to catch their 
treasure for their own use. 

I know, now, that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and 
had acted on it before General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I 
don't believe a word of the treasure story ; it is absurd on its face, and General 
Halleck or anybody has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and Cabinet, 
with their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my 
command. 

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's dispatch is 
wherein he goes out of his way, and advises that my subordinates, Generals 
Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sher- 
man's " commands. 

This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 237 

words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before 
embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sher- 
man's Truce Disregarded," authenticated as "official," by Mr. Secretary Stan- 
ton, and published in the New York papers of April 28th. * 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General commanding. 

General Sherman, however, declined to make the change 
suggested by General Grant, and gave his reasons at length: 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
Washington, D. C, May 26, 1805. J 

Colonel T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant- General, Washington, D. C. 

Colonel : I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25th last evening, 
and hasten to answer. I wish to precede it hy renewed assurance of my con- 
fidence and respect for the President and Lieutenant-General Grant, and that 
in all matters I will he most willing to shape my official and private conduct 
to suit their wishes. The past is hey r ond my control, and the matters em- 
braced in the operations to which you refer are finished. It is but just the 
reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand of record, but in all 
future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decision of General Grant, 
though I think it wrong. * * * * 

In discussing this matter, I would like to refer to many writers on military 
law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text (see his Chapter No. 27). In 
the very first article he prefaces that "Good Faith" should always be ob- 
served between enemies in Avar, because when our faith has been pledged to 
him, as far as the promise extends he ceases to be an enemy. He then defines 
the meaning of compacts and conventions, and says they are made some 
times for a general or a partial suspension of hostilities, for the surrender of 
an army, etc. They may be special, limited to particular places, or to 
particular forces, but of course can only bind the armies subject to the 
general who makes the truce, and co-extensive only with the extent of his 
command. 

This is all I ever claimed, and clearly covers the whole case. All of North 
Carolina was in my immediate command, with General Schofield its depart- 
ment commander, and his army present with me. I never asked the truce to 
have effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck himself, 
in his Orders No.], defines his own limits clearly enough, viz.: "Such part of 
North Carolina as was not occupied by the command of Major-General 
Schofield." He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's retreat toward 
Saulsbury and Charlotte without invading my command, and so patent was 
his purpose to defy and violate my truce that Mr. Stanton's publication of the 
fact, not even yet recalled, modified, or explained, was headed: "Sherman's 
Truce Disregarded," that the whole world drew but one inference. It admits 
of no other. I never claimed that the truce bound Generals Halleck and 
Canby within the sphere of their respective commands as defined by them- 



238 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

selves. It was a partial truce of very short duration, clearly within my limits 
and rights, justified by events, and, as in the case of prisoners in my custody, 
or the violation of a safeguard given by me in my own territorial limits, I 
was bound to maintain " Good Faith." 

I prefer not to change my report ; but again repeat that in all future cases 
I am willing to be governed by the interpretation of General Grant, although 
I again invite his attention to the limits of my command and those of Gen- 
eral Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's 
dispatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered his generals 
to pay no heed to my orders within the clearly defined area of my own com- 
mand. I am, etc., 

W. T. Sherman, Major-General commanding. 

The movements of General Halleck, of which General 
Sherman thus pointedly complained, were made in pursuance 
of the following order from General Grant : 

Fortress Monroe, April 22, 1865. 
Major-Generxd Halleck, Richmond, Va. 

The truce entered into by Sherman will be ended as soon as I can reach 
Raleigh. Move Sheridan with his cavalry toward Greensboro, North Caro- 
lina, as soon as possible. I think it will be well to send one corps of infantry 
also, the whole under Sheridan. The infantry need not go further than Dan- 
ville, unless they receive orders hereafter to do so. 

U. S. Grant, IAeutenant- General. 

General Sherman's report and the subsequent correspond- 
ence in relation to it between himself and General Grant, 
having been brought to the attention of General Halleck, the 
latter thus reviewed the whole subject : 



MES, ) 

15. j 



Headquarters Military Division op the Ja 
Richmond, Va., June 7, 1865 
Hon. E M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir: I have just received the Army and Navy Gazette of May 30th, con- 
taining an official publication of Major-General Sherman's letters of May 
9th and 26th, with other papers on the same subject, parts of which had been 
previously published in the newspapers. In these letters and papers General 
Sherman has made statements and reflections on my official conduct, which 
are incorrect and entirely unjustified by the facts of the case. 

1st. He charges that I encroached upon his military command, by directing 
a portion of my troops to march upon Greensboro in North Carolina. 

By direction of the President, I was, on the 19th of April last, assigned to 
the command of the Military Division of the James, which included "such 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 239 

parts of North Carolina as were not occupied by the command of Major- 
Genera] Sherman." At the time my troops were ordered to Greensboro 
General Sherman's troops did not occupy that part of North Carolina- it 
was occupied by the enemy, and consequently within my command, as defined 
by General Orders, No. 71, of the War Department. 

But whether or not Greensboro, or any part of North Carolina, was in my 
command, General Sherman's remarks are equally without justification. On 
the 22d of April Lieutenant-General Grant notified me that Sherman's 
arrangements had been disapproved and orders given to resume hostilities 
and directed me to move my troops on Danville and Greensboro, precisely as 
I did move them, there to await his further orders. My instructions to Gen- 
erals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright were just such instructions as General 
Grant had directed me to give. The offense, or whatever he may please to 
call it, if any there was, of marching my troops within territory claimed 
by General Sherman, was not mine, but General Grant's, and all the abuse 
which he has directed upon me for that act must fall upon the General-in- 
Chief. 

2d. General Sherman charges that by marching my troops into North 
Carolina I violated his truce, which he was bound to enforce even at the cost 
of many lives by a collision of our respective armies. 

General Sherman had never sent me his truce; I had never seen it and 
did not know its terms or conditions. I only knew that his truce or 
" arrangement," whatever it was, had been disapproved and set aside by the 
President, and General Grant in ordering the movement of my troops simply 
notified me of this fact and of the renewal of hostilities. Even if Sherman's 
truce had been binding on me, which it was not, I had no knowledge of the 
clause relating to forty-eight hours' notice. 

It is strange that he should seek to bind me by conditions of the existence of 
which I was ignorant, and he had taken no measures to inform me. But 
even had I known them I could not have acted otherwise than I did. I 
simply carried out the orders of my superior officer, who had seen the truce 
and knew its terms. If General Sherman was, under the circumstances, 
justified in stopping the movements of my troops, even by destroying the 
commands of General Sheridan and General Wright, the responsibility of this 
sacrifice of human life must have rested either upon General Sherman or 
upon General Grant, for I simply obeyed the orders of the latter in regard to 
these movements. 

General Sherman reflects on me for not going in person to violate, as he is 
pleased to call it, a truce which he "was bound in honor to defend and main- 
tain," "even at the cost of many lives," and upon the marching powers of the 
troops which I sent into North Carolina. In reply to this I can only say 
that I was not ordered to go with these troops, but to send them under their 
commanders to certain points, there to await further orders from Lieutenant- 
General Grant, precisely as I directed. The troops were mostly selected by Gen- 
eral Grant, not by me, and as he had commanded them for a year he probably 



240 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

knew something of their capacity for marching, and whether or not they 
would march their legs off" "to catch the treasure for their own use." 

3. Again, General Sherman complains that my orders of April 26th to 
push forward against Johnston's army were given at the very time I knew 
that that army was surrendering to him. 

In making this statement he forgets time and circumstances. He must 
have known that I did not have, and could not possibly have had at that 
time, any official information of any new arrangements between him and 
Johnston for the surrender of the latter's army. Neither General Sherman 
nor any one else could have sent me such official information otherwise than 
by sea, which would have required several days. I only knew from General 
Grant that Sherman's "arrangements" had been disapproved, that orders had 
been given to resume hostilities, and that I was directed by him to push for- 
ward my troops to Greensboro, where they would receive further orders. 
All other information from North Carolina came from rebel sources. 

4th. The burthen of General Sherman's complaint on this subject is, that I 
ordered Generals Sheridan and Wright to push forward their troops as 
directed by General Grant, "regardless of any orders from any one except 
General Grant." 

This was simply carrying out the spirit of my instructions from General 
Grant. He had notified me that orders had been given to resume hostilities, 
and had directed me to send certain troops to Greensboro to await his further 
orders. As these troops approached the boundaries of North Carolina, John- 
ston, Beauregard, and other rebel officers tried, on the alleged grounds of 
arrangements with Sherman, to stop the movement ordered by General Grant 
When informed of this, I directed my officers to execute the commands which 
General Grant had given to me, regardless of orders from any one except 
Grant himself. I respectfully submit that I could not have done less without 
neglecting my duty. 

5th. General Sherman sneers at my sending troops from the direction of 
Burkesville and Danville against Davis in North Carolina as "hardly worthy 
of" my "military education and genius." However ridiculous General 
Sherman may consider these movements, they were made precisely as General 
Grant had directed them. 

6th. He complains that I did not notify him in regard to Davis and his 
stolen treasure. For the reason that I had no communication open to him. 
My most direct way of communicating with him was through the Depart- 
ment at Washington, and I sent all information to the Department as soon 
as it was received. 

However " absurd" General Sherman may have considered the information, 
it was given by some of the most respectable and reliable business men in 
Richmond, through a gentleman whose character and position would prevent 
me from pronouncing his statements " absurd," and of saying, without exam- 
ination, " I don't believe a word of the treasure story." 

7th. In order to sustain his position that the movements of my troops 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 241 

ordered by General Grant were in violation of his truce, which I was hound to 
observe, even without knowing its terms, and that he would have been justified 
to resent, "even at the the cost of many lives," General Sherman refers to a 
chapter of International Law. His reference is most pointedly against liis 
positions and doctrines, and the case given in illustration in paragraph 4 was one 
of which General Sherman was personally cognizant. In that case a subordi- 
nate commander refused to be bound by a truce of his superior commanding 
another department. General Sherman was not even my superior. I con- 
tend that all my orders were justified by the laws of war and military usage, 
even if they had not been directed by superior authority. 

8th. General Sherman says that General Grant "reached the Chesapeake 
in time to countermand General Halleck's orders and prevent his violating 
my truce." This is not true. General Grant neither disapproved nor 
countermanded any orders of mine, nor was there at that time any truce. It 
had ceased by General Grant's orders to resume hostilities and the subsequent 
surrender of Johnston's army of which he then notified me, and recalled 
a part of the troops which he had directed me to send to Danville and 
Greensboro. 

9th. There is but one other point in General Sherman's official complaint 
that I deem it necessary to notice. I refer to the suggestion made to you in 
regard to orders to Generals Thomas and Wilson for preventing the escape 
of Davis and his Cabinet. Although these officers were under the nominal 
command of General Sherman, yet after he left Atlanta, they received their 
instructions and orders from yourself and General Grant direr/, not through 
General Sherman. 

This is recognized and provided for by the regulations of the War Depart- 
ment and has been practised for years. I have transmitted hundreds of 
orders in this way, and General Sherman was cognizant of the fact. The 
movements of Generals Thomas, Stoneman, Wilson, A. J. Smith, etc., while 
within General Sherman's general command, have been directed in this 
way for more than six months. In suggesting that orders be sent to these 
officers directly and not through General Sherman, I suggested no departure 
from well established official channels. But even if I had, the responsibility 
of adopting that course must rest upon the authority who sent the orders. 

If his complaint is directed against the form of the suggestions, I can only 
say that I was innocent of any intended offense. My telegram was hurriedly 
written, intended for yourself, not the public, and had reference to the state 
of facts as reported to me. It was reported that orders purporting to come 
from General Sherman had been received through rebel lines for General 
Wilson to withdraw from Macon, release his prisoners, and that all hostilities 
should cease. These orders threw open the doors for the escape of Davis and 
his party. This I knew was contrary to the wishes and orders of the Gov- 
ernment; but I had no means of knowing whether or not Sherman had been 
so informed. I at the time had no communication with him or with General 
Grant, and I was not aware that either could communicate with our officers 
16 



242 THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 

in the West, except through rebel authorities, who, of course, could not be 
relied on. I repeat that my suggestions had reference only to the facts and 
wishes of the Government as known to me at the time, and was intended in 
no respect to reflect upon, or be disrespectful to General Sherman. If I had 
been able to communicate with General Sherman, or had known at the time 
the condition of affairs in North Carolina, there would have been no necessity 
or occasion for any suggestion to you, and most probably none would have 
been made. 

With these remarks, I respectfully submit that General Sherman's report, 
so far as he refers to me, is unjust, unkind, and contrary to military usage, 
and that his statements are contrary to the real facts of the case. I beg 
leave further to remark that I have, in no way, shape, or manner, criticised 
or reflected upon General Sherman's course in North Carolina, or upon his 
truce, or as General Grant styles it "arrangement" with Johnston and 
Breckinridge, but have simply acted upon the orders, instructions, and 
expressed wishes of my superiors as communicated to me, and as I under- 
stand them. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

H. W. Halleck, Major-General 

The same officer who captured the original of Mr. Reagan's 
draft of the rejected terms, also secured the written opinions 
of the different members of Mr. Davis' Cabinet, rendered in 
accordance with his request, made at the session of his Cabinet 
held on the 21st of April, at Charlotte, N. C. All reviewed 
the situation at length. 

A few extracts from these opinions will serve to show that 
the rebel Cabinet held substantially the same views of the 
scope of Sherman's terms as, according to Mr. Stanton, were 
entertained at Washington. 

Mr. Reagan wrote: 

* * * * "The agreement under consideration secures to our 
people, if ratified by both parties, the uninterrupted continuance of the 
existing State Governments; the guarantees of the Federal Constitution, and 
of the Constitutions of their respective States; the guarantee of their political 
rights, and of their rights of person, and property, and immunity from future 
prosecutions, and penalties for their participation in the existing war, on the 
condition that we accept the Constitution and Government of the United 
States, and disband our armies by marching the troops to their respective 
States, and depositing their arms in the State arsenals, subject to the future 
control of that Government, but with a verbal understanding that they are 
only to be used for the preservation of peace and order in the respective 



THE TERMS WITH JOHNSTON. 243 

States. It is also to be observed that the agreement contains no direct 
reference to the question of slavery; requires no concessions from us in 
regard to it, and leaves it subject to the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States and of the several States just as it was before the war." 

Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, summed up the terms as 
follows : 

" The Military Convention made between General Johnston and General 
Sherman is, in substance, an agreement that if the Confederate States will 
cease to wage war for the purpose of establishing a separate government, the 
United States will receive the several States back into the Union, with their 
State Governments unimpaired, with all their Constitutional rights recognized, 
with protection for the persons and property of the people, and with a general 
amnesty." 

Mr. George Davis, Attorney-General, wrote: 

"Taken as a whole, the convention amounts to this, that the States of the 
Confederacy shall reenter the old Union upon the same footing on which they 
stood before seceding from it." 

In the light of these opinions, how unjust does General 
Sherman's attack upon the memory of Secretary Stanton 
appear ! 

General Sherman relates that at the first meeting with John- 
ston, after the rejection of these terms, the latter, " without 
hesitation agreed to, and we executed" the final terms. But 
even these were drawn up by General Schofield, and this 
officer, during the subsequent absence of General Sherman, 
also made supplementary terms with Johnston, which were 
found to be necessary to complete the details of the surrender. 

From all of which it appears that the records tell a very 
different story of the negotiations with General Johnston from 
that contained in the Memoirs. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

OPINIONS OF JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET OFFICERS ON SHERMAN'S 

TERMS. 

General Sherman, in his Memoirs, returns with increased 
violence to his old attack upon Secretary Stanton, and attempts 
to hold him chiefly responsible for a course in regard to the 
Sherman-Johnston terms, which at the time was approved by 
the President, General Grant, General Halleck, every member 
of the Cabinet, and by the loyal North. 

He attempts to convey the impression that Mr. Stanton 
exceeded his authority in the matter, by the statement that 
President Johnson, and nearly all the members of the Cabinet 
assured him, after his arrival in Washington, that they knew 
nothing of Mr. Stanton's publications setting forth the nature 
of his terms and the reasons of the Cabinet for rejecting them. 
This is an attempt to escape upon a technicality. The Presi- 
dent, and every member of the Cabinet, had united in rejecting 
the terms on the grounds which Mr. Stanton made known. 
It is doubtless true that none of them, except Mr. Stanton, 
knew that these reasons were to be made public in the shape 
they were till they saw them in the newspapers. And, as the 
Secretary of War " oifered no word of explanation or apology," 
General Sherman concluded to insult him in public, which he 
seems to think he afterward did, by refusing to take Mr. 
Stanton's hand, or as he expresses it, speaking of his own 
behavior on the stand at the great review, "I shook hands 
with the President, General Grant, and each member of the 
Cabinet. As I approached Mr. Stanton, he offered me his 
(244) 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 245 

hand, but I declined it publicly, and the fact was univer- 
sally noticed " — but how decidedly to the discredit of General 
Sherman he does not relate in his new capacity of historian. 

His main complaint is directed at the reasons assigned by 
Mr. Stanton for the rejection of his terms. He contends that 
personally he " cared very little whether they were approved, 
modified, or disapproved in toto" only he " wanted instruc- 
tions;" and yet in a letter to Halleck, quoted in the Memoirs, 
and written the day these terms were agreed upon, is this 
appeal : 

"Please give all orders necessary according to the views the Executive may 
take, and influence him, if possible, not to vary the terms at all, for I have 
considered every thing, and believe that the Confederate armies once dis- 
persed, we can adjust all else fairly and well." 

It is now known, from documents which might have slept 
but for General Sherman's revival of this matter, that the 
members of Jeff. Davis' Cabinet construed the Sherman- 
Johnston terms exactly as Mr. Stanton and the other members 
of Lincoln's Cabinet did. 

It has already been made to appear that Mr. Reagan, the 
Confederate Postmaster-General; Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary 
of War; Wade Hampton, and General Johnston held a con- 
sultation at the headquarters of the latter, late at night, after 
the first conference with General Sherman. Up to that time 
no draft of "terms" had been prepared by either side, and 
Mr. Reagan thereupon drew up outlines, based upon John- 
ston's conversations with Sherman, and this paper was the 
next day handed to the latter, and, with it before him, he 
wrote the memorandum, which was afterward signed. This 
was agreed to, and did not differ in its most important points 
from the draft prepared by Mr. Reagan. 

The latter, therefore, was well qualified to inform Mr. Davis 
of the character of these terms; and a few days later, when 
they had been under consideration in the rebel Cabinet, he, 
in common with his associate members, at the request of Mr. 



246 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

Davis, gave a written opinion upon the terms and the question 
of accepting them. 

This paper, which is now both interesting and pertinent to 
the questions General Sherman has raised, is as follows : 

Views of Postmaster-General Reagan : 

To the President. Charlotte, N. C, April 22, 1865. 

Sir — In obedience to your request for the opinions in writing of the mem- 
bers of the Cabinet on the questions : first, as to whether you should assent 
to the preliminary agreement of the 18th inst., between General Joseph E. 
Johnston, of the Confederate army, and Major-General W- T. Sherman, of 
the army of the United States, for the suspension of hostilities and the adjust- 
ment of the difficulties between the two countries ; and, if so, second, the 
proper mode of executing this agreement on our part, I have to say that, 
painful as the necessity is, in view of the relative condition of the armies 
and resources of the belligerents, I must advise the acceptance of the terms 
of the agreement 

General Lee, the General-in-Chief of our armies, has been compelled to 
surrender our principal army, heretofore employed in the defense of our 
capital, with the loss of a very large part of our ordnance, arms, munitions 
of war, and military stores of all kinds, with what remained of our naval 
establishment. The officers of the civil government have been compelled to 
abandon the capital, carrying with them the archives, and thus to close, for 
the time being at least, the regular operations of its several departments, 
with no place now open to us at which we can reestablish and put these 
departments in operation, with any prospect of permanency or security for 
the transaction of the public business and the carrying on of the Govern- 
ment. The army under the command of General Johnston has been reduced 

to fourteen or fifteen infantry and artillery and cavalry, and this 

force is, from demoralization and despondency, melting away rapidly by the 
troops abandoning the army and returning to their homes singly and in 
numbers large and small; it being the opinion of Generals Johnston and 
Beauregard that with the men and means at their command they can oppose 
no serious obstacle to the advance of General Sherman's army. General 
Johnston is of opinion that the enemy's forces now in the field exceed ours 
in numbers by probably ten to one. Our forces in the South, though still 
holding the fortifications at Mobile, have been unable to prevent the fall of 
Selma and Montgomery in Alabama, and of Columbus and Macon in 
Georgia, with their magazines, workshops, and stores of supplies. 

The army west of the Mississippi is unavailable for the arrest of the vic- 
torious career of the enemy east of that river, and is inadequate for the 
defense of the country west of it. The country is worn down by a brilliant 
and heroic, but exhausting and bloody struggle of four years. Our ports are 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 247 

closed so as to exclude the hope of procuring arms and supplies from abroad ; 
and we are unable to arm our people if they were willing to continue the 
struggle. The supplies of quartermaster and commissary stores in the 
country are very limited in amount, and our railroads are so broken and 
destroyed as to prevent, to a great extent, the transportation and accumula- 
tion of those remaining. Our currency has lost its purchasing power, and 
there is no other means of supplying the treasury; and the people are hostile 
to impressments and endeavor to conceal such supplies as are needed for the 
army from the officers charged with their collection. Our armies, in case of 
a prolongation of the struggle, will continue to melt away as they retreat 
through the country. There is danger, and I think I might say certainty, 
based on the information we have, that a portion, and probably all of the 
States will make separate terms with the enemy as they are overrun, with the 
chance that the terms so obtained will be less favorable to them than those 
contained in the agreement under consideration. And the despair of our 
people will prevent a much longer continuance of serious resistance, unless 
they shall be hereafter urged to it by unendurable oppressions. 

The agreement under consideration secures to our people, if ratified by 
both parties, the uninterrupted continuance of the existing .State Govern- 
ments; the guarantees of the Federal Constitution, and of the Constitutions 
of their respective States; the guarantee of their political rights and of their 
rights of person and property, and immunity from future prosecutions and 
penalties for their participation in the existing war, on the condition that we 
accept the Constitution and Government of the United States, and disband 
our armies by marching the troops to their respective States, and depositing 
their arms in the State arsenals, subject to the future control of that Govern- 
ment, but with a verbal understanding that they are only to be used for the 
preservation of peace and order in the respective States. It is also to be 
observed that the agreement contains no direct reference to the question of 
slavery, requires no concessions from us in regard to it, and leaves it subject 
to the Constitution and Laws of the United States and of the several States 
just as it was before the war. 

With these facts before us, and under the belief that we can not now rea- 
sonably hope for the achievement of our independence, which should be dearer 
than life if it were possibly attainable, and under the belief that a continu- 
ance of the struggle, with its sacrifices of life and property, and its accumu- 
lation of sufferings, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be both 
unwise and criminal, I advise that you assent to the agreement as the best 
you can now do for the people who have clothed you with the high trust of 
your position. 

In advising this course I do not conceal from myself, nor would I withhold 
from your Excellency, the danger of trusting the people who drove us to war 
by their unconstitutional and unjust aggressions, and who will now add the 
consciousness of power to their love of dominion and greed of gain. 

It is right also for me to say that much as we have been exhausted in men 



248 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

and resources, I am of opinion that if our people could be induced to con- 
tinue the contest with the spirit which animated them during the first years 
of the war, our independence might yet be within our reach. But I see no 
reason to hope for that now. 

On the second question, as to the proper mode of executing the agreement, 
I have to say that whatever you may do looking to the termination of the 
contest by an amicable arrangement which may embrace the extinction of 
the Government of the Confederate States, must be done without special 
authority to be found in the Constitution. And yet, I am of opinion that, 
charged as you are with the duty of looking to the general welfare of the 
people, and without time or opportunity, under the peculiarity and necessities 
of the case, to submit the whole question to the States for their deliberation 
and action without danger of losing material advantages provided for in the 
agreement ; and, as I believe that you, representing the military power and 
authority of all the States, can obtain better terms for them than it is probable 
they could obtain each for itself; and, as it is in your power, if the Federal 
authorities accept this agreement, to terminate the ravages of war sooner than 
it can be done by the several States, while the enemy is still unconscious of 
the full extent of our weakness, you should, in case of the acceptance of 
the terms of this agreement by the authorities of the United States, accept 
them on the part of the Confederate States, and take steps for the disbanding 
of the Confederate armies on the terms agreed on. As you have no power to 
change the government of the country, or to transfer the allegiance of the 
people, I would advise that you submit to the several States, through their 
governors, the question as to whether they will, in the exercise of their own 
sovereignty, accept, each for itself, the terms proposed. 

To this it may be said, that after the disbanding of our armies and the aban- 
donment of the contest by the Confederate Government, they would have 
no alternative but to accept the terms proposed or an unequal and hopeless 
war, and that it would be needless for them to go through the forms and incur 
the trouble and expense of assembling a convention for the purpose. To such 
an objection, if urged, it may be answered that we entered into the contest to 
maintain and vindicate the doctrine of State rights and State sovereignty, and 
the right of self government, and that we can only be faithful to the Consti- 
tution of the United States, and true to the principles in support of which we 
have expended so much blood and treasure, by the employment of the same 
agencies to return into the old Union which we employed in separating from it 
and in forming our present Government; and that if this should be an unwel- 
come and enforced action by the States, it would not be more so on the part 
of the States than on the part of the President, if he were to undertake to 
execute the whole agreement, and while they would have authority for acting 
he would have none. 

This plan would at least conform to the theory of the Constitution of the 
United States, and would, in future, be an additional precedent, to which the 
friends of State rights could point in opposing the doctrine of the consolida- 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 249 

tion of powers in the central government. And if the future shall disclose a 
disposition (of which I fear the chance is remote) on the part of the people of 
the United States to return to the spirit and meaning of tin- Constitution, 
then this action on the part of the States might prove to be of great value to 
the friends of constitutional liberty and good government. 

In addition to the terms of agreement, an additional provision should be 
asked for, which will probably be allowed without objection, stipulating for 
the withdrawal of the Federal forces from the several States of the Confederacy, 
except a sufficient number to garrison the permanent fortifications and take 
care of the public property until the States can call their conventions and 
take action on the proposed terms. 

In addition to the necessity for this course, in order to make their action as 
free and voluntary as other circumstances will allow, it would aid in softening 
the bitter memories which must necessarily follow such a contest as that in 
which we are engaged. 

Nothing is said in the agreement about the public debt and the disposition 
of our public property beyond the turning over of the arms to the State 
arsenals. 

In the final adjustment we should endeavor to secure provisions for the 
auditing of the debt of the Confederacy, and for its payment in common with 
the war debt of the United States. 

We may ask this on the ground that we did not seek this war, but only 
sought peaceful separation to secure our people and States from the effects of 
unconstitutional encroachments by the other States, and because, on the princi- 
ples of equity, allowing that both parties had acted in good faith, and gone to 
war on a misunderstanding which admitted of no other solution, and now agree 
to a reconciliation, and to a burial of the past, it would be unjust to compel 
our people to assist in the payment of the war debt of the United States, and 
for them to refuse to allow such of the revenues as we might contribute to be 
applied to the payment of our creditors. If it should be said that this is a 
liberality never extended by the conqueror to the conquered, the answer is 
that if the object of the pacification is to restore the Union in good faith and 
to reconcile the people to each other, to restore confidence and faith, and 
prosperity, and homogenity, then it is of the first importance that the terms 
of reconciliation should be based on entire equity, and that no just ground of 
grief or complaint should be left to either party. And to both parties, look- 
ing not only to the present but to the interest of future generations, the 
amount of money which would be involved, though large, would be as nothing 
when compared with a reconciliation entirely equitable, which should leave 
no sting to honor, and no sense of wrong to rankle in the memories of the 
people, and lay the foundation for new difficulties and for future wars. It is 
to this feature, it seems to me, the greatest attention should be given by both 
sides. It will be of the highest importance to all, for the present as well as 
for the future, that the frankness, sincerity, and justice of both parties shall 
be as conspicuous in the adjustment of past difficulties, as their courage and 



250 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

endurance have been during the war, if we would make peace on a basis 
which would he satisfactory and might be rendered perpetual 

In any event provisions should be made which will authorize the Con- 
federate authorities to sell the public property remaining on hand, and to 
apply the proceeds, as far as they will go, to the payment of our public 
liabilities, or for such other disposition as may be found advisable. 

But if the terms of this agreement should be rejected, or so modified by the 
Government of the United States as to refuse a recognition of the right of 
local self-government and our political rights, and rights of persons and 
property, or as to refuse amnesty for past participation in this war, then it 
will be our duty to continue the struggle as best we can, however unequal it 
maybe; as it would be better and more honorable to waste our lives and 
substance in such a contest than to yield both to the mercy of a remorseless 
conqueror. 

I am, with great respect, your Excellency's obedient servant, 

John H. Reagan, Postmaster-Genei-cU. 

It will be seen that Mr. Reagan, whose opportunities for 
being well informed were excellent, looked upon the Sherman 
terms as "preliminary," and held, as Mr. Stanton said our 
Cabinet did, that subsequently a claim might be made that 
the North should help pay the rebel war debt. 

The views of the other members of the Davis Cabinet, sub- 
mitted in writing at the same time, were as follows: 

Views of Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State : 

Charlottk, N. C, 22d April, 1865. 
To the President. 

Sir : I have the honor to submit this paper as the advice in writing which 
you requested from the heads of the departments of the Government. 

The military convention made between General Johnston and General 
Sherman is, in substance, an agreement that if the Confederate States will 
cease to wage war for the purpose of establishing a separate government, the 
United States will receive the several States back into the Union with their 
State Governments unimpaired, with all their constitutional rights recognized, 
with protection for the persons and property of the people, and with a general 
amnesty. 

The question is whether, in view of the military condition of the belliger- 
ents, the Confederate States can hope for any better result by continuing the 
war; whether there is any reason to believe that they can establish their 
independence and final separation from the United States. 

To reach a conclusion it is requisite to consider our present condition and 
the prospect of a change for the better. 



JEFF. PAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 251 

The General-in-Chief of the armies of the Confederacy has capitulated, 
and his army, the largest and finest within our country, is irretrievably lost. 

The soldiers have been dispersed and remain at home as paroled prisoners. 

The artillery, arms, and munitions "of war are lost, and no help can be 
expected from Virginia, which is at the mercy of the conqueror. 

The army next in numbers and efficiency is known as the Army of Ten- 
nessee, and is commanded by Generals Johnston and Beauregard. 

Its rolls call for more than seventy thousand men. Its last returns show a 
total present for duty, of all arms, of less than twenty thousand men. This 
number is daily diminishing by desertions and casualties. In a recent con- 
ference with the Cabinet at Greensboro Generals Johnston and Beauregard 
expressed the unqualified opinion that it was not in their power to resist 
Sherman's advance, and that as fast as their army retreated, the soldiers of 
the several States on the line of retreat would abandon the army and go 
home. 

We also hear on all sides, and from citizens well acquainted with public 
opinion, that the State of North Carolina will not consent to continue the 
struggle after our armies shall have withdrawn further south, and this with- 
drawal is inevitable if hostilities are resumed. 

This action of North Carolina would render it impossible for Virginia to 
maintain her position in the Confederacy, even if her people were unanimous 
in their desire to continue the contest. 

In the more southern States we have no army except the forces now 
defending Mobile and the cavalry under General Forrest. The enemy are so 
far superior in numbers that they have occupied within the last few weeks 
Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon, and could continue their career 
of devastation through Georgia and Alabama without our being able to pre- 
vent it by any forces now at our disposal. 

It is believed that we could not at the present moment gather together an 
army of thirty thousand men by a concentration of all our forces east of the 
Mississippi River. 

Our sea-coast is in possession of the enemy, and we can not obtain arms 
and munitions from abroad except in very small quantities and by precarious 
and uncertain means of transportation. 

We have lost possession in Virginia and North Carolina of our chief 
resources for the supply of powder and lead. 

We can obtain no aid from the Trans-Mississippi Department, from which 
we are cut off by the fleets of gun-boats that patrol the river. 

We have not a supply of arms sufficient for putting into the field even ten 
thousand additional men, if the men themselves were forthcoming. 

The Confederacy is, in a word, unable to continue the war by armies in the 
field, and the struggle can no longer be maintained in any other manner than 
by a guerrilla or partisan warfare. Such a warfare is not, in my opinion, 
desirable, nor does it promise any useful result. It would entail far more 
suffering on our own people than it would cause damage to the enemy; and 



252 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

the people have been such heavy sufferers by the calamities of the war for the 
last four years that it is at least questionable whether they would be willing 
to engage in such a contest, unless forced to endure its horrors in preference 
to dishonor and degradation. 

The terms of the convention imply no dishonor, impose no degradation, 
exact only what the victor always requires — the relinquishment by his foe of 
the object for which the struggle was commenced. 

Seeing no reasonable hope of our ability to conquer our independence, 
admitting the undeniable fact that we have been vanquished in the war, it is 
my opinion that these terms should be accepted, being as favorable as any 
that we, as the defeated belligerents, have reason to expect or can hope to 
secure. 

It is further my opinion that the President owes it to the States and to the 
people to obtain for them, by a general pacification, rights and advantages 
which they would, in all probability, be unable to secure by the separate 
action of the different States. It is natural that the enemy should be willing 
to accord more liberal conditions for the purpose of closing the war at once 
than would be granted if each State should continue the contest till separate 
terms could be made for itself. 

The President is the chief political executive of the Confederacy, as well as 
the Commander-in-Chief of its armies. In the former capacity he is power- 
less to act in making peace on any other basis than that of independence. In 
the latter capacity he can ratify the military convention under consideration, 
and execute its provisions relative to the disbandment of the army and the 
distribution of the arms. He can end hostilities. 

The States alone can act in dissolving the Confederacy and returning to the 
Union, according to the terms of the convention. 

I think that if this convention be ratified by the United States, the Presi- 
dent should, by proclamation, inform the States and the people of the Con- 
federacy of the facts above recited ; should ratify the convention so far as he 
has authority to act as Commander-in-Chief, and should execute the military 
provisions; should declare his inability, with the means remaining at his 
disposal, to defend the Confederacy or maintain its independence, and should 
resign a trust which it is no longer possible to fulfill. 

He should further invite the several States to take into immediate consid- 
eration the terms of this convention, with a view to their adoption and 
execution as being the best and most favorable that they could hope to obtain 
by a continuance of the struggle. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of State. 

Views of Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy : 

Charlotte, N. C, 24th April, 1865. 
Mr. President: In compliance with your suggestion I have the honor 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 253 

briefly to present the following views upon the propositions discussed in Cab- 
inet council yesterday. 

These propositions, agreed upon and signed by General Joseph E. Johnston 
and W. T. Sherman, may fairly be regarded as providing for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities, the disbandment of our armies, and the return of our 
soldiers to the peaceful walks of life ; the restoration of the several States of 
our Confederacy to the old Union, with the integrity of their State Govern- 
ments preserved; the security of their "people and inhabitants" in their 
rights of person and property under the Constitution and the Laws of the 
United States, equally with the people of any other State, guaranteed, 
and a general amnesty for and on account of any participation in the 
present war. 

The very grave responsibility devolved upon you by these propositions is 
at once apparent. To enter at all upon their discussion is to admit that 
independence, the great object of our struggle, is hopeless. I believe and 
admit this to be the case, and therefore do I advise you to accept these propo- 
sitions so far as you have the power to do so; and my conviction is that nine- 
tenths of the people of every State of the Confederacy would so advise if 
opportunity were presented them. They are weary of the war and desire 
peace. If they could be rallied and brought to the field, a united and 
determined people might even yet achieve independence ; but many circum- 
stances admonish us that we can not count upon their cordial and united 
action. 

The vast army of deserters and absentees from our military service during 
the past twelve months, the unwillingness of the people to enter the armies, 
the impracticability of recruiting them, the present utter demoralization of 
our troops consequent upon the destruction of the Army of Virginia, the 
rapid decrease by desertion of General Johnston's army, which as it retreats 
south, if retreat it can, will retain in its ranks but few soldiers beyond the 
by-paths and cross-roads which lead to their homes, together with the recent 
successes of the enemy, the fall of Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and 
Macon, his forces in the field and his vast resources, all dictate the admission 
I have made. 

I do not believe that by any possibility we could organize, arm, and equip, 
and bring into the field this side of the Mississippi fifteen thousand men 
within the next sixty days, and I am convinced that both General Beaure- 
gard and General Johnston are utterly hopeless of continuing the contot. A 
guerrilla warfare might be carried on in certain portions of our country for 
a time, perhaps for years, but while such a warfare would be more disastrous 
to our own people than it could possibly be to the enemy, it would exercise 
little or no influence upon his military operations, or upon his hold upon 
the country. Conducted upon our own soil our own people would chiefly feel 
its evils, and would afford it neither countenance nor support. Guerrilla 
warfare never has been and never can be carried on by and between peoples 
of a common origin, language, and institutions. 



254 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

Our sea-board and our ports being in the enemy's hands we can not rely 
upon supplies of arms and other munitions of war from abroad, and our 
means of producing them at home, already limited, are daily decreasing. 
The loss of Selma and of Columbus, where much valuable machinery for the 
construction of ordnance and ordnance stores was collected, must materially 
circumscribe our ability in this respect. 

Our currency is nearly worthless, and will become utterly so with further 
military disasters, and there is no hope that we can improve it. 

The arms of the United States have rendered the great object of our strug- 
gle hopeless, have conquered a reconstruction of the Union, and it becomes 
your duty to secure to the people, as far as practicable, life, liberty, and 
property. 

The propositions signed by the opposing generals are more favorable to 
these great objects than could justly have been anticipated. 

Upon you, with a more thorough knowledge of the condition of our 
country, the character and sentiments of our people, and of our means and 
resources, than is possessed by others, is devolved the responsibility of 
promptly accepting or of promptly rejecting them. I advise their acceptance; 
and that, having notified General Johnston of your having done so, you 
promptly issue, so soon as you shall learn the acceptance thereof by the 
authorities of the United States, a proclamation to the people of the Confed- 
erate States, setting forth clearly the condition of the country, your inability 
to resist the enemy's overwhelming numbers, or to protect the country from 
his devastating and desolating march, the propositions submitted to you, and 
the reasons which, in your judgment, render their acceptance by the States 
and the people wise and expedient. You can not, under the Constitution, 
dissolve the Confederacy and remit the States composing it to the Govern- 
ment of the United States. 

But the Confederacy is conquered. Its days are numbered. Virginia is 
lost to it, and North Carolina must soon follow, and State after State, under 
the hostile tread of the enemy, must reenter the old Union. The occasion, the 
emergency, the dire necessities and misfortunes of the country, the vast inter- 
ests at stake, were never contemplated by those who framed the Constitution. 
They are all outside of it, and in the dissolution of the Confederacy and the 
wreck of all their hopes, the States and the people will turn to you, whose 
antecedents and whose present position and powers constitute you, more than 
any other living man, the guardian of their honor and their interests, and 
will expect you not to stand upon constitutional limitations, but to assume 
and exercise all powers which to you may seem necessary and proper to 
shield them from useless war, and to save from the wreck of the country all 
that may be practicable of honor, life, and property. 

If time were allowed for the observance of constitutional forms I would 
advise the submission of these propositions to the' executives of the several 
States to the end that, through the usual legislative and conventional action, 
the wills of the people of the States respectively might be known. But in 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 255 

the present condition of the country such delay as this course would involve 
would be the death-blow to all hopes founded upon them. 

Tlie pacification of the country should be as speedy as practicable, to the 
end that the authorities of the States may enter upon the establishment and 
maintenance of law and order. Negotiations for this purpose can more 
appropriately follow upon the overwhelming disaster of General Lee than at 
a future time. The wreck of our hopes results immediately from it. 

I omit all reference to the details which must be provided 'for by the con- 
tending parties to this agreement for future consideration. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

S. R. Maixoky, Secretary of the Navy. 

Views of Attorney-General Davis : 

Charlotte, N. C., 22rf April, 1865. 
To the President. 

Sir : The questions submitted by you to the members of your Cabinet for 
their opinions are : 

1. Whether the convention agreed upon on the 18th inst., by and between 
General Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces, and Major-General 
Sherman, commanding the forces of the United States, in North Carolina, 
should be ratified by you. 

2. If so, in what way should it be done. 

The terms of that convention are substantially as follows : 

That the armies of the Confederate States shall be disbanded and their 
arms surrendered. 

That the several State Governments shall be recognized by the Executive 
of the United States, upon their officers and legislatures taking the oaths 
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and where there are con- 
flicting State Governments the question to be referred to the decision of the 
Supreme Court. 

That all political rights and franchises, and all rights of person and prop- 
erty, shall be respected and guaranteed. 

That a general amnesty be granted, and no citizen be molested in person 
or property for any acts done in aid of the Confederate States in the prosecu- 
tion of the war. 

Taken as a whole the convention amounts to this, that the States of the 
Confederacy shall reenter the old Union upon the same footing on which they 
stood before seceding from it. 

These States having, in their several conventions, solemnly asserted their 
sovereignty and right of self-government, and having established for them- 
selves, and maintained through four years of bloody war a government of 
their own choosing, no loyal citizen can consent to its abandonment and 



256 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

destruction as long as there remains a reasonable hope of successful resistance 
to the arms of the United States. 

The question, therefore, whether the terms of the military convention 
should be accepted will depend upon whether the Confederate States are in a 
condition further to prosecute the war with a reasonable hope of success, and 
this question will be answered by a brief review of our military situation. 

The Army of Northern Virginia, for four years the pride and boast of the 
Confederacy, under the lead of the General-in-Chief, whose name we have 
been accustomed to associate with victory, after having been defeated and 
reduced to a mere remnant by straggling and desertion, has capitulated to 
the enemy. All who were not embraced in the capitulation have thrown 
away their arms and disbanded beyond any hope of reorganization. 

Our only other army east of the Mississippi, the Army of Tennessee, con- 
tains now about thirteen thousand effective men, of infantry and artillery, and 
is daily melting away by desertion. It is confronted by one of the best armies 
of the United States, fifty thousand strong. Manifestly it can not fight, and 
if it retreats, the chances are more than equal that, like the Army of Northern 
Virginia, it will dissolve, and the remnant be forced to capitulate. If it 
should retreat successfully, and offer itself as a nucleus for reorganization, it 
can not be recruited. Volunteering is long since at an end, and conscription 
has exhausted all its force. East of the Mississippi, scattered through all the 
States, we have now about forty thousand organized troops. To oppose these 
the enemy have more than two hundred thousand. Persevering efforts for 
many months past have failed to overcome the obstacle to the removal of 
troops from the west to the east of the Mississippi. We can, therefore, look 
for no accession of strength from that quarter. If a returning sense of duty 
and patriotism should bring back the stragglers and deserters in sufficient 
numbers to form a respectable army, we have not the means of arming them. 
Our supply of arms is very nearly exhausted, our means of manufacturing 
substantially at an end, and the blockade of our ports prevents their intro- 
duction from abroad, except in small quantities, and at remote points. In 
view of these facts our two generals highest in command in the field have 
expressed in decided terms our inability longer to continue the struggle. 
Observation has satisfied me that the States of Virginia and North Carolina 
are finally lost to our cause. The people of the latter are utterly weary of 
the war, broken and despairing in spirit, and eager to accept terms far less 
liberal than the convention proposes. In the absence of a general arrange- 
ment they will certainly make terms for themselves. Abandoned by our 
armies, the people of Virgina will follow their example, and it will be im- 
possible to arrest the process of disintegration thus begun. 

This melancholy array of facts leaves open but one conclusion- I am 
unhesitatingly of the opinion that the convention ought to be ratified. 

As to the proper mode of ratification, greater doubt may be reasonably enter- 
tained. The Confederate Government is but the agent of the States, and as 
its chief executive you can not, according to our governmental theory, bind 



JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 257 

the States to a government which they have not adopted for themselves. 
Nor can you rightfully, without their consent, dissolve the government which 
they have established. But there are circumstances so desperate as to over- 
ride all constitutional theories, and such are those which are pressing upon 
us now. The Government of the Confederate States is no longer potent for 
good. Exhausted by war in all its resources to such a degree that it can no 
longer offer a respectable show of resistance to its enemies, it is already 
virtually destroyed. And the chief duty left for you to peform is to provide 
as far as possible for the speedy delivery of the people from the horrors of war 
and anarchy. 

I therefore respectfully advise that upon the ratification of the convention 
by the Executive of the United States, you issue your proclamation, plainly 
setting forth the circumstances which have induced you to assent to the terms 
proposed, disbanding the armies of the Confederacy, resigning your office as 
chief magistrate, and recommending to the people of the States that they 
assemble in convention and carry into effect the terms agreed on. 

George Davis. 

Views of Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary of War: 

Charlotte, N. C. f April 23, 1865. 
To His Excellency the President. 

Sir: In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit my advice as 
to the course you should take upon the memorandum or basis of agreement 
made on the 18th inst. by and between General J. E. Johnston, of the Con- 
federate States Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, of the United States 
Army, provided that paper shall receive the approval of the Government of 
the United States. 

The principal army of the Confederacy was recently lost in Virginia. 
Considerable bodies of troops not attached to that army have either dis- 
banded or marched toward their homes, accompanied by many of their 
officers. Five days ago the effective force, in infantry and artillery, of General 
Johnston's army was but fourteen thousand seven hundred and seventy men, 
and it continues to diminish. That officer thinks it wholly impossible for 
him to make any head against the overwhelming forces of the enemy. Our 
ports are closed, and the sources of foreign supply lost to us. The enemy 
occupy all or the greater part of Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and North Carolina, and move almost at will through the other States to the 
east of the Mississippi. 

They have recently taken Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, Macon, and 
other important towns, depriving us of large depots of supplies and of muni- 
tions of war. Of the small force still at command, many are unarmed, and 
the Ordnance Department can not furnish five thousand stand of small arms. 

I do not think it would be possible to assemble, equip, and maintain an 
army of thirty thousand men at any point east of the Mississippi River. 
17 



258 JEFF. DAVIS' CABINET ON SHERMAN'S TERMS. 

The contest, if continued after this paper is rejected, will be likely to lose 
entirely the dignity of regular warfare, many of the States will make such 
terms as they may, in others separate and ineffective hostilities may be prose- 
cuted, while the war, wherever waged, will probably degenerate into that 
irregular and secondary stage out of which greater evils will flow to the South 
than to the enemy. 

For these and for other reasons which need not now be stated, I think we 
can no longer contend with a reasonable hope of success. 

It seems to me that the time has arrived when, in a large and clear view of 
the situation, prompt steps should be taken to put an end to the war. 

It may be said that the agreement of the 18th inst. contains certain stipula 
tions which you can not perform. 

This is true, and it was well understood by General Sherman that 
only a part could be executed by the Confederate authorities. In any 
view of the case grave responsibilities must be met and assumed. If the 
necessity for peace be conceded, corresponding action must be taken. The 
mode of negotiation which we deem regular and would prefer is imprac- 
ticable. 

The situation is anomalous and can not be solved upon principles of theo- 
retical exactitude. 

In my opinion you are the only person who can meet the present 
necessities. 

I respectfully advise : 

1. That you execute, so far as you can, the second article in the agreement 
of the 18th inst. 

2. That you recommend to the several States the acceptance of those parts 
of the agreement upon which they alone can act. 

3. Having maintained, with faithful and intrepid purpose, the cause of the 
Confederate States while the means of organized resistance remained, that 
you return to the States and the people the trust which you are no longer able 
to defend. 

Whatever course you pursue opinions will be divided. Permit me to give 
mine. Should these or similar views accord with your own, I think the 
better judgment will be that you can have no higher title to the gratitude of 
your countrymen and the respect of mankind than will spring from the wis- 
dom to see the path of duty at this time, and the courage to follow it, regardless 
alike of praise or blame. 

Respectfully and truly your friend, 

John C. Breckinridge, Secretary of War. 

General Sherman deserves thanks for bringing to light the 
above interesting and valuable historical papers. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

SNEERS AT THE STAFF THE CONTROVERSY WITH THE WAR 

DEPARTMENT OVER THE CONTROL OF THE STAFF CORPS. 

General Sherman, in his last chapter discusses at consid- 
erable length the same issues which he raised with the Secretary 
of War and the statute law, when he assumed the duties of 
general and promulgated an order assigning all officials in the 
War Department, except the Secretary himself, and possibly 
his chief clerk, to duty on his staff. In his treatment of this 
question he indulges in many undignified sneers at staff officers. 
For example : 

"The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selected and 
chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and too commonly 
construe themselves into the elite, as made of better clay than the common 
soldier. Thus they separate themselves more and more from their comrades 
of the line, and in process of time realize the condition of that old officer of 
artillery, who thought the army would be a delightful place for a gentleman 

if it were not for the d d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the 

young lord in 'Henry IV.,' who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that 'but for 
these vile guns he would himself have been a soldier.' This is all wrong; 
utterly at variance with our democratic form of government and of universal 
experience; and now that the French, from whom we had copied the system, 
have utterly 'prescribed' it, I hope that our Congress will follow suit." 

General Sherman's own military history, however, will 
show that it was not until he attained the rank of brigadier- 
general that his antipathy to staff duty began. But from that 
time forward it has been marked. Even the large body of 
staff officers in his own army, who, on the Atlanta campaign, 
had been continuously on duty and most of the time under 

(259) 



260 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

fire from May till September, did not escape being made to 
feel this prejudice. 

While the army was moving from Atlanta on Hood, who 
had passed to its rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, inspector- 
general on the staif, was appointed by the Governor of Ohio 
to the command of one of the new regiments from that State. 
Whereupon General Sherman issued the following order: 

[Special Field Orders No. 98.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864. J 

1st. Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, acting Inspector-General on the 
staff of this military division, having been appointed colonel of the One- 
Hundred and Eightieth Ohio, is hereby relieved from duty at these headquar- 
ters, and will proceed to Nashville and assume command of his new regiment. 

2d. The General commanding thanks Colonel Warner for his most zealous 
and intelligent service during the past campaign, compliments him on his 
good sense in preferring service with troops to staff duty, and predicts for him 
the highest success in his professional career. 

By order of Major- General W. T. Sherman. 

Colonel Warner was an able and gallant officer. As lieu- 
tenant-colonel of an Ohio regiment, he w r as detailed for duty 
on the staif of General Sherman, and afterward, upon being 
appointed to a colonelcy, he naturally desired to assume com- 
mand of his regiment. Certainly there were very few, if any, 
of the hundreds of staff officers serving with General Sher- 
man who would not gladly have exchanged places with 
Colonel Warner. They were for the most part, men who 
had volunteered for the war without stopping to bargain for 
place or power, and accepted their staff positions and obeyed 
the orders detailing them for such duty as they would have 
obeyed any other military orders they might have received. 
It was a fact universally recognized that promotion came 
chiefly from the line, and none of them, with the same oppor- 
tunity, would have failed to follow Colonel Warner's example. 

In the nature of things it was impossible for many of them 
to receive such promotion in the line as would justify them in 
asking to be relieved from staif duty, and under the circum- 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 261 

stances, General Sherman's order was to these officers both a 
cruel wrong and a gratuitous insult. 

But if General Sherman in writing his final chapter had 
remembered the facts set forth in the opening of his book, he 
might have tempered his language in regard to staff service. 

The Memoirs begin with the information that in the Spring of 
1846 he was first-lieutenant in the Third Artillery, and present 
with his company at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. In April 
of the same year he was detailed for recruiting service. In 
June he was ordered to California with Company F of his regi- 
ment, and assigned to staff duty as quartermaster and commis- 
sary. In March, 1847, he returned to company duty. The 
next month (April) he was assigned as aid-de-camp to Gen- 
eral Kearney. In May General Kearney left California, and 
Lieutenant Sherman became acting assistant adjutant-general 
on the staff of Colonel R. B. Mason. In February, 1849, 
he was relieved from this service and assigned in the same 
capacity to the staff of General Persifer F. Smith. While 
thus acting his duties were changed to those of aid-de-camp 
on the same staff, in which capacity he continued to act until 
September, 1850, when he rejoined his company in St. Louis 
with the assurance that he would soon receive a regular staff 
appointment. This promise was soon after fulfilled, and on 
the 27th of the same month he was appointed captain and 
commissary of subsistence in the regular army. This position 
he held until his resignation some three years after, Sep- 
tember 6th, 1853, having thus completed an almost unbroken 
record of seven years' service as an officer of the staff. 

And when, after the hesitation about reentering the army 
at the beginning of the war, which he details at length, he 
finally decided to take part in the struggle, he applied for 
staff duty again, as is plain from the close of the letter in 
which he tendered his services. "Should they be needed." 1 
he writes May 8, 1861, to the Secretary of War, "the records 
of the War Department will enable you to designate the sta- 
tion in which I can render the most service." As these 



262 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

records for seven preceding years of his former army duty 
pertained mainly to varied staff service, the intent of the 
application is manifest. 

However, he was made colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry, 
and this was his "new regiment." But, instead of following 
Colonel Warner's example, who went from inspector on the 
staff to the command of a regiment, he reversed it, and with 
his colonel's commission in his pocket passed to duty as 
inspector on the staff of General Scott, and this duty con- 
tinued until he was assigned to the command of a brigade 
some weeks later. From this time forward he "had the good 
sense to prefer service with troops to staff duty." 

In this last chapter General Sherman argues that military 
correspondence with higher officials should pass through the 
hands of the intermediate generals, in order that they may 
never be ignorant of any thing that concerns their command. 
This has always been considered sound doctrine in the army, 
and yet General Sherman's records show that he constantly 
corresponded directly with General Halleck, on matters inti- 
mately affecting the whole army, without sending the letters 
through his own superiors. Now he writes : " I don't believe 
in a chief-of-staff at all." But up to the 18th of April, 1865, 
he sustained most intimate, cordial, and confidential relations 
with General Halleck as chief-of-staff, and on that date, as 
has been seen, wrote, asking him to influence the President, 
" if possible, not to vary the first terms made with Johnston at 
all." So close were these relations as to suggest the idea that 
his present non-belief in a chief-of-staff dates from a few days 
later, when, in addressing General Grant after his terms had 
been rejected, he wrote: 

"It now becomes my duty to paint in justly severe characters the still more 
offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's dispatch of April 26th 
to the Secretary of War, embodied in his to General Dix of April 27th." 

Out of the circumstances attending the rejection of the 
Johnston-Reagan terms, grew the controversy with the Secre- 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 263 

tary of "War over the relative rights and powers of this officer 
and those of the General of the Army, which subject is dis- 
cussed at some length in the Memoirs. 

Ever since Secretary Stanton's fearless performance of duty 
in connection with the political features of Johnston's surren- 
der, General Sherman has maintained that this officer was a 
mere clerk, and in his last chapter he contends that the Gen- 
eral of the Army should have command of all the heads of 
staff-corps, and that the President and Secretary of War should 
command the army through the general. What he leaves 
to the Secretary of War is thus described : " Of course, the 
Secretary would, as now, distribute the funds according to 
the appropriation bills, and reserve to himself the absolute 
control and supervision of the larger arsenals and depots of 
supply." 

And while he declares that the law or its judicial interpre- 
tation is against the right for which he contends, the removal 
of army headquarters to St. Louis resulted in great degree 
from the fact that when he became general he could not 
bring himself to conform to this law. The history of this 
controversy is pertinent to his present discussion of the organ- 
ization and control of the staff-corps. 

One of his first official acts, when made General of the 
Army, was to issue an order reducing the Secretary of War to 
the position which he had frequently before with great em- 
phasis assigned him, namely, that of a mere clerk. 

The preliminary order to effect this he obtained from the 
President. It was as follows : 

[General Orders No. 11.] 

Headquarters of the Army, ) 
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, March 8, 1869. J 

The following orders of the President of the United States are published 
for the information and government of all concerned : 

War Department, } 
Washington City, March 5, 1869./ 

By direction of the President General William T. Sherman will assume 
command of the Army of the United States. 



264 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

The Chiefs of Staff Corps, Departments, and Bureaus will report to and act 
under the immediate orders of the General commanding the Army. 

All official business, which by law or regulations requires the action of 
the President or the Secretary of War, will be submitted by the General of 
the Army to the Secretary of War ; and, in general, all orders from the Pres- 
ident or Secretary of War to any portion of the army, line, or staff, will be 
transmitted through the General of the Army. 

J. M. Schofieud, Secretary of War. 

By command of the General of the Army. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

General Schofield, who expected to retire in a few days, 
did not care to make issue upon it, and contented himself 
with pointing out that it violated or contravened some 
twenty-six express provisions of statute law, or regulations 
having the force of law. Based upon the above order Gen- 
eral Sherman issued the following: 

[General Orders No. 12.] 

Headquarters op the Army, ) 
Adjutant-Generai/s Office, Washington, March 8, 1869. J 

By direction of the President of the United States, the undersigned hereby 
assumes command of the Army of the United States. His general staff 
will be : 

Brevet Major-General E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General. 

Brevet Major-General P. B. Marcy, Inspector-General. 

Brevet Major-General M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General. 

Brevet Major-General A. B. Eaton, Commissary-General Subsistence. 

Brevet Major-General J. K. Barnes, Surgeon- General. 

Brevet Major-General B. W. Brice, Paymaster-General. 

Brevet Major-General Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate-General. 

Brevet Major-General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers. 

Brevet Major-General A. B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance. 

Brevet Brigadier-General A. J. Myer, Chief Signal Officer. 

His personal staff, Aids-de-Camp with the rank of Colonel from this date, 
will be : 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. McCoy, Second Lieutenant, Second In- 
fantry. 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel L. M. Dayton, Captain, Seventh Cavalry. 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Audenried, Captain, Sixth Cavalry. 

Brevet Brigadier-General C. B. Comstock, Major, Corps of Engineers. 

Brevet Brigadier-General Horace Porter, Major, Ordnance Department. 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 265 

Brevet Brigadier-General F. T. Dent, Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-third 

Infantry. 

II. Generals commanding military departments, in addition to the duties 
heretofore required of them, will give their special atttention to the econom- 
ical administration of all branches of the service within their command, 
whether of the line or staff', and to this end will exercise supervision and 
command of every part of the army within their limits not specially 
excepted. 

III. The military academy, general depots of supply, arsenals of con- 
struction, permanent forts in process of construction or extensive repairs, 
general recruiting depots, and officers employed on duties not military, are 
excepted from the operation of the foregoing paragraph. 

IV. All orders and general instructions to the troops, or to staff" officers 
serving in military departments, must go from the headquarters of the army 
through the Adjutant-General's office, and through the Generals commanding 
the military divisions and departments in which the officers are serving; but 
ordinary correspondence relating to the details of execution may he carried 
on between the parties concerned and the heads of the staff' department or 
corps charged with their execution. -yy. T Sherman, General. 

On the 13th of March General Rawlins assumed the duties 
of Secretary of War, and among his first acts he called the 
attention of the President to the various violations of law in- 
volved in Sherman's order These were too plain to admit 
either of doubt or extended discussion, and the following 
order was issued by direction of the President, revoking those 
printed above: 

[General Orders No. 28.] 

Headquarters of the Armt, ) 
Adjutant-Generai/s Office, Washington, March 27,1869.) 

The following orders, received from the War Department, are published 
for the government of all concerned : 

Washington City, March 26, 
By direction of the President, the order of the Secretary of War, dated War 
Department, March 5, 1869, and published in General Orders No. 11, Head- 
quarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's office, dated March 8, 1869, except 
so much as directs General W. T. Sherman to " assume command of the 
Army of the United States," is hereby rescinded. 

All official business which, by law or regulations, requires the action of the 
President or Secretary of War, will be submitted by the Chiefs of Staff Corps, 
Departments, and Bureaus, to the Secretary of War. 

All orders and instructions relating to military operations, issued by the 



War Department, \ 
3, 1869.] 



266 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

President or Secretary of War, will be issued through the General of the 
Army. John A. Rawlins, Secretary of War. 

By command of General Sherman. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 

The violations of law in General Sherman's Order No. 12, 
can be readily made to appear. The act of July 25, 1866, 
reviving the grade of General, authorized him, "under the 
direction and during the pleasure of the President, to com- 
mand the armies of the United States." The same act author- 
ized him to select "for service upon his staff such number of 
aids, not exceeding six, as he may judge proper," and the act 
of July 28, three days later, provided that " there shall be one 
General * * * * entitled to the same staff officers, 
in number and grade, as now provided by law." The law 
provided only six; Sherman's order assigned sixteen — an 
excess of ten ; and more than this, each of the ten was, by law, 
directly under the Secretary of War. 

But before following this branch of the subject to its 
conclusion, it will be well to present in brief some of the 
decisions upon the relations of the President as commander- 
in-chief under the Constitution, and those of the Secretary of 
War to the army : 

"By the Constitution the President is made Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States. The departments of war and of the 
navy are the channels through which his orders proceed to them respectively, 
and the secretaries of these departments are the organs by which he makes 
his will known to them. The orders issued by those officers are, in the con- 
templation of the law, not their orders, but the orders of the President of the 
United States. — [1 Opinions, 380. 

By the act of August 7, 1789, establishing the War Depart- 
ment, the duties of the Secretary of War are thus defined: 

"There shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Depart- 
ment of War, and there shall be a principal officer therein to be called the 
Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such 
duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the 
President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution relative to mili- 
tary commissions, or to the land or naval forces, ships or warlike stores of the 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 267 

United States, or to such other matters respecting military or naval affairs as 
the President of the United States shall assign to the said department." 

Subsequently, upon the establishment of a Navy Depart- 
ment, the supervision of naval affairs was withdrawn from the 
War Department. 

"The Secretary of War is 'The regularly constituted organ of the Presi- 
dent for the administration of the military establishment of the nation, and 
rules and orders publicly promulgated through him must be received as the 
acts of the Executive, and as such be binding upon all within the sphere of 
his legal and constitutional authority.' — [U. S. vs. Eliason, 16 Peters, 291. 

" The War Department has a staff officer, the Adjutant-General, through 
whom the Secretary, in behalf of the President, that is, the President, .-[teaks 
when he sees fit, in matters pertaining to the army." — [7 Opinions, 473. 

And yet General Sherman, in the first line of his assign- 
ments, boldly invaded the official household of the President, 
his military superior, and ordered the chief staff officer there 
to report to him at the headquarters of the army. This did 
not differ, in any material respect, from what General Sheridan 
or any other general officer would be guilty of in issuing an 
order directing staff officers to report to him, who, by express 
provision of law, had been placed under the General of the 
Army. 

The Quartermaster and Commissary Departments are placed 
by law directly under the Secretary of War, and yet General 
Sherman attached them both to his staff, and assumed that 
they were under his direction. The law regulating their 
duties reads as follows: 

"In addition to their duties in the field, it shall be the duty of the Quarter- 
master-General, his deputies, and assistant deputies, when thereto directed by 
the Secretary of War, to purchase military stores, camp equipage, and other 
articles requisite for the troops, and generally to procure and provide means of 
transport for the army, its stores, artillery, and camp equipage. — [Act March 
28, 1812. 

"Supplies for the army, unless in particular and urgent cases the Secretary 
of War should otherwise direct, shall be purchased by contract, to be made 
by the Commissary-General * under such regulations as 

the Secretary of War may direct." — [April 14, 1818. 



268 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

These officers are also severally directed by law to make 
their reports to the Secretary of War. And none of these 
acts were changed when the grade of General was revived. 

By another section it is made the duty of the Quartermaster- 
General, " under the direction of the Secretary of War/' to 
receive and distribute all clothing and camp and garrison 
equipage, and, " under the direction of the Secretary of War," 
to enforce a system of accountability for the same. 

In the same manner the Surgeon-General by law performs 
his duties under the direction of the Secretary of War, and, 
in short, the whole general staff is, by law, governed by regu- 
lations which the Secretary of War is, by direct statute pro- 
vision, obliged to make. 

By the law creating it, the Bureau of Military Justice was 
"attached to and made a part of the War Department." 

Paragraph 1,063 of Revised Army Regulations, which were 
enacted by Congress into law, reads as follows: 

"The Signal Officer shall have charge, under the direction of the Secretary 
of War, of all signal duty, and of all books, papers, and apparatus connected 
therewith." 

The following extracts from regulations, taken from many 
similar provisions, show clearly that Congress placed the gen- 
eral staff under the Secretary of War, and these regulations 
have been recognized by Congress since the office of General 
was established : 

"Paragraph 1,010. The Chief of such Military Bureau in the War 
Department shall, under the direction of the Secretary of War, regulate, as 
far as practicable, the employment of hired persons required by the adminis- 
trative service of his department. 

" Paragraph 1,013. Chiefs of the Disbursing Department shall, under the 
direction of the Secretary of War, designate where principal contracts shall 
be made, etc." 

Paragraph 1,197 makes the approval of the Secretary of 
War necessary to rules which the Surgeon-General may pre- 
scribe for supplying hospitals. 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 269 

By various paragraphs of regulations the Paymaster-General 
is directed to report to the Adjutant-General, the legal staff 
officer of the Secretary of War. 

" Paragraph 1,360. The Chief Engineer, with the approbation of the Sec- 
retary of War, will regulate and determine the number, quality, form, and 
dimensions of the necessary vehicles, pontoons, tools, etc." 

By paragraphs 1,377, 1,378, 1,379, all the operations of 
the Ordnance Department are placed under the Secretary 
of War. 

The officers of the Engineer Corps are placed under the 
sole direction of the President. 

These various citations are quite sufficient to prove that the 
theory of Congress in all its legislation relating to army 
organization has been, that the President is Commander-in- 
Chief, while the Secretary of War is his representative at the 
head of the army, and his organ of communication with it; 
that the Adjutant-General is the staff officer of the Secretary 
of War, that is, of the President; and that the chiefs of the 
various staff corps form the general staff of the President, and 
are in consequence under the direction of the Secretary of War. 

Thus it will be readily seen that Sherman's order contra- 
vened, or directly violated the laws and regulations which 
have the full force of law, for the government of the army. 
After that order was revoked, and his attention had been thus 
pointedly called to the law, every subsequent protest against 
it was unsoldierly, and in short, insubordination. The same 
conduct in any officer of less rank would not have been 
allowed to go unpunished. If the general of an army con- 
stantly frets over the restraints of the regulations, what 
attention can he rightfully expect to be paid them by the 
army at large? 

Although at the time his order was revoked, he was 
made fully acquainted with the law, a few months later he 
was found not only violating it, but reporting and defending 
his disregard both of orders and the law. The facts upon 



270 SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 

which this statement is based will be found in his annual 
report for 1869. 

General Rawlins died September 6, following the issuing 
of General Order, No. 28, given above. General Sherman 
was assigned temporarily to the desk of the Secretary of 
War. The following paragraph of the President's order, as 
given above, was still in force : 

'By direction of the President, * * * * all official business 
which, by law or regulations, requires the action of the President or the Sec- 
retary of War, will be submitted by the Chiefs of Staff Corps, Departments, 
and Bureaus to the Secretary of War." 

No order revoking this had been issued by the President. 
General Sherman was also aware that this order had been 
framed solely to control his official acts. It was not an order 
that he would for a moment forget. And yet, while speaking 
in his annual report of these same Chiefs of Staff Corps, Depart- 
ments, and Bureaus, General Sherman said: 

"The heads of these departments reside in Washington, and submit 
annually a written report of their operations for the past year. It so hap- 
pened that I was Secretary of War during the month of October, when by 
law these reports were made in order to reach the Public Printer by the first 
of November, and I required all the annual reports to be addressed, like all 
other military reports, to the Adjutant-General for the perusal of the General 
of the Army, who could make use, of such information as they contained, 
and then lay them before the Secretary of War. This is, in my judgment, the 
course that should always be pursued — though a different one has heretofore 
prevailed — for otherwise we would have the absurdity of a general com- 
manding an army with his chief staff officer reporting to somebody else." 

A little further on in the same paper he called attention to 
a report made by the Military Committee of the House, upon 
which, however, the House had taken no action, much less 
Congress, in which the Committee expressed the opinion that 
the staff corps should be as directly under the control of the 
general and the department commanders as the officers of the 
line. He then added : " I heartily concur in these views, and, 
go far as my authority goes, will carry them out." And this 



SNEERS AT THE STAFF. 271 

in a formal report, after lie had been expressly ordered by the 
President not to carry out these identical views. 

Throughout this controversy of General Sherman's own 
raising and pressing, there was no attempt by the AVar Depart- 
ment to assume unlawful authority over the General of the 
Army, nor had there been any other limitations placed upon 
his power than the law imposes. The case was simply this : 
The Secretary of War had been guided by the law as it exists. 
General Sherman had constantly protested against the law in 
the case, and, so far as he could, ignored it. The whole trouble 
on his side was this: He had not been regarded as Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and had not been allowed to command the 
army as such. Instead of exercising his authority under the 
law and in accordance with the terms of his commission — 
that is, "under the direction and during the pleasure of the 
President, to command the armies of the United States" — he 
insisted upon being allowed to exercise that authority as if 
both law and commission read, "under the direction and 
according to the pleasure of "W. T. Sherman." 



CHAPTER XX. 

CONCLUSION — THE CASE AGAINST THE MEMOIES SUMMED UP. 

In closing this review, based throughout upon facts dis- 
closed by the official files, the case against the author of the 
Memoirs may be summed up as follows: 

Ten years after the close of the war, when the open, and all 
the secret official records, collected and arranged for ready 
reference, were at his service, he has published to the world a 
story of his campaigns, crowded with inaccuracies, and stained 
with injustice done associate commanders and cooperating 
armies. 

The kindly years which, for most who followed the flag, 
have effaced whatever jealousies and misunderstandings arose 
in the field, leaving prominent in memory only the central 
and enduring fact of common service in a worthy cause, seem 
to have exerted no such influence upon him, but rather acted 
as mordants to fix all unpleasant things indelibly upon his 
pages. By following the statements of his book, and com- 
paring them with the records of the same events, made at the 
time of their occurrence, and often by his own hand, many 
grave differences have been established. 

Where the Memoirs give the credit of the move on Forts 
Henry and Donelson to Halleek, the records show that it 
belongs to Grant. AVhere General Sherman argues against 
the idea of a surprise at Shiloh, the records prove it to have 
been complete, and due mainly to his own blindness and 
neglect. Where he seeks to detract from the service rendered 
there by Buell and his army, the records set that service in 
(272) 



CONCLUSION. 273 

clear light. While he intimates that Rosecrans acted dis- 
creditably at Iuka and Corinth, and that Grant was deeply 
offended over some failure or blunder not clearly defined, the 
reports of the latter are found to commend Rosecrans strongly 
for these brilliant battles. Where he now visits severe cen- 
sure, in connection with his failure at Chickasaw Bayou, his 
own report of the action, written at the time, commends the 
very officers, thus unjustly arraigned, for having done the 
heaviest fighting, and accomplished all that was possible. 
Where he assails General Sooy Smith for causing the partial 
failure of his Meridian expedition, his own orders, then issued, 
claimed complete success; and while he now declares he never 
had any intention of going to Mobile, the letters of General 
Grant (who ordered his movement) to Halleck and Thomas, 
informed these officers that in certain contingencies Sherman 
was to push for Mobile. He describes Rosecrans' flanking 
movement to capture Chattanooga as a march from that city 
to attack the enemy; and the battle which secured this strong- 
hold, as a defeat before it, and its occupation after the battle 
as a retreat into it. He describes the terrible condition of 
affairs in Chattanooga, following the battle of Chickamauga, 
and seeks to create the impression that Rosecrans alone was in 
fault, when the records show that Burnside failed him on one 
flank and Sherman on the other — this too after the pressing 
necessities of the case had been repeatedly represented to them 
both — and that finally Burnside never came, and Sherman 
himself was seven weeks behind the time set for his arrival at 
Chattanooga, exhibiting no special activity in his advance 
until after Rosecrans was removed, when suddenly, under 
Grant's request to come on, the energy of his movement sur- 
passed praise. While he states that Grant was afraid the 
Army of the Cumberland cotdd not be drawn out of its 
trenches to attack Bragg, and wanted Sherman's men to come 
up and coax them into fighting by the power of their example, 
the records show that Grant had confidence enough in 
Thomas' army to. order it — before Sherman was within sup- 
18 



274 CONCLUSION. 

porting distance even — to do what the latter afterward failed 
to perform; and further, that when General Thomas insisted 
upon giving orders for an attack without waiting for Sherman, 
who was still delayed with the greater part of his troops, 
Grant assented, and Thomas actually accomplished that part 
of the battle assigned for the first day, before Sherman arrived ; 
and lastly, that the Army of the Cumberland stormed and 
carried the whole line of Missionary Ridge hours before 
Sherman even received the news of the great success, he 
alone, of the three army commanders, having failed, though 
after splendid fighting, to carry the point assigned to him. 
While he contends that the failure to bring Johnston to bat- 
tle at Resaca, was due to the timidity of General McPherson, 
the records show that this officer acted exactly in accord- 
ance with Sherman's own orders; and while the latter claims 
that from the outset of the movement, it was his intention 
merely to feign through Buzzard Roost on Dalton, and press 
the bulk of the army through Snake Creek Gap on Johnston's 
rear, the records show that for three days he " assaulted 
precipices " in front of Dalton, with Thomas' and Schofield's 
armies, before he allowed McPherson to make more than a 
diverson on Johnston's rear, so that the latter, being warned 
in time, withdrew safely. At Kenesaw he assaulted impreg- 
nable works to teach his veterans that flanking was not the 
only means of attacking an enemy, and failed at a cost of two 
thousand men, claiming now that Thomas, McPherson, and 
Schofield agreed with him that the assault was necessary, when 
the records clearly reveal Thomas' stern dissatisfaction, and a 
bold extension to the right by Schofield, which plainly indicates 
that the latter looked for success in the direction from which it 
finally came, through their old and sure method of flanking. 
He describes the battle before Atlanta, where McPherson 
fell, in such a manner that no reader would dream of its being 
a great surprise, and well nigh serious disaster; but the 
records disclose an army, plunged by the flank against an 
enemy in position behind heavy works, on the supposition 



CONCLUSION. 275 

that Atlanta was evacuated, suddenly and unexpectedly at- 
tacked by the enemy upon its left and rear, before it had 
ceased to exult over the announcement from Sherman that the 
enemy had abandoned Atlanta, and his order for a vigorous 
pursuit. While he claims that he originated the March to the 
Sea, and had it in his "mind's eye" by the 21st of September, 
the records prove that Grant had planned the campaign through 
to Mobile in the previous January, notified Halleck of it on 
the loth of that month, Thomas on the 19th, and that in 
February Thomas was arranging the details of the move as 
far as Atlanta. The records show further, that on the 10th 
of September Grant suggested a move from Atlanta on 
Augusta or Savannah, instead of Mobile, since the control of 
the latter had passed into the hands of the Union forces. 

Concerning Savannah, the records reveal an escape of Hardee 
with ten thousand, from Sherman's sixty thousand, without 
disclosing even a plausible excuse. Here the Memoirs show 
Sherman looking back to Nashville, from whence alone, 
through defeat of Hood, could come a success that should 
vindicate his March to the Sea, and finding fault with Thomas, 
who, though crippled in all ways by Sherman, was through 
superhuman efforts there, saving him from the jeers of the 
Nation. 

In treating of Savannah, he also attacks Mr. Stanton for 
carelessness in connection with the captured cotton, and 
transactions relating thereto, while the records show not only 
that he had absolutely no foundation for his charges, but that 
in most respects the exact opposite of what he wrote was true. 
After a magnificent and really wonderful inarch through the 
Carolinas, with every warning, as the Memoirs relate, that the 
enemy was rapidly concentrating in his front, the records show 
that he neglected all precautions, and marched the two wings 
of his army, neither moving in close order, so far apart that 
when the head of the left wing was attacked at 10 o'clock one 
forenoon, by the whole rebel army, estimated by himself to 
have been from thirty-seven to forty thousand, the advance 



276 CONCLUSION. 

of his right wing, marching to the sound of battle, to support 
the left, did not arrive till the next morning, while the bulk 
of this wing did not reach the field till the following after- 
noon ; and then, when his whole force was in front of and on 
the flank of the enemy, the latter escaped. Such is the record 
history of Bentonville, the last battle of his army. 

What shall be said of the political negotiations which 
followed ? What need be said further than the records 
show, that, beginning with a proposition to receive the sur- 
render of Johnston's forces upon the same terms Grant had 
extended to Lee, he ended by surrendering to Johnston upon 
terms drawn up by a member of the rebel Cabinet? 






